On the morning of February 8, 2016, in a budget committee meeting room of the Japanese Diet, an opposition lawmaker took the microphone. He asked Takaichi Sanae, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications: "If a television station repeatedly broadcasts content opposing the amendment of Article 9 of the Constitution, is it possible to issue a suspension of broadcasting operations?"

There was a brief silence. Takaichi rose from her seat and answered slowly.

"In cases where a broadcaster repeatedly violates political impartiality and shows no improvement even after administrative guidance, I cannot promise that we would take no action at all."

The moment those words were spoken, several people in the room exchanged glances. They intuitively grasped the ripple effects this statement would create.

The following morning, every major newspaper in Japan featured the remark on its front page. The Japan Federation of Commercial Broadcasting Workers' Unions (Minpo Roren) issued a statement of protest. The Tokyo Bar Association published its own statement. The Communist Party criticized it as an "expression of an authoritarian temperament." In a public opinion poll, 67.4 percent of respondents replied that the remark "threatened or somewhat threatened" the freedom of the press.

Takaichi did not back down an inch. She maintained that she was simply explaining a legal interpretation. Article 4 of the Broadcasting Act stipulates the duties that broadcasters must uphold, and Article 174 outlines the suspension of broadcasting operations as a penalty for violations. Her position was that since she had been asked how those provisions apply in reality, she answered based on the letter of the law.

However, that was not the true heart of the debate.

Article 4 of the Broadcasting Act was enacted in 1950. Its content consists of four points: not to harm public order or good customs; to be politically impartial; not to distort the facts; and to clarify various perspectives on issues where opinions are divided.

On the surface, these provisions seem obvious. However, the legal interpretation surrounding this article has been a subject of debate for over 70 years.

The majority view among constitutional scholars and media law experts is that the political impartiality regulation in Article 4 is a code of ethics that broadcasters should observe voluntarily. It is not intended to be a basis for the government to judge violations and issue administrative sanctions such as suspending broadcasts. If interpreted that way, it becomes a tool for the government to censor broadcasting content.

A competing interpretation exists. Broadcasters, who use public airwaves, are different from general magazines or newspapers. Airwaves require a license, and the government is the one that manages those licenses. Suspending or revoking a license when the duties accompanying it are not fulfilled is a basic principle of administration.

The line between these two interpretations is not clear. There is no judicial precedent; the judiciary has never made a final ruling.

What Takaichi did was publicly declare an interpretation favorable to the government in this gray zone. The words "suspension of broadcasting operations is possible" coming from the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications have no legal force, but they have a practical effect. When broadcasters hear those words, their thoughts are simple: Can this minister really do that, and can we afford to take that risk?

It was after this that the term "Takaichi Phobia (高市恐怖症)" emerged within the broadcasting industry.

Journalists and producers on the front lines of Japanese broadcasting use this term. It refers to the phenomenon of self-restraint—refraining from reporting that might offend Minister Takaichi, even without official instructions. This is the phobia. It is not irrational like a medical diagnosis; it is a self-limitation born of rational calculation.

During the year 2016, three prominent Japanese television news anchors stepped down almost simultaneously. Shimada Toshiaki of NHK, Koga Shigeaki of TV Asahi, and Kishii Shigeaki of TBS each left their positions. All of them were figures known for their critical tone toward the government.

Was it a coincidence? The broadcasters each offered their own reasons: contract expiration, viewership ratings, or personal choice. However, media organizations and researchers expressed suspicion regarding the simultaneous disappearance of critical journalists. It happened not long after the remarks about the Broadcasting Act.

Whether this was a matter of cause-and-effect or mere correlation cannot be proven. Self-censorship is invisible. Reports that were never made, commentaries deleted during the editing process, and special features that were never planned in the first place leave no records.

However, the World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) does leave a record.

In 2016, Japan's ranking plummeted to 72nd. It was an 11-place drop from 61st the previous year. In its report, RSF wrote that "political pressure, corporate interests, and gender inequality often prevent journalists from fully exercising their role as a watchdog." It pointed out that the government and corporations "routinely exert pressure" on the management of mainstream media outlets, which leads to "strong self-censorship on sensitive subjects."

In 2024, Japan ranked 70th, and in 2025, it reached 66th. While the rank rose slightly, its position as the lowest among the G7 nations remained unchanged. Among the G7, the United States (55th), France (21st), Germany (10th), the United Kingdom (24th), Canada (19th), and Italy (46th) were all ahead.

In a group of advanced nations that profess democracy, Japan alone lags behind in press freedom. Why?

NHK is Japan's public broadcaster. Although it is funded by license fees, the members of its Board of Governors are appointed by the Cabinet. This structure creates questions about its independence. It is difficult for any country's public broadcaster to be completely free from government influence. However, in Japan's case, many point out that the relationship is exceptionally close.

The situation for commercial broadcasters is different. Why do private broadcasting companies, which operate on advertising, worry about the government? The reason lies in their permits. To operate a broadcasting station, a permit for airwave usage is required, and that permit must be renewed every five years. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is the body that decides on these renewals. When the Minister said "suspension of broadcasting operations is possible," what the management of these companies likely thought of was permit renewal.

This structure is not unique to Japan. Many countries operate a broadcasting permit system. However, differences arise in the transparency of the renewal process, the existence of independent review bodies, and the strength of legal mechanisms to prevent political interference.

A comparison with South Korea is interesting. In Korea, too, the relationship between the Broadcasting Act and the media is a hot political topic. The independence of the Korea Communications Commission, the composition of the boards of public broadcasters, and pressure regarding reporting critical of the government are issues that recur. Regardless of which government is in power, the temptation to control broadcasting exists. The strength of the institutional safeguards against that temptation determines the quality of democracy.

Both Japan and Korea are places where this question must continue to be asked.

In October 2025, Takaichi Sanae was inaugurated as Prime Minister.

The term "Takaichi Phobia" once again circulated in the broadcasting industry. The person who had made those remarks as Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications nine years ago was now Prime Minister. This was a position with far greater power—the position that appoints the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications and can influence overall broadcasting policy.

Since her inauguration, no direct pressure on broadcasters has been reported in official records. There have been no instances of executing or hinting at broadcast suspension orders. Prime Minister Takaichi held press conferences, and each broadcaster covered them. On the surface, things appeared normal.

However, deterrence works differently. Just as nuclear weapons exert strategic influence through nuclear deterrence even when they are not used, the possibility of broadcast suspension influences the behavior of broadcasters even when the measure is not actually employed. A wielder of power who once said it was "possible" had now reached the apex of that power.

Reporters Without Borders closely monitored the Japanese media environment after the launch of the Takaichi Cabinet. Time will tell what changes Japan will show in the Press Freedom Index.

Regarding the relationship between broadcasting and power, democratic theory has established clear principles.

The media must be a watchdog of power. It is the function of the press to inform the public when the government commits a wrongdoing. Two conditions are necessary for this function to operate. First, the media must be independent of power. Second, that independence must be institutionally guaranteed.

It is difficult for broadcasting to satisfy both conditions simultaneously. This is due to the structural characteristic of requiring government permits to use airwaves. Print or internet media can be operated without such permits. Broadcasting alone possesses this inherent dependency.

Efforts to minimize this dependency have been made in countries with advanced press freedom. These institutional mechanisms include creating independent regulatory bodies to separate permit decisions from the executive branch, clearly legislating the conditions for permit renewals, and focusing on structural regulation rather than content regulation.

Do these mechanisms function sufficiently in Japan? Takaichi's 2016 remarks brought that question back to the surface. And in 2025, when the person who made those remarks became Prime Minister, the question became even more acute.

This issue will not be unfamiliar to Korean readers. In Korea, controversies over media capture, conflicts regarding the composition of public broadcasting boards, and the politicization of appointing heads of media outlets are repeated. Every time the administration changes, a battle breaks out over the governance of broadcasting.

This battle does not stem merely from a hunger for power. The influence that broadcasting has on elections and public opinion creates a motive for the powerful to control it. In turn, broadcasters become mindful of that power. it is a vicious cycle.

There are two ways to break this cycle: changing the system or resisting. Changing the system is achieved through legislation, while resistance comes from the professional courage of journalists.

Have both worked sufficiently in Japan? There were certainly bar associations that issued protest statements against Takaichi's 2016 remarks and journalists who raised their voices in resistance. However, the system did not change.

One of the tests facing Takaichi Sanae as Prime Minister is precisely this: How will she define the relationship with broadcasting while her remarks from nine years ago follow her like a shadow? To argue that those remarks were a legal explanation rather than a threat, it is not enough to simply refrain from exercising that authority. The true proof lies in creating an environment where broadcasters can report without fear.

Whether that proof will be provided remains to be seen. For now, it is time to reserve judgment. However, there were those remarks in 2016, and there is analysis that they created a chilling effect on the broadcasting field. And the person who made those remarks has become Prime Minister. History will record what the connection between these facts means.

References

- Tokyo Bar Association Protest Statement (2016): https://www.toben.or.jp/message/seimei/post-425.html - Minpo Roren Protest Statement: https://www.minpororen.jp/?p=293 - RSF Japan Press Freedom Report: https://rsf.org/en/country/japan - Japan Times — Japan's G7-lowest press freedom ranking (2025): https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/05/03/japan/japan-press-freedom-ranking/ - East Asia Forum — Japanese Media Freedom and Politics: https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/07/16/politics-puppeteers-japans-press-freedom/