The 2026 U.S.-Iran War and the Global Energy Crisis

Chapter 6: Iran's Retaliation and the Gulf in Flames

6.1 Five Hundred Ballistic Missiles and Two Thousand Drones

At 8:30 AM UTC on February 28, 2026, simultaneous launch orders were issued across the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) communication network. Tehran was still burning. Just hours earlier, the joint U.S.-Israeli operation "Operation Epic Fury" had unleashed nearly 900 airstrikes across Iran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had died in his official residence bunker. Defense Minister Aziz Nassirzadeh and IRGC Commander Mohammad Baqpoor died the same day. The entire top leadership of the Iranian regime had been destroyed.

The Western calculation was this: remove the leadership, and Iran's military command structure would be paralyzed. The regime would either collapse from within or at minimum be forced to the negotiating table. That was the assessment.

That assessment was wrong.

The IRGC had spent decades preparing for precisely this scenario. A distributed command structure. Underground missile bases. Mobile launch platforms. A system designed to function even after a decapitation strike. Khamenei's death was not officially confirmed on state television until the early hours of March 1, but the IRGC's retaliation came much faster. Before 9:00 AM UTC on February 28, ballistic missiles were rising from underground silos and mobile launchers across Iran. At concealed airfields in the Kavir Desert, Shahed-series suicide drones were taking off in waves.

During the first week of fighting, Iran launched approximately 500 ballistic missiles. Suicide drones numbered over 2,000. Western intelligence estimated the figure at more than 2,400. There had been an assessment that Israel destroyed roughly one-third of Iran's missile inventory on June 12, 2025, during the previous war, but Iran had spent the intervening eight months restocking. As of February 2026, Israeli military intelligence estimated Iran possessed around 2,500 ballistic missiles. The types of missiles Iran held were diverse. Short-range Fateh-110 class systems with ranges of 300 kilometers. The Khorramshahr-4, which traveled 2,000 kilometers. Iran's "hypersonic" Fattah-1 and Fattah-2 missiles were included as well. The Fattah-1 was designed by adding a small solid-fuel rocket motor to the reentry vehicle of conventional ballistic missiles, allowing it to change trajectory during its descent. Iran claimed this missile reached speeds exceeding Mach 13. Fabian Hinz of the International Institute for Strategic Studies noted that this classification "obscured more than it explained," but it was true that maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV) placed increased burden on existing interception systems. On March 1, reports indicated the Fattah-2 had entered combat use. The Fattah-2 carries a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) rather than a maneuverable reentry vehicle. It is capable of skip-glide flight through the atmosphere, making its approach vector difficult to predict. This category of weapon had never before seen combat use in the Middle East.

The targets were not limited to Israel.

Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. All nations that Iran judged to be hosting or acquiescing to U.S. military operations fell within range. Seven countries, including Israel, came under simultaneous attack. According to Xinhua's timeline, explosions began to be reported across Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan around 9:30 AM UTC on February 28. Iranian media announced that at least 14 U.S. military bases had been struck.

Iran's tactic in a single word: saturation. Simultaneous pressure from different altitudes, different speeds, different directions. Slow drones launch first. Their role is to scatter air defense radar attention and exhaust interceptor missile stockpiles. A single Shahed-series drone costs tens of thousands of dollars. An intercepting Patriot missile runs 2 to 4 million dollars. An SM-6 costs over 4 million dollars. While swarms of drones drain air defenses, ballistic missiles following behind deliver the main blow. Mix in cruise missiles as well, and an air defense system must simultaneously track threats at low altitude, medium altitude, and high altitude. No air defense architecture was designed to stop all three at one hundred percent effectiveness.

Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia is a clear example. The base was home to U.S. Air Force E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control aircraft and KC-135 aerial refueling tankers. According to U.S. officials who confirmed the details to the Wall Street Journal, Iranian missile strikes damaged at least five U.S. Air Force refueling aircraft and destroyed an E-3 Sentry on the ground. The Washington Post reported that at least ten service members were wounded, two of them seriously. At Camp Buehring in Kuwait, the U.S. military compound came under strike, with six service members killed in action. The waters near the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain were also hit by drones. Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE and Al Udeid base in Qatar were not spared.

On March 21, a more brazen incident occurred. Iran fired two long-range ballistic missiles at the Diego Garcia joint U.S.-British military base in the Indian Ocean. A distance of roughly 3,800 kilometers from Iranian territory. According to U.S. officials cited by CNN and the Wall Street Journal, one missile broke apart during flight and the other was intercepted by an SM-3 interceptor fired from a U.S. Navy ship. Iran denied the attack entirely, but Israel insisted Iran had used a two-stage intercontinental ballistic missile-class weapon. Regardless of success, Iran had shattered the 2,000-kilometer range limit it had set for itself. European capitals now fell theoretically within reach.

The military historical significance of this simultaneous attack on seven countries is unmistakable. Compared to the Iran-Israel exchanges in April and October 2024, and the June 12, 2025 war, the scale and simultaneity were in a different category entirely. It could not be compared to Iraq's Scud missile provocations during the 1991 Gulf War. Iran had demonstrated that it possessed saturation attack capability against which no single nation could mount one hundred percent defense. CENTCOM announced within days that it had reduced Iran's missile-launch capacity by 86 percent. Yet the "remaining 14 percent" had created damage sufficient to shake the entire Middle East.

6.2 Cascading Strikes on Gulf Energy Infrastructure

Had Iran's retaliation remained confined to military bases, the character of this war might have been different. Gulf nations would have found it disagreeable that U.S. military bases on their soil came under attack, yet could have classified it as a matter between the United States and Iran. Iran did not permit that classification.

Ras Laffan, a major industrial complex in Qatar. The world's densest concentration of liquefied natural gas production facilities. Roughly 20 percent of global LNG supply originates here. Fourteen massive LNG liquefaction trains stand in rows, with mega-capacity LNG carriers moored at adjacent terminals.

On March 2, Iranian drones struck Ras Laffan and Mesaieed industrial zone. QatarEnergy immediately announced a total halt to natural gas production. The order came from Energy Minister Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi. Soon after, it declared force majeure across all LNG supply contracts. According to Reuters citing internal sources, the gas liquefaction facilities alone would require weeks to restart.

But the true catastrophe arrived on March 18.

That day, Israel conducted bombing strikes on Iran's South Pars gas field. South Pars is the world's largest natural gas field, a resource shared by Iran and Qatar beneath the seabed. Iran was drawing 80 percent of its domestic natural gas demand from this field. Iran immediately announced retaliation. Through Tasnim news agency, the IRGC specified five facilities it would strike "within hours": Saudi Arabia's SAMREF refinery, the Jubail petrochemical complex, the UAE's Al Hosn gas field, Qatar's Ras Laffan refinery, and Mesaieed petrochemical complex. And it kept its word.

Iranian missiles struck the LNG facilities at Ras Laffan with force. QatarEnergy announced that "extensive damage" had been sustained. Tom Marzouk, director of gas and LNG at Wood Mackenzie, told Al Jazeera that "Ras Laffan damage is severe enough that even if the conflict ends and the Strait of Hormuz reopens, Qatar's LNG production will not fully recover within weeks." "It could easily take months to return to full capacity, and the schedule for the North Field East and new South Field projects will be affected as well," he assessed. Al-Kaabi of QatarEnergy expressed the damage more directly. 17 percent of LNG export capacity had been lost. Annual revenue losses of roughly 20 billion dollars were projected. Facility restoration would require three to five years. He warned that "a single strike has set the regional economy back by 10 to 20 years."

Qatar's response was firm. The Foreign Ministry declared Iran's military and security attaché and his staff as personas non grata and demanded they leave within 24 hours.

Saudi Arabia could not avoid the impact either. The SAMREF refinery at Yanbu on the Red Sea coast came under strike. This refinery is a joint venture between Saudi Aramco and ExxonMobil. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed, Yanbu represented Saudi Arabia's only alternative export route for crude oil. Iran targeted precisely that alternative. The Saudi Defense Ministry announced it had intercepted one ballistic missile aimed at Yanbu, but drones still got through. Dozens of additional drones headed toward Riyadh and the Eastern Region were also intercepted by Saudi air defenses. Reports also surfaced that Greek-operated Patriot batteries intercepted two Iranian ballistic missiles aimed at Saudi refineries.

Kuwait's situation was graver. Mina Al-Ahmadi, one of the world's largest refinery complexes, came under repeated Iranian drone attacks. This refinery processes 730,000 barrels of crude daily. On March 19 and 20, drones arrived on consecutive days. Fires broke out simultaneously in multiple facilities, and Kuwait National Petroleum Company suspended operations at some units. No fatalities were reported, but Kuwait International Airport's radar system and fuel tanks were struck by drones as well. Kuwait's power and desalination facilities were hit, killing one Indian laborer. The Chief Executive of Kuwait National Petroleum Company summarized the situation: "Iran essentially has taken the global economy hostage."

In the UAE, U.S. military installations at Al Dhafra Air Base came under attack, and fires broke out near Fujairah port. Near Dubai International Airport, a drone-related incident ignited a fuel tank, temporarily halting flights. Bahrain's Bapco refinery also reported fires in warehouse facilities from debris falling from "Iranian attack."

Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned that these strikes represented only an "extremely small fraction" of Iran's capability, and declared that any repeated attacks on Iranian energy facilities would trigger "unlimited retaliation."

Consider the numbers. Qatar, responsible for 20 percent of global LNG exports, saw its key facilities shut down. Saudi Arabia's only Red Sea export route faced disruption. Kuwait's largest refinery sustained repeated hits. UAE ports and airports faced instability. All of this unfolded simultaneously with the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. If the strait's blockade had stopped oil transport, then infrastructure strikes had stopped oil production and refining itself. When these two conditions converged, the energy supply capacity of the Gulf region collapsed structurally.

On March 19, after an Arab-Islamic foreign ministers conference held in Riyadh, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan told reporters: "There is a limit to the patience being shown now. We have capacities and capabilities that are quite significant. If necessary, we will use them. Whether it takes a day, two days, or a week, I will not say in advance."

Gulf nations faced a forced choice. Continue focusing on diplomacy and defense, or shift to an aggressive response against Iran. Torbjorn Soltvet, Chief Middle East Analyst at Verisk Maplecroft risk consulting, summarized the dilemma for CNBC: "Active measures to maintain neutrality, such as restricting U.S. base access, proved ineffective at protecting Gulf states from Iranian strikes. But military action against Iran could invite even more serious Iranian retaliation."

On March 26, six nations,Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan,issued a joint statement condemning attacks by Iran and Iran-backed Iraqi militias. This was a declaration that Gulf states would no longer treat this war as someone else's problem.

6.3 Strikes on Israeli Territory

Just before 2:00 PM on March 1, 2026, in Beit Shemesh, a city in central Israel. Located roughly 29 kilometers west of Jerusalem, a city of 130,000 residents. Tiferet Israel Synagogue in the Ramat Lehi residential quarter. The time was the end of the Sabbath.

An Iranian ballistic missile made a direct hit on this synagogue. The building collapsed, and the ceiling of the underground air-raid shelter came down with it. Nine people were killed. Three siblings from the Biton family were among the dead: Yaakov (age 16), Avigail (age 15), and Sarah (age 13). Twenty-eight people were wounded, two of them seriously. Search operations continued, with concerns raised that more survivors might be trapped beneath the rubble.

Yehuda Shlomo, a paramedic with Magen David Adom (MDA), described the scene upon arrival: "Massive structural destruction and smoke in the air, and tremendous chaos. Dozens of frightened injured were making their way out of destroyed buildings."

Amnesty International released its investigation results on March 31. Based on analysis of verified social media video, photographs, and video collected at the scene, the organization concluded that a ballistic missile carrying a large warhead had been used. Israeli media estimated the warhead weight at approximately 500 kilograms. Erika Guevara-Rosas, Senior Director of Research and Policy at Amnesty, stated: "The weapon used in Iran's Beit Shemesh attack has extremely poor accuracy and carries a large warhead, making its use in densely populated civilian areas entirely inappropriate." According to 2024 analysis, Iranian ballistic missiles typically miss their targets by at least 500 meters or more. The Beit Shemesh strike was the deadliest incident in Israel since the war began.

Questions arose about why the interception system failed to stop this missile. The Israeli military confirmed that at least two interceptor missiles had been fired but missed. Reports also indicated that warning sirens had not sounded in time in the Beit Shemesh area. Israel's air defense is structured as a layered system: the Arrow-3 (exoatmospheric defense), Arrow-2 (upper atmosphere defense), David's Sling (medium-range defense), and Iron Dome (short-range defense). Israeli military spokesman Efi Defrin stated: "The air defense system operated but failed to intercept the missile." He added: "This is not a new or unfamiliar type of ammunition."

Ammunition that was not new killed nine civilians. Israel's multilayered air defense was recording an interception rate of 92 percent. Yet as Israeli military spokesman Daniel Shoshani acknowledged: "A single ballistic missile can produce tragic results."

On March 21, Iranian missiles struck Dimona and Arad in southern Israel. Dimona is home to the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center, the cornerstone of Israel's nuclear weapons program. Iranian state television reported that this strike was retaliation for an Israeli and American attack that morning on Iran's Natanz nuclear enrichment facility using bunker-buster bombs. Nuclear facility attacks were being met with nuclear facility counterattacks.

According to the Israel Ministry of Health, 116 people were wounded in Arad, seven of them seriously. In Dimona, 64 people were wounded with one serious case. Soroka Medical Center reported treating 175 injured from both cities. Israeli fire authorities explained: "In both Dimona and Arad, interceptor missiles were fired but missed the threats. Two ballistic missiles carrying warheads weighing hundreds of kilograms struck direct hits." The International Atomic Energy Agency stated that no damage to the Negev Nuclear Research Center was reported and no abnormal radiation readings were detected. However, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi urged "maximum military restraint in the vicinity of nuclear facilities."

Tel Aviv continued to suffer casualties. On February 28, a missile struck a residential building in Tel Aviv, killing one civilian woman and wounding 22. On March 9, two construction workers at a site in Yehud, outside Tel Aviv, were killed by fragments from an Iranian cluster munition. On March 17, cluster munitions fell on an apartment building in Ramat Gan, killing two residents in their seventies standing just outside a safe room. The appearance of cluster warheads on Iranian missiles represented a new threat. In a March 11 report, the New York Times analyzed video of "flaming debris falling" and raised concerns about international humanitarian law violations in light of the civilian injury cases in central Israel.

Ben Gurion International Airport also remained unsafe. Missile fragments damaged three civilian aircraft parked at the terminal. Israeli authorities limited maximum boarding on departing flights to 130 passengers.

Despite all this damage, Israeli fatalities remained markedly lower than those on the Iranian side. As of late March, deaths from Iranian missiles on Israeli soil numbered around 15. According to the Iranian Red Crescent Society's count as of March 6, at least 1,230 people had died in Iran. This asymmetry served as evidence that Israel's multilayered air defense system and civil defense infrastructure (safe rooms, warning sirens, the Home Front Command app) were functioning. Yet it simultaneously proved that the system was not perfect, something Beit Shemesh demonstrated plainly.

Israeli military spokesperson Shoshani attributed the sharp decline in missile launch frequency to the success of the IRGC's launcher destruction operations. 'On the first day of war, hundreds of missiles came flying. After that, there were days when the number dropped to single digits.' France24 reported that by day five of the war, Iran's missile attack frequency had decreased markedly, but added that the reason was 'unclear.' Was it due to U.S. and Israeli launcher destruction operations? Was Iran preserving its remaining stockpile? Or was it preparing for a tactical shift in the next phase?

Prime Minister Netanyahu acknowledged in a statement released the night of the attack on Dimona and Arad that it had been 'a very difficult night,' yet declared, 'We will fight the enemy with resolve on all fronts.'

How far would that 'all fronts' extend? By the end of March 2026, no one could answer that question. One thing was clear. Iran's retaliation had transformed this war from a bilateral conflict between the United States and Iran into a regional crisis across the Middle East. The Gulf's energy infrastructure burned, Israeli civilians died, and Kuwait's emir protested that 'we are being attacked without any provocation by a neighboring Islamic nation we consider a friend.' America had started the war, but America's allies were paying the cost. And that cost did not remain in the Middle East. As the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz coincided with the destruction of Gulf energy infrastructure, the global energy market began to shake.

Kim Kyung-jin, Lawyer and AI Policy Expert

AI Legal Policy Specialist · Former National Assemblyman · Author of Multiple Books

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