AI Library
The Double Structure of Digital Sovereignty
Europe’s Departure from Palantir and the Chains of American Big Tech
Kim Kyung-jin, Attorney at Law
This is a record of 2026, when European intelligence agencies and defense ministries began removing analytics tools from America’s Palantir. It covers the replacement decisions made by France’s General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI), Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), and the Netherlands Ministry of Defense; the incident in which US export controls severed an ally’s ac…
New English Edition
Artificial Intelligence in Horticulture
Kim Kyung-jin, Attorney at Law
Across five chapters and ten sections, this book examines computer vision for crop diagnosis, harvesting robots and autonomous field systems, smart greenhouses and digital twins, precision irrigation and supply-chain quality control, high-throughput phenotyping, and predictive breeding.
New English Edition
Artificial Intelligence in Food Crop Agriculture
Kim Kyung-jin, Attorney at Law
Across six chapters and eighteen sections, the book examines digital agricultural infrastructure, remote sensing, crop diagnosis, yield forecasting, precision irrigation, genomics, molecular breeding, agricultural robotics, climate-smart agriculture, and global food security.
New English Edition
The Future of Forestry and Agroforestry
Kim Kyung-jin, Attorney at Law
Driven by Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation
Across five chapters and fifteen sections, the book follows satellites, drones, LiDAR, digital twins, forest-specific language models, wildfire and pest forecasting, forestry robotics, agroforestry, timber traceability, and forest carbon markets.
New English Edition
Smart Livestock Farming: AI Enters the Barn
Kim Kyung-jin, Attorney at Law
Sensors listen, cameras watch, and artificial intelligence helps farmers decide.
Across five chapters and fifteen sections, the book follows precision livestock farming from animal health and reproduction to robotic milking, virtual fencing, digital twins, methane reduction, welfare, and data ownership.
Table of Contents
Han Dong-hoon, Busan Buk-gu Gap: A Record of the 100 Days Before and After the Election (Mar. 26-Jul. 3, 2026)
Kim Kyung-jin
Table of Contents and 13 sections
From March 26 to July 3, 2026, this record follows the spring after expulsion, the Busan Buk-gu Gap by-election, victory as an independent, and the first bill submitted in the National Assembly.
Table of Contents
Artificial Intelligence and Medicine
Kim Kyung-jin, Attorney at Law
AI in clinical care, hospitals, education, and research
AI in medical imaging, risk prediction, treatment planning, hospital operations, education, and research, with patient safety, privacy, and accountability.
[AI Library] Chapter 4: Peace Within Grasp
The 2026 U.S.-Iran War and the Global Energy Crisis
Chapter 4: Peace Within Grasp
Kim Kyung-jin
The 2026 U.S.-Iran War and the Global Energy Crisis
Chapter 4: Peace Within Grasp
4.1 Oman's Mediation and the Third Geneva Negotiations
On Friday, February 27, 2026, Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi, Oman's foreign minister, appeared on CBS News' "Face the Nation" in Washington, D.C. His expression before the camera was bright. He came to convey the results of the U.S.-Iran third round of indirect nuclear negotiations that had concluded in Geneva the day before. Moderator Margaret Brennan asked him: President Trump had said he was dissatisfied with the outcome of the negotiations,was diplomacy failing? Al-Busaidi answered: "A peace agreement is within reach."
But behind those words lay a long diplomatic journey.
U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations began on April 12, 2025. The trigger was President Trump sending a letter to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The first high-level meeting was held in Muscat, the capital of Oman, with Middle East envoy Steve Wittkoff representing the United States and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi representing Iran. The two sides did not sit in the same room. It was shuttle diplomacy, with Oman's foreign minister carrying messages back and forth through the corridors. After the first round, both sides assessed it as "constructive."
A second round in Rome, Italy, was followed by a third technical round in Muscat. But even after Trump's 60-day deadline passed, no agreement emerged. On June 12, 2025, Israel attacked Iran. The United States also took part in strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. It was twelve days of war. In this air campaign, called "Operation Midnight Hammer," major Iranian nuclear sites were destroyed and the negotiating table shattered. Throughout the second half of 2025, there was no direct communication between the United States and Iran.
The turning point came from within Iran. At the end of December 2025, protests driven by economic distress spread nationwide. It was the worst level since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In January 2026, Iranian security forces violently suppressed tens of thousands of protesters. Trump encouraged the Iranian people to continue protesting while hinting at the possibility of military action. U.S. military forces began concentrating in the Middle East. It was the largest deployment since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln Strike Group was positioned near Iranian waters.
In the midst of this pressure, an unexpected diplomatic move appeared. Regional countries including Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia pressed both the United States and Iran to resume talks. Originally, a framework was discussed in which Turkey would provide the venue and regional countries would participate as observers, but Iran rejected this. Iran did not want to give Turkey mediation leverage or be exposed to additional demands from other regional countries. Instead, Iran chose Oman.
On February 6, 2026, in Muscat, indirect talks between the United States and Iran resumed. This time, the composition of the U.S. delegation had changed. Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner joined Wittkoff. And for the first time, Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), appeared at the negotiating table in full dress uniform. It was a silent message that an aircraft carrier was waiting in the Arabian Sea. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi drove home a point in public remarks: "Nuclear negotiations and the resolution of key issues must take place in a calm atmosphere without threats and pressure."
On February 17, the second round was held in Geneva. The location was the residence of Oman's ambassador in Cologny. It proceeded in an indirect format, with messages exchanged over approximately two and a half hours. After the talks, both sides left without an official statement. There were two key issues: the level of uranium enrichment and the question of transferring stockpiles of highly enriched uranium abroad.
U.S. demands were clear. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio laid them out: complete dismantling of Iran's nuclear program, discussion of the ballistic missile program, cessation of support for regional proxy forces, and improved treatment of its own citizens. Rubio said: "I am not confident we can reach agreement with these people, but we will try."
Iran's position was on a different plane. Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran's National Security Council, drew a clear line that Tehran would only negotiate on nuclear issues. This meant that ballistic missile programs and regional influence could not be put on the table. Iran asserted its right to a peaceful nuclear program under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and maintained that missile capability was central to national defense.
On February 26, the third round in Geneva. This would be the last conversation before war.
In the morning session, the two sides exchanged messages for three hours under Oman's mediation. Foreign Minister al-Busaidi posted on social media that "creative and positive ideas are being exchanged." The talks stalled temporarily when the U.S. side demanded zero uranium enrichment. A break ensued while Wittkoff and Kushner met separately with the Ukrainian delegation, and talks resumed in the afternoon.
At this point, Iran made a forward-looking proposal. According to the New York Times, the substance of the proposal conveyed by four Iranian officials was as follows: suspension of nuclear activities and uranium enrichment for three to five years. After that, joining a regional nuclear consortium and maintaining only low enrichment at the 1.5 percent level for medical research purposes. The existing stockpile of highly enriched uranium (460 kilograms at 60 percent purity) would be diluted in stages. Monitoring access for IAEA inspectors would be permitted. Compared to Iran's previous declaration that overseas transfer of highly enriched uranium was a "red line," it was a significant concession.
Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi appeared on Iran's state-run Press TV and said: "We were able to identify and discuss the key elements of a potential agreement. There are certainly differences, but in most cases, we have at least reached a general understanding of how to resolve the issues." The two sides agreed to hold technical follow-up talks at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. The date was set for Monday, March 2.
Al-Busaidi announced after the talks that "substantial progress" had been made. The next day, after meeting with Vice President JD Vance in Washington, he stood before CBS cameras. The key message he conveyed was this: "The most important outcome is that Iran has agreed never to possess nuclear material that could be used to make a nuclear bomb. This is something that was not in the old agreement from the Obama era." The explanation was that zero stockpiling, rather than whether enrichment takes place, was the key. Whether enrichment occurred or not, if a stockpile could not be maintained, a bomb could not be made.
Al-Busaidi believed that disposal of existing stockpiles, establishment of a verification system, and securing inspection access could all be completed within ninety days. He believed that if "we grant diplomacy the space it needs," an agreement could be reached.
At the moment that interview aired, two aircraft carriers were waiting in the Persian Gulf. The Gerald R. Ford Strike Group had joined the Abraham Lincoln.
4.2 The Secret Attendance of Britain's National Security Adviser
On March 17, 2026, the Guardian published a bombshell article.
The article stated that Jonathan Powell, Britain's national security adviser, had been attending the third Geneva round in secret. Three independent sources confirmed his attendance. Powell had been inside the negotiations building in an advisory role at the Omani ambassador's residence in Cologny and had brought along a technical expert from the British Cabinet Office.
Behind Powell's attendance was deep concern about the competence of the U.S. negotiating team. According to the Guardian, a former official who had been briefed on the talks testified this way: "Wittkoff and Kushner did not bring an American technical team. They utilized IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi as their technical expert, but that is not Grossi's role. So Jonathan Powell brought his own team."
Powell's assessment was optimistic. Western diplomats and former officials told the Guardian this: "Jonathan believed an agreement could be reached. But Iran had not yet come that far. There was still a gap on the question of UN nuclear facility inspections." The British team was surprised by the proposal Iran had put forward. It was not a finished agreement, but it was progress, and it was unlikely to be Iran's final proposal. The British side expected that based on the progress made in Geneva, the next round,that is, the Vienna technical talks on March 2,would naturally proceed.
There was one point that impressed British officials. Iran was prepared to make this agreement permanent. Unlike the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), Iran showed willingness to accept a structure without a sunset clause, in which restrictions on the nuclear program would be maintained indefinitely.
But the most explosive part of the Guardian article was elsewhere. One source put it this way: "We viewed Wittkoff and Kushner as Israeli assets who dragged the president toward war." There was also a pointed observation that Wittkoff's official statements about Iran's nuclear program were full of basic errors. Kushner had left during the talks,accounts differed on whether he left the Iranians with the impression that Trump would welcome the agreed terms, or whether the American negotiating team itself knew something extraordinary was needed to convince Trump to pursue diplomacy instead of war.
Shortly after the Guardian report, a spokesman for 10 Downing Street issued a denial. "These negotiations were bilateral talks between the United States and Iran, with Oman mediating. Jonathan did not attend the Geneva talks and was not part of the talks at the residence." But this denial was a subtle exercise in linguistic technique. It failed to directly contradict the report that Powell had been in an advisory role inside the same building, even if he was not "part of the talks themselves."
Powell's attendance revealed the depth of diplomatic failure. Behind Britain's refusal to support the U.S. attack on Iran under Prime Minister Keir Starmer lay precisely this context. British officials stated they had found no evidence that Iranian missiles posed a threat to Europe or that Iran had acquired nuclear weapons. Britain's judgment was that diplomatic options had not yet been exhausted. Powell believed the path to resolution through negotiation remained open.
That path was blocked by bombing less than 48 hours after Powell left that building.
4.3 Trump's Ten-Day Ultimatum and the Collapse of Negotiations
While diplomats in Geneva were refining a draft agreement, a different clock was ticking in Washington.
On February 19, 2026, President Trump issued an ultimatum to Iran at the inaugural meeting of the "Board of Peace" in Washington. If a "meaningful" agreement was not reached within ten to fifteen days, he warned, "really bad things will happen." The next day, February 20, Trump doubled down before reporters. "Either you make a deal, or something unfortunate is going to happen to them. The timeline is fixed."
Ten days. In diplomacy, ten days is the blink of an eye. Technical verification of the nuclear program, adjustment of enrichment levels, design of an IAEA inspection system, the scope and timeline of sanctions relief. None of these is the kind of thing that can be concluded within ten days. The 2015 JCPOA negotiations took two years.
According to Bloomberg, the deadline of this ultimatum was timed to March 2, when the IAEA Board of Governors was to convene in Vienna. The board was scheduled to review a new draft resolution condemning Iran. In June 2025, there had been a precedent: Israel initiated attacks within 24 hours of an IAEA Board resolution condemning Iran. At that time, U.S. officials suggested that the IAEA resolution provided legal justification for military intervention. The same pattern was repeating.
To understand the effect of the ultimatum on the negotiating table, one must look at dynamics within Iran. On February 17, Supreme Leader Khamenei rejected the negotiating conditions Trump had proposed, declaring that "Trump does not have the capacity to bring down the Islamic Republic." He also said Iran could sink the U.S. Navy. In early February, the IRGC released footage of the test launch of the latest ballistic missile Khoramshahr-4. It had the range to strike Israel and U.S. bases in the Middle East. Yahya Rahim Safavi, deputy commander of the IRGC's political department, drove home a point: "Sitting at the negotiating table does not mean abandoning military capability."
U.S. demands became increasingly harsh. According to the Wall Street Journal, Washington demanded closure of Iran's three major nuclear facilities: Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Transfer of all remaining enriched uranium to the United States. No sunset clause in the agreement. The United States would provide only limited sanctions relief initially and would consider additional relief if Iran complied over an extended period.
Iran's state IRIB TV reported that the Iranian delegation had completely rejected overseas transfer of enriched uranium. Ali Shamkhani, a senior adviser to Khamenei, wrote on social media: if the core issue was preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, Iran was prepared to put forward measures to guarantee that. But Trump's insistence on controlling Iran's entire nuclear program was a "fantasy," he said.
There is a scene showing how this gap collided. Shortly after Iran submitted its own proposal at the Geneva talks on February 26, Iranian media reported that the U.S., demanding "zero enrichment" and transfer of all 60 percent enriched uranium to America, had caused negotiations to stall temporarily. Iranian diplomats told Reuters: "If the United States approaches the nuclear and non-nuclear issues separately, we can reach a framework for agreement." Iran's demand was to discuss only the nuclear issue. The U.S. demand was to discuss missiles and proxy forces as well. This parallel line had never narrowed once since the first talks in April 2025.
But after the third round ended, the reactions of the two sides diverged. Oman's mediator and Iran were optimistic. Al-Busaidi announced "substantial progress," and Araghchi announced they had "identified the key elements of a potential agreement." But according to Bloomberg, the U.S. side left Geneva disappointed. Reports said Trump was dissatisfied with the course of the talks, and this set the stage for the attack on February 28.
On February 25, Trump addressed the U.S. Congress, mentioning Iran's resumption of its nuclear program and declaring: "I will never allow Iran to possess nuclear weapons." On the same day, Foreign Minister Araghchi said a "historic" agreement with the U.S. was "within reach." On the same day, in the same time frame, one side was giving a speech preparing for war while the other was announcing peace.
After the talks concluded on February 26, technical follow-up discussions in Vienna were scheduled for March 2. Al-Busaidi announced that "after consulting with capitals, we will resume shortly."
On the night of February 27, as Albukaisi met with Vice President JD Vance and recorded a CBS interview, foreign embassies in Iran began their withdrawal. The U.S. State Department designated Iran as a "State Sponsor of Wrongful Detention." According to the defense publication Axios, the United States and Israel had originally planned to launch an attack a week earlier but had postponed it.
While Oman's diplomat spoke in the CBS studio of peace within grasp, the Central Command was conducting its final operational briefing. According to the defense publication Defense Update, at the very moment Albukaisi met with Vice President Vance on the night of February 27, Oman's foreign minister reported that Iran had agreed to zero enriched uranium stockpiles and full verification by the IAEA. Hours later, Trump issued the final attack order to Central Command. It was a "No Aborts" order at 3:38 p.m. Eastern time.
Saturday, February 28, 2026, around 7 a.m. Tehran time. The United States and Israel launched a massive bombing campaign across Iran. Operation Epic Fury. The Israeli code name was Operation Roaring Lion. Trump announced the attack through an 8-minute video posted to Truth Social at 2 a.m. Eastern time.
During the first 12 hours, roughly 900 American air strikes were executed. The Israeli Air Force conducted the largest aerial campaign in history, with about 200 fighter jets striking approximately 500 military targets in western and central Iran. Within 24 hours, total strikes exceeded 1,000 targets, and surpassed 1,250 within 48 hours.
The residence of Supreme Leader Khamenei was the first target. In the early morning of March 1, Iranian state media announced Khamenei's death. The IRGC-affiliated Pars News Agency reported that Khamenei's daughter, son-in-law, grandson, and daughter-in-law Zahra Hadadaadel had also been killed in the air strikes. The Iranian government declared 40 days of mourning. Multiple military leaders, including Defense Minister Aziez Nasirzadeh, IRGC Commander Mohammad Pakpour, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Ali Shamkhani, were killed. According to CBS News, intelligence officials also reported that 40 Iranian officials had been killed in the initial strikes.
Foreign Minister Albukaisi posted a brief message on social media. "I am appalled. Substantive and serious negotiations have been undermined once again." He added, "Neither American interests nor the cause of global peace are well served by this."
In the single word "again" lay the full weight of Oman's frustration. In June 2025, a sixth round of talks had been scheduled when Israel struck just before. This time, a Vienna technical meeting had been set for March 2, but the attack began two days earlier. The pattern was clear: military action intruded just as diplomacy approached resolution. This had now repeated twice.
On March 2, immediately after the attack, Wittcoff stated that Iran had asserted an "inalienable right" to uranium enrichment in Geneva and rejected the American zero-enrichment proposal, even claiming that 460 kilograms of 60-percent enriched uranium could produce 11 nuclear bombs. However, experts raised the possibility that the American negotiating team had misunderstood Iran's proposal. The U.S. side had failed to properly understand Iran's offer to suspend enrichment for years, or why Iran could not trust the American nuclear fuel supply offer.
An analysis in Common Dreams interpreted Albukaisi's CBS appearance this way: "The Omani foreign minister stepped into the public spotlight to inform the American people. In the moment Trump chose war, peace had been within reach."
Within reach. There were several ways to measure that distance. Albukaisi believed 90 days would be enough. Powell thought one more round would do. The Vienna technical meeting was scheduled for March 2.
Trump's clock was running at a different speed. On the morning of February 28, when B-2 stealth bombers descended over the Persian Gulf, 48 hours remained until the Vienna meeting.
AI Expert Kim Kyung-jin, Attorney at Law
Specialist in AI Legal Policy, Former Member of Parliament, Author of Multiple Works
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Kim Kyung-jin
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