The 2026 U.S.-Iran War and the Global Energy Crisis

Chapter 11: The Birth of the Toll State

11.1 Iran's Parliament Pushes for Toll Legislation

March 26, 2026, morning, Tehran. Fifteen parliamentarians gathered in the conference room of Iran's Islamic Parliament (Majlis) National Security and Foreign Policy Committee. The agenda was simple: a bill to impose tolls on all commercial vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. When the semi-state-run news agencies Fars and Tasnim transmitted this news simultaneously, energy traders in London and New York had to check their screens twice. No state in history had ever imposed tolls on a natural strait.

The bill's formal title was the 'Strait of Hormuz New Management Plan.' Congressman Mohammadreza Rezai Kouchi, chair of the committee, led the effort, and the time needed to pass it through committee was less than half a day. The bill consisted of eight articles: establishing legal grounds for security measures within the strait, ensuring vessel navigation safety, preventing maritime environmental pollution, introducing a toll system based on the Iranian rial, prohibiting vessels and cargo from the United States and Israel from transiting, codifying Iran's state and military sovereignty, building cooperative joint management with Oman, and restricting vessel transit from countries participating in unilateral economic sanctions against Iran.

The bill was able to pass committee in a single day because it was not creating something new but rather belatedly codifying into law what was already happening in reality. Since early March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had been operating what amounted to checkpoints between Qeshm Island and Larak Island. Vessels seeking to pass through the strait had to submit their IMO identification number, cargo manifest, crew list, actual ownership structure, and final destination to intermediaries linked to the Revolutionary Guard. Vessels that passed inspection were assigned a navigation code and an escort by Revolutionary Guard speedboats. The cost of that escort was two million dollars per vessel.

What the bill sought to formalize was precisely this system.

Chairman Rezai Kouchi appeared on state television and said, 'Parliament seeks to legally formalize Iran's sovereignty, control, and oversight of the Strait of Hormuz while creating a revenue source through toll collection.' He added, 'The Strait of Hormuz is a passage like any other. We are providing security, and it is entirely natural that vessels and tankers pay us tolls.'

Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, did not hide the bill's motivation in an interview with Iran International, a Persian-language satellite broadcaster based in London. 'War costs enormous amounts of money. Naturally, we must collect tolls from vessels passing through the strait.'

A bill for the costs of war. This was the bill's true name.

For twenty-six days after the war began on February 28, the United States and Israel's 'Operation Epic Fury' systematically destroyed Iran's military infrastructure. Nuclear facilities, missile bases, air defense systems, command and control centers. On March 30, President Trump posted on Truth Social that if a deal was not reached quickly, he could destroy all of Iran's power plants, oil wells, Kharg Island, and desalination facilities, reducing them to complete rubble. Kharg Island is the heart through which over ninety percent of Iran's crude oil exports pass. Power plants and desalination facilities are critical infrastructure directly tied to the survival of the Iranian people.

Iran's calculation was this: if the United States threatened to destroy oil export infrastructure, Iran would instead earn money at the chokepoint through which oil passes. If Iran could not sell its own oil, it would install a tollgate at the door where others' oil passes. It was a new revenue model born of war.

On the day the bill passed committee, data from maritime intelligence firm Windward showed a single number: normal commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz had declined by ninety-five percent since the war began. In the week from March 15 onward, only sixteen vessels with their AIS (Automatic Identification System) turned on passed through the strait. IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez told Al Jazeera that approximately two thousand vessels were waiting on both sides of the strait. Lloyd's List reported a larger number, stating that the number of vessels stranded in and around the Persian Gulf had reached thirty-two hundred.

These vessels were drifting, waiting only for Iran's toll bill to be finalized.

Lloyd's List reported that by the third week of March, twenty-six vessels had passed through the strait on pre-approved routes under the Revolutionary Guard's 'toll booth' system. At least two of them were confirmed to have paid tolls in Chinese yuan. According to Lloyd's List, a Chinese shipping services company acted as an intermediary to process the payment.

The bill now awaited a vote in the full parliament, review by the Guardian Council, and the president's signature. The vote was expected to take place between late March and early April. If the bill passed, the Revolutionary Guard's ad hoc extortion would transform into a permanent system grounded in Iranian domestic law.

The bill contained one subtle mechanism. It designated the currency for toll payment as the Iranian rial, not the dollar. For Iran, expelled from the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) network by American financial sanctions, it needed to create its own cash flow outside the dollar payment system. If tolls were collected in rials, shipping companies would need to purchase rials through third-country channels, which would have the effect of propping up the Iranian currency that had suffered repeated collapses. It was like placing an oxygen mask on a domestic economy devastated by war.

Actual payments in the field were being made in Chinese yuan, not rials. The gap between the bill's language and reality revealed Iran's double strategy. Legally asserting sovereign rights while materially relying on Chinese financial infrastructure. Declaring a challenge to dollar hegemony while using the yuan as the tool of that challenge.

There had been similar attempts in the past. In 2019, in opposition to the Trump administration's first-term 'Maximum Pressure' policy, parts of Iran's parliament had proposed a toll bill for the Strait of Hormuz. Back then it was abandoned without proper debate. There was no war. There was no blockade. The Revolutionary Guard did not yet substantially control the strait.

2026 was different. The strait was closed, mines had been laid, tankers were burning, and two thousand vessels were adrift. The bill was merely catching up with reality.

11.2 Mojtaba Khamenei's First Public Statement

March 12, 2026, day thirteen of the war. A news anchor at Iran's state broadcaster (IRIB) began reading a script. On the screen hung a single still photograph of a man wearing a black turban. There was no voice, no video. Only the photograph and the anchor's recitation.

Mojtaba Khamenei. Fifty-six years old. A man who lost his father Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, his mother, his wife, his sister, his nephew, and his brother-in-law in the first strikes by the United States and Israel on February 28. A man selected as the next supreme leader by the Assembly of Experts on March 9. A man who said he learned the news of his selection through state television.

It was not even certain whether he was alive. Israeli intelligence disclosed on March 11 that Mojtaba had been wounded in the legs in the same strikes that killed his father, and the extent of his injuries was still being assessed. Unconfirmed reports circulated that he had fallen into a coma and had his legs amputated. Western intelligence agencies disagreed over whether the statement was truly his or had been written by his associates.

Regardless of whether the statement was authentic, its content altered the trajectory of the global economy.

Among the sentences the anchor read aloud was one passage.

'The lever of blocking the Strait of Hormuz must undoubtedly continue to be used.'

It took minutes for this single sentence to spread across the world. Oil prices reacted immediately. According to CNBC, oil prices showed additional upward momentum shortly after the statement.

Mojtaba's statement began with a brief eulogy of his father. 'After his martyrdom, I had the opportunity to view his body. What I saw was a mountain of strength, and I heard that his robust hand held a clenched fist.' He then praised the patience and courage of the Iranian people and thanked the military's fighters who 'had blocked the enemy's path with powerful blows.'

And then he came to the core.

'I promise everyone this: we will not stop seeking vengeance for the blood of our martyrs,' he said. 'The vengeance we intend is not limited to the supreme leader's martyrdom. Each person of the nation who has been martyred by the enemy is an independent target of vengeance.'

He demanded reparations. 'We will receive reparations from the enemy. If the enemy refuses, we will take from them property in whatever measure we deem appropriate, and if that proves impossible, we will destroy property of equal scale.'

And then came Hormuz. A declaration that the blockade of the strait is not a temporary tactic but a permanent lever. A demand for the immediate closure of U.S. bases. 'I recommend that you close those bases as soon as possible. Because you have now realized that America's claim to provide security and peace has been nothing but lies.' A warning that if the bases are not closed, they will be attacked.

The statement also hinted at the possibility of escalation. 'Research has been conducted on opening other fronts where the enemy is inexperienced and extremely vulnerable. If the state of war continues and aligns with our interests, we will activate them.'

The Soufan Center's analysis precisely identified the nature of the statement. That Mojtaba sees Hormuz not as an artery of the global economy but as an extension of Iran's national security. And that simultaneously, he did not completely close the door to a political settlement. The Soufan Center assessed the message as: 'This is war, and Iran will continue fighting, but the responsibility to stop the war lies with the other side.'

Rob Geist Pinfold, a lecturer in international security at King's College London, told Al Jazeera, 'There is nothing of what the Trump administration might have expected, such as a shift in rhetoric that could come from a new supreme leader. What we are hearing here is a doubling of the existing position.'

Mojtaba Khamenei had long been a 'hidden hand' in Iranian politics. He had never held an official government post or high religious position. His record lay in the shadows. Close ties to the Revolutionary Guard and the hardline militia Basij. A reputation as the backstage orchestrator of bloody suppression during the 2009 Green Movement, the anti-election-fraud protests. Allegations raised by Western intelligence agencies of anonymous real estate holdings worth hundreds of millions of dollars in Europe. He was a man skilled at concealing the reality of power.

His fixation on tolls was not only a matter of external policy. Internal power dynamics were at stake.

For the new supreme leader ascending to power following his father's death, the most urgent task was maintaining the Revolutionary Guard's loyalty. With American sanctions drying up oil export revenues, war costs snowballing, and resources desperately short to cover military payroll and operational expenses. The entity directly collecting tolls at the Strait of Hormuz is the Revolutionary Guard. The cash collected was likely to go directly to the Revolutionary Guard's operational fund without passing through the government's official budget.

By delegating 'this lever' to the Revolutionary Guard, Mojtaba created a structure of paying for loyalty in cash. Externally, a proclamation of economic hostage-taking against the West. Internally, a promise to the military. Follow me, and I will hand you an inexhaustible revenue stream.

Zeidon Alkinani, a Middle East analyst for Al Jazeera, saw through this structure. He noted that by focusing the statement on armed resistance, it 'allowed him to avoid discussion of economic reform, state building, and several fundamental issues important to ordinary Iranians.'

On the same day the statement was issued, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian hinted at the possibility of ending the war if certain conditions were met. There was a subtle gap between the supreme leader's statement and the president's remarks. Mojtaba: determination to fight to the end. Pezeshkian: conditional negotiation. A power struggle within Iran was unfolding over the direction of the war.

However, in Iran's constitutional structure, final decision-making authority rests with the Supreme Leader. The president is an executor. Moztaba's statement represented official state policy, while Pezeshkian's remarks represented flexibility within the boundaries of that policy.

The Trump administration, using Pakistan as a mediator, transmitted a 15-point ceasefire proposal to Iran. The most critical condition was 'ensuring complete freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz.' Iran's response was contained in Moztaba's statement: Keep the strait closed. Keep using the lever. The hardline newspaper Kayhan went further, presenting Iran's ceasefire preconditions as including 'withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the Middle East' alongside 'international formalization of toll collection on the Strait of Hormuz.'

In previous negotiations, Iran demanded sanctions relief and recognition of rights to peaceful nuclear technology. Control over the Strait of Hormuz was not on the list of demands. War created new demands. Because the blockade proved more effective than anticipated. As CNN's analysis stated, 'The scale of impact inflated Tehran's ambitions.'

11.3 Monthly Potential Revenue of 600 to 800 Million Dollars

Let's start with the numbers.

In peacetime, approximately 120 to 140 large merchant ships passed through the Strait of Hormuz daily. These vessels carried 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products per day. To this we add LNG (liquefied natural gas) carriers departing from Qatar. One-fifth of global maritime oil transport and one-quarter of worldwide LNG trade pass through this waterway.

Iran charges 2 million dollars per vessel (approximately 3 billion won).

CNN's calculation is this: Under normal circumstances, if 20 million barrels of crude oil move daily, approximately 10 Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) would transport them. At 2 million dollars per vessel, that is 20 million dollars per day. In a month, approximately 600 million dollars. Including LNG carriers, it could exceed 800 million dollars per month.

Iran's semi-official TASNIM News Agency presented even bolder figures. If 120 vessels per day each pay 2 million dollars, the annual total reaches 100 billion dollars (approximately 150 trillion won). This equals 20 to 25 percent of Iran's GDP. If the 3,200 vessels stuck in the Persian Gulf collectively clear their accumulated tolls in one payment and exit the strait, 6.4 billion dollars (approximately 9.6 trillion won) would flow into Iran's hands at once.

Of course, these figures are propaganda. During war, 120 vessels do not pass through daily. By the end of March, traffic through the strait had fallen to 5 percent of peacetime levels. The 2 million dollars per vessel itself reflects the peak risk premium in the war's immediate aftermath, and would necessarily adjust as the system stabilizes over time.

So we need a comparison. Egypt's Suez Canal.

The Suez Canal recorded a record 9.4 billion dollars in toll revenue in fiscal year 2023. More than 50 vessels pass through daily, and 12 percent of global trade flows through this canal. The average toll per vessel is approximately 400,000 dollars. This revenue formed a cornerstone of Egypt's national finances and a source of foreign exchange. (In 2024, attacks on the Red Sea by Yemeni Houthi forces caused revenue to plunge to 4 billion dollars, but this was an exceptional situation.)

The case Iranian lawmakers repeatedly cited while pushing through their legislation was none other than Suez. 'Just as vessels pay tolls at the Suez Canal, it is natural that we receive compensation in exchange for providing security at the Strait of Hormuz.'

This analogy contains a critical flaw.

The Suez Canal is a man-made artificial structure. Construction began in 1859 and took ten years, followed by more than 160 years of continuous maintenance and dredging. A new channel was added in 2015. Because enormous capital and labor were invested in building and maintaining the canal, there is economic justification for collecting tolls: recovery of construction costs and coverage of maintenance expenses.

The Strait of Hormuz is a natural waterway. At its narrowest point, it measures 34 kilometers across. What Iran did was not build the strait but block it. It laid mines, attacked oil tankers, threatened with speedboats and anti-ship missiles, then announced, 'We will provide security.' It is no different from an arsonist setting a fire and then billing for firefighting services.

CNN presented a more realistic scenario. If, after the war, traffic through the strait recovers to 50 to 60 vessels per day (half peacetime levels), and the toll per vessel adjusts to 400,000 dollars (Suez levels), Iran could generate stable monthly revenue of 600 to 800 million dollars. Annually, 7.2 to 9.6 billion dollars. Roughly equivalent to the Suez Canal's normal annual revenue of 9.4 billion dollars.

This comparison reveals the scale of Iran's ambition. Iran seeks to replicate overnight through war and force the revenue structure Egypt built up over 160 years of constructing and maintaining its canal.

History provides a precedent. The 1956 Suez Crisis. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which had been controlled by Britain and France. Britain, France, and Israel intervened militarily but withdrew in the face of opposition from the United States and the Soviet Union, and Egypt secured permanent control of the canal. For the subsequent 70 years, the Suez Canal became Egypt's most stable source of foreign currency.

Iran wants to Suez-ize Hormuz. To make control of the strait a fait accompli through war, to gain international recognition of that control in peace negotiations, and to cement toll collection as a permanent institution through legislation. This is why 'international recognition of Iran's sovereignty and control over the Strait of Hormuz' ranks among Iran's five ceasefire conditions.

Skepticism dominates assessments of whether this vision could be realized. Karen Young, a senior fellow at Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy, told CNBC: 'It is practically impossible for Iran to establish toll gates. GCC countries will neither accept nor tolerate such measures.'

Yet there was a gap between the judgment of impossibility and the reality actually unfolding. Chinese and Indian vessels were already paying tolls and transiting the strait. South Korean and Egyptian vessels were included in Iran's list of 'friendly nations' and permitted passage. Even if the system lacked international recognition, if it functioned in reality, its effects were identical.

The impact on South Korea's economy was immediate. With 70 percent dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil, South Korea took a direct hit from the Hormuz crisis. The skyrocketing maritime shipping costs and insurance premiums from toll charges were passed directly into the per-unit cost of crude imports. Goldman Sachs projected supply shortages could reach 800 million barrels, and Brent crude exceeded 165 dollars per barrel.

11.4 The Gap Between International Law and Reality

In 1429, Danish King Erik VII began charging tolls on all foreign vessels passing through the Øresund Strait. At Kronborg Castle in Helsingør, the very castle Shakespeare chose as the stage for Hamlet, ships had to drop anchor and wait their turn. Those who refused to pay tolls faced cannon fire from both shores. These strait tolls, known as the 'Sound Dues,' comprised two-thirds of Denmark's state revenue in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This toll system, which lasted 428 years, provoked the anger of European powers including Britain, France, Sweden, and Prussia, sparked several wars, and was finally abolished by the Copenhagen Convention of 1857. In return, Denmark received 33.5 million rigsdaler from twelve nations, equivalent to roughly one year of Denmark's state expenditure at the time. The United States paid an additional 393,000 dollars through a separate bilateral agreement.

In 2026, 169 years later, what Iran seeks to do at the Strait of Hormuz is exactly what Denmark did at the Øresund. Physically dominate a narrow strait and extract money from passing vessels. There is one difference: In 1857, the international community reached consensus that strait tolls were relics of an old order that impeded free trade. In the 169 years since, no nation had imposed tolls on a natural strait. Iran would be the first.

CNN directly referenced this historical precedent: 'In the nineteenth century, Denmark imposed tolls on the Danish Strait, but in the face of protests from multiple nations, it agreed in 1857 to the Copenhagen Convention, which abolished the so-called Sound Dues.' Iran's toll system would be without precedent in modern maritime history.

From the perspective of international law, the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz is clear. Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants special status to straits like Hormuz that are 'used for international navigation between one part of the high sea or exclusive economic zone and another part.' Article 38 provides that all vessels and aircraft of all states enjoy the right of 'transit passage' through such straits without hindrance. Article 44 specifies that states bordering the strait 'shall not hamper' transit passage, and this right cannot be suspended for any reason.

James Kraska, a professor of international maritime law at the U.S. Naval War College, explained to CNN: 'The Strait of Hormuz is a strait used for international navigation with overlapping waters of Iran and Oman. Iranian and Omani law apply in these waters. However, because it is an international strait, the right of transit passage applies to all nations, permitting unobstructed passage on the surface, in the air, and underwater by submarines.' His conclusion was that international law contains no legal basis for imposing tolls.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters shortly after a G7 foreign ministers meeting held in France: 'If Iran decides to control the Strait of Hormuz and determine that the international community must pay to pass through, this is not only illegal but unacceptable and dangerous to the world. The world must have a plan to deal with this.' The G7 foreign ministers issued a statement emphasizing 'the absolute necessity of restoring safe and toll-free freedom of navigation.'

Gulf Cooperation Council Secretary General Jasem Mohamed Al-Budaiwi condemned Iran's toll collection as 'an assault on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.'

The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2817 on March 11. The resolution defines Iran's regional attacks as violations of international law and serious threats to international peace and security, reaffirming that the navigation rights and freedom of merchant ships and commercial vessels must be respected. It included language condemning all Iranian actions and threats to close, obstruct, or interfere with international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

International law defines Iran's actions as unlawful. UN Security Council resolutions exist. The G7 issued a statement. The GCC issued a condemnation.

Yet Iran possessed a legal defense argument.

Iran signed but never ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. For more than 40 years, Iran remained a signatory to this convention ratified by 168 countries without ratifying it. The United States also did not ratify it. Iran's argument was this: We are not a state party to the convention, so we are not bound by the transit passage provisions. In our territorial waters, only innocent passage, not transit passage, applies. Innocent passage can be temporarily suspended if it poses a threat to the coastal state's security. We have the right to restrict the passage of hostile-nation vessels during a state emergency of total warfare.

Analysis from Israel's National Security Institute (INSS) identified the weakness in this logic. The right of transit passage is established not only in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea but also as customary international law. Because the overwhelming majority of nations worldwide accept this legal principle, the dominant legal view is that Iran is bound by it regardless of whether it has ratified the convention.

A legal scholar and former U.S. Navy officer writing for Just Security identified the fundamental contradiction in this situation: 'The Hormuz crisis reveals a basic vulnerability in maritime law. Transit passage rights are strongly protected in doctrine, but actually enforcing them proves difficult when a coastal state has the will to violate the rules.'

This is the essence of the problem: the gap between law declaring Iran's actions unlawful and actually stopping those unlawful acts.

The narrowest point of the Strait of Hormuz spans 21 nautical miles (39 kilometers). As Jason Chuah, a maritime law professor at London City University, explained to Al Jazeera, the entire width of the strait consists of the territorial waters of Iran and Oman. There is no portion corresponding to the high seas. Iran claims 12 nautical miles from its coastline as territorial waters, as does Oman. The physical structure of the strait itself favors Iran.

Iran exploited this geographic advantage skillfully. The central shipping channel of the strait, designated as an international route, became a danger zone of mines and attacks. To avoid this danger zone, vessels had to divert northward around Qeshm and Larak islands off Iran's coast, entering Iranian territorial waters. The moment a vessel enters Iranian territorial waters from international waters, the legal character of passage changes. Iran charges fees ostensibly for 'security services' within its territorial waters.

Iran's Foreign Ministry sent a letter to the 176 member states of the International Maritime Organization: 'Non-hostile vessels, provided they do not participate in or support hostile acts against Iran and fully comply with declared safety and security regulations, may safely transit the Strait of Hormuz through coordination with Iranian authorities.' It was a letter that packaged unlawful force control as legitimate administrative procedure.

Apurva Mehta, a partner at Indian law firm ANB Legal, told Al Jazeera: 'It remains unclear which vessels must pay tolls and in what currency they should be settled. However, commercial considerations appear likely to override questions about the legitimacy of these tolls. Countries will likely prioritize getting their cargo through even if they must pay the tolls.'

This was the reality of March 2026.

The U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet was stationed in Bahrain. Yet the American Navy did not physically block the Revolutionary Guard's toll system. U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright admitted to not being "prepared" to escort tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. To physically halt the toll system would require intercepting Iranian patrol boats and, in some cases, blocking Chinese merchant vessels that brokered payment in yuan. Neither Washington nor Beijing was ready to assume that level of escalation.

Mine countermeasures capability was also a problem for the U.S. Navy. Of the fourteen Avenger-class minesweepers the American Navy possessed, only four remained, all forward-deployed in Sasebo, Japan. Four Littoral Combat Ships could be equipped with mine-clearing modules, and twenty-five Sea Dragon minesweeping helicopters could be deployed, but only three LCS were stationed in the Middle East. The escort operations, ship reflagging, and large-scale task force formations used during the 1987-88 Tanker War could not be replicated in 2026.

Global shipping companies and cargo owners made a capitalist, pragmatic calculation. Should they risk a hundred-million-dollar tanker and the millions of barrels of crude it carried being sunk or seized by Iranian missiles? Or should they pay a two-million-dollar toll and pass safely? The answer was clear. Lloyd's of London classified the Gulf waters as the highest tier of war-risk zones and charged war insurance premiums reaching several percent of ship value. A two-million-dollar toll might have cost less than war insurance.

Amanda Bjorn, head of claims at Singapore-based maritime insurance broker Cambiaso Risso Asia, told Bloomberg: "In the end, it comes down to whether you can trust Iran. This will become a barrier to global trade that blocks the freedom of navigation we have enjoyed for the past century."

Vessels from China, India, Malaysia, Egypt, South Korea, and Pakistan began passing through the strait with Iranian approval. It was selective opening. American and Israeli ships were blocked. Ships from Western allies faced restrictions. Vessels from countries Iran classified as "friendly" were allowed passage. Tolls were paid in yuan. Chinese shipping service companies acted as intermediaries.

This arrangement directly violated the non-discrimination clause, a core principle of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. As confirmed by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, Iran was allowing passage on a discriminatory basis depending on political alignment.

But declaring a violation is not the same as stopping it.

On March 27, 2026, responding to United Nations requests, Iran announced it would expedite and quickly process the passage of humanitarian aid and agricultural cargo through the strait. Iran's ambassador to Geneva, Ali Bahreini, confirmed this agreement. It was a gesture of humanitarian concession. At the same time, it reaffirmed the fact that Iran held control of the strait. Only those who can "expedite" passage can also "block" it.

That same day, China's COSCO announced to customers that it was resuming general cargo container reservations to Gulf ports including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar. However, ship-tracking data confirmed that on March 27, two Chinese container ships attempted to exit through the strait but turned back. This indicated either that the Revolutionary Guard's system was not functioning consistently or that the agreement on passage conditions remained incomplete.

The gap between law and reality is a pattern repeated in history. Denmark was able to collect tolls in the Sound for four hundred twenty-eight years not because law permitted it, but because the cannons of Kronborg Castle permitted it. Britain, France, and Sweden protested repeatedly and even went to war, but so long as cannons commanded the strait, tolls continued. The toll was abolished not because Denmark lost a legal argument, but because by the middle of the nineteenth century the military power and economic pressure of the great naval powers overwhelmed Denmark's cannons. And even then, Denmark did not withdraw for free. It received 33.5 million rigsdaler in compensation.

Whether Iran knows this history is unknown. But what Iran is doing is the twenty-first-century version of what Denmark did. Instead of Kronborg's cannons, the Revolutionary Guard's speedboats, anti-ship missiles, and suicide drones. Instead of the customs house in Helsingør, checkpoints between Qeshm and Larak islands. Instead of rigsdaler, yuan.

There is one difference. In 1857, the international community had the will and the capability to abolish strait tolls. Whether the international community in 2026 possesses that will and capability remains to be proven.

On March 26, Israel killed Revolutionary Guard Navy Commander Major General Alireza Tangsiri and Intelligence Officer Brigadier General Behnam Rezaei in an airstrike on Bandar Abbas. Israel's defense minister identified Tangsiri as "the person directly responsible for terror operations including the laying of mines and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz." Maritime analysts assessed that the loss of Rezaei's intelligence network could weaken the Revolutionary Guard Navy's operational capacity, but the bureaucratized toll system would persist. The commander was dead, but the system survived.

The birth of the toll state laid bare the fundamental limits of international law. The articles of the legal codes drafted in the conference rooms of Geneva had no power to change reality when faced with mines floating over the Strait of Hormuz and speedboats below. UN Security Council Resolution 2817 condemned Iran's actions, but the resolution could not remove the mines. G7 foreign ministers emphasized "freedom of navigation without tolls," but that declaration could not tear up a two-million-dollar bill.

Law says: tolls are illegal. Reality answers: without tolls, you cannot pass.

In this gap, an era of global maritime order was coming to an end.

Attorney Kim Kyung-jin, artificial intelligence expert

Specialist in AI legal policy, former National Assemblyman, author of numerous works

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