November 15, 1955. A hotel conference room in Tokyo. The merger negotiations between the Liberal Party of Japan and the Japan Democratic Party were finalized. The two conservative parties became one. The name was the Liberal Democratic Party (自由民主党), abbreviated as the LDP.

The reason for the merger was clear: to stop the Japan Socialist Party. At the time, the Socialist Party was gaining support and aiming for a change of government. A sense of crisis—that a divided conservative front would lose to the Socialists—bound the two parties together.

The LDP, born from that union, has dominated for approximately 70 years. Although they were briefly pushed into the opposition twice, in 1993 and 2009, they soon returned to power. Among democratic nations worldwide, cases of a single party holding power for this long are rare.

Why on earth is this the case?

The first reason is the electoral system.

The election for the Japanese House of Representatives (the lower house) uses a system that combines single-seat constituencies and proportional representation. One member is elected from each of the 289 single-seat constituencies, and 176 additional members are elected from 11 proportional representation blocks. There are 465 seats in total.

The single-seat constituency system has a specific characteristic: in a winner-takes-all format where only the top candidate is elected, parties with organizational strength and funding have an overwhelming advantage. Over 70 years, the LDP has built an organizational network across the country. It has maintained close relationships with local agricultural cooperatives (JA), construction companies, and chambers of commerce. This network translates into votes in single-seat constituencies. According to an analysis by Akahata, the organ of the Japanese Communist Party, it was not uncommon for the LDP to secure more than 80% of single-seat constituency seats while receiving only around 50% of the total vote. This is the magic of the system.

While proportional representation favors minority parties, it is not bad for the LDP when the opposition parties are divided. If the opposition vote is split, the LDP's share of the proportional vote remains relatively high.

The second reason is the fragmentation of the opposition.

Japan lacks a strong two-party system like those in South Korea or the United States. The opposition is divided into several parties. The Constitutional Democratic Party, Nippon Ishin no Kai, the Democratic Party for the People, the Communist Party, and Reiwa Shinsengumi compete with their own respective platforms. To borrow an expression from one political commentator, if the ruling party is structured to coalesce as "those on the leader's side," the opposition is merely a collection of "those who are not on the leader's side." It is as if things that are "not apples" are scattered as persimmons, grapes, and bananas.

If the opposition cooperates, they can defeat the LDP. In fact, when the Democratic Party of Japan took power in 2009, it was possible because the opposition had coalesced. However, after that administration collapsed in just three years and the LDP returned, the opposition fragmented once again. The memory of that failure has made opposition unity even more difficult.

The LDP has maintained a long-standing cooperative relationship with its coalition partner, Komeito. Komeito's organizational support bolsters LDP candidates in single-seat constituencies. This coalition is one of the factors that enhances the stability of LDP dominance.

The third reason is the LDP's own adaptability.

The reason a single party could remain in power for 70 years is not because it stayed the same. Rather, it is because it changed. The LDP does not fix its platform. It adjusts its policies according to the demands of the voters. During the Koizumi era, it implemented neoliberal reforms. During the Abe era, it shifted toward aggressive fiscal spending. When necessary, it has even adopted welfare policies advocated by socialist parties. This flexibility has made the LDP a party that a wide range of voter groups can support.

The faction system also contributed to this adaptability. Multiple factions within the LDP allowed various positions to compete internally. While this might look chaotic from the outside, it functioned internally to absorb diverse interests. The LDP operated like a single, large coalition party.

However, in 2024, this faction system faced a decisive crisis.

A scandal erupted involving political fund party tickets (政治資金パーティー券), a long-standing practice in Japanese politics. Various LDP factions held political fund-raising parties and allocated ticket quotas to their member lawmakers. Lawmakers who sold more than their quota pocketed the excess revenue instead of returning it to the faction, and failed to record that money in their political fund balance reports.

The scale of the incident was massive. In the case of the Abe faction (Seiwa Policy Research Council), it was revealed that approximately 600 million yen in illegal kickbacks had occurred over the five years from 2018 to 2022. Across all five LDP factions, the amount that the LDP itself disclosed as unrecorded reached approximately 570 million yen. This was the "Uragane" (裏金, slush fund) scandal.

This was first reported in November 2022 by Shimbun Akahata (しんぶん赤旗), the organ of the Japanese Communist Party. Major media outlets like NHK and the Yomiuri Shimbun subsequently followed suit, and prosecutors launched an investigation. From late 2023 through early 2024, a series of LDP lawmakers were indicted. The term "Uragane Lawmaker" flooded the Japanese media.

Prime Minister Kishida's approval ratings plummeted. Between January and April 2024, the LDP dissolved the Kishida, Abe, and Nikai factions in succession. The Seiwa Policy Research Council, which had been the core of LDP factional politics for 70 years, closed its doors. Factions were the blood vessels of the LDP; those vessels were severed all at once.

This scandal led directly to a decrease in LDP seats in the October 2024 House of Representatives election. The LDP-Komeito coalition lost its majority. Kishida stepped down. In the subsequent leadership election, Ishiba Shigeru was elected president, but the Ishiba Cabinet also failed to recover approval ratings. The LDP's crisis continued.

In that context, in September 2025, Takaichi Sanae rose to the presidency. It was the first leadership election held since the dissolution of the factions. Her image of being uninvolved in the scandal and her clear conservative platform drew support from party members. Taking office as Prime Minister in October, she dissolved the House of Representatives and held a general election in February 2026.

The result was a landslide victory. The LDP won 316 seats on its own. Combined with its coalition partner, Nippon Ishin no Kai, the total reached 352 seats—the largest number of seats in the post-war era. The LDP, which many thought had withered away due to the scandal, achieved its greatest landslide ever under Takaichi's banner.

How should we interpret this?

One interpretation is this: despite the scandal, Japanese voters ultimately chose the LDP because the opposition failed to become a viable alternative. Even if they disliked the LDP, voters disliked or distrusted the opposition more. This is passive support. Voters did not choose the LDP out of love, but because they felt there was no other choice.

There is another interpretation. A figure like Takaichi breathed new vitality into the LDP. The departure of the scandal's main protagonists and the entry of a new leader were perceived by voters as a signal of reform. The symbolism of being the first female prime minister also contributed to creating an image of a fresh start.

Both interpretations are likely partially correct. Whether the LDP's landslide demonstrates the health of democracy or the failure of opposition politics is a matter of perspective.

To South Korean readers, this situation may feel both familiar and strange.

South Korea does not have a long-term ruling party like the LDP. Power alternates between conservatives and progressives. Changes of government occur relatively frequently and sometimes in dramatic ways. The drama of presidential impeachment repeats itself.

Which is the better democracy? There is no simple answer.

The advantage of long-term rule is policy continuity. During the LDP's reign, the Japanese bureaucratic system operated stably, and long-term industrial policies were maintained. There was no major wavering in the U.S. alliance, trade policy, or diplomatic direction. Businesses could predict the policy environment. Long-term projects like semiconductor development, the automotive industry, and the electronics industry continued regardless of political shifts.

The disadvantages of long-term rule are also clear: the corruption of power. The political fund scandal is one example. Oversight functions weaken. If the opposition is not a substantial competitor, the ruling party operates the government in whatever way is convenient for itself. Collusion develops between politicians, bureaucrats, and the business world. This structure, known as the "Iron Triangle," has persisted in Japan for decades.

A bigger problem is political complacency (無事安逸). The stability of knowing they will win the election anyway weakens the incentive for innovation. There is a tendency to maintain the status quo even when problems exist without resolving them. It is not unrelated to the fact that structural issues like the low birth rate, economic stagnation, and fiscal deficits have been neglected for decades.

On the other hand, when changes of government are frequent like in Korea, it is difficult to maintain long-term policies. New administrations repeatedly overturn the policies of their predecessors. However, the option of replacement works when power becomes corrupt. This is why presidential impeachment is possible.

Rather than concluding which side is better, the realistic task for both countries is to consider how to make democracy work better within their own respective political structures.

Following the 2024 scandal, discussions on political reform arose in Japan. Revisions to the Political Funds Control Act were made in June 2024. These included strengthening lawmaker responsibility, expanding information disclosure, and mandating the reporting of revenue from factional parties. However, critics argued that this was insufficient. They pointed out that loopholes in the law remained. In particular, the insufficient obligation to disclose how political funds are spent remained a problem.

What is true reform? Is it a change in the electoral system? The establishment of an independent anti-corruption agency? Stronger media oversight? Stronger participation by civil society?

There is no single answer. Democracy is a combination of system and culture. Systems alone are insufficient, and culture cannot operate without them. Both must develop together.

The fact that Japanese democracy has functioned to some extent even under LDP one-party rule is partly due to Japan's culture of the rule of law and the expertise of its bureaucratic system. Even if the LDP dominates, the courts rule independently, and bureaucrats maintain their own expertise. It is not perfect, but it is not a total dictatorship either.

Will the Takaichi administration maintain this balance or shake it? Will the confidence given by the massive number of 316 seats lead to an abuse of power? This is the core question facing Japanese democracy today.

The structure of one-party rule may not be inherently good or bad in itself. The issue is how it is managed within that structure. The fact that the LDP has governed for 70 years was the choice of Japanese voters. One cannot say from the outside that that choice was bad. Voters judged that this party was better than the alternatives. That judgment must be respected.

However, choice comes with responsibility. The choice of the LDP must be evaluated by the LDP's performance. Is the economy working well? Is society stable? Is the lives of the people improving? Is the party that caused the scandal truly reflecting and changing? These must be the criteria for continuous judgment.

And for voters to be able to make better choices, the opposition must be stronger. The opposition must become a true alternative. The power to change one-party rule does not come from the outside, but when a stronger competitor appears.

Will the day come when this old homework of Japanese politics is solved? While the Takaichi era may not provide the answer, it is certainly making the question more acute. The massive number of 316 seats makes the question even heavier. Unchecked power has repeatedly made the same mistakes throughout history. It remains to be seen whether the Japanese LDP can avoid this lesson of history.

References

- History of the LDP (Wikipedia Japanese): https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%87%AA%E7%94%B1%E6%B0%91%E4%B8%BB%E5%85%9A - The LDP Political Fund Party Ticket Uragane Issue (Wikipedia): https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB%E8%B3%87%E9%87%91%E3%83%91%E3%83%BC%E3%83%86%E3%82%A3%E3%83%BC%E5%8F%8E%E5%85%A5%E3%81%AE%E8%A3%8F%E9%87%91%E5%95%8F%E9%A1%8C - List of Uragane Lawmakers (Jiji Press): https://www.jiji.com/jc/v8?id=202410uragane-team - Single-seat Constituency System and the LDP's Excessive Seats (Akahata): https://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik25/2026-02-12/2026021202_01_0.php - LDP Landslide in the 2026 General Election (nippon.com): https://www.nippon.com/ja/japan-data/h02703/ - Parallel Election System of Single-seat Constituencies and Proportional Representation (Wikipedia): https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%B0%8F%E9%81%B8%E6%8C%99%E5%8C%BA%E6%AF%94%E4%BE%8B%E4%BB%A3%E8%A1%A8%E4%B8%A6%E7%AB%8B%E5%88%B6