The 2026 U.S.-Iran War and the Global Energy Crisis

Chapter 21: Night at the Kirishi Refinery

21.1 Twenty Drones Against Russia's Second-Largest Refinery

On the night of March 25, 2026, the sky above Kirishi in Leningrad Oblast was quiet. About 100 kilometers southeast of Saint Petersburg. On the flat marshlands of the Volkhov River valley stood a massive industrial facility that had been in place since Soviet times. Kirishinefteorgsintez, abbreviated KINEF. Russia's second-largest refinery, operated by Surgutneftegaz.

To gauge the scale of this refinery, numbers are needed. Annual processing capacity of approximately 20 million tons. Converting to daily terms, that is 350,000 barrels. Six point six percent of Russia's total refining capacity comes from this single facility. During 2024, KINEF produced 2 million tons of gasoline, 7.1 million tons of diesel, 6.1 million tons of fuel oil, and 600,000 tons of asphalt. A significant portion of the petroleum products supplied to Saint Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, and Pskov Oblast is produced here. It is no exaggeration to call it the energy heart of northwestern Russia.

That night, a formation of Ukrainian long-range suicide drones (UAVs) flew toward this heart.

Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko's first message on Telegram was brief: "An attack is being repelled over Kirishi district. There is damage to the industrial zone." He did not mention the refinery by name. He said that more than twenty drones were shot down over Leningrad Oblast. Being shot down meant that many more had flown in.

Where the drones that were not shot down went became clear the following morning. According to the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed via Telegram, KINEF's primary crude oil distillation units ELOU-AVT-2 and ELOU-AVT-6 were struck. The asphalt production facility, the hydrotreating unit (the process that removes sulfur from petroleum products), and the gas fractionation system (the process that separates mixed gases into their component parts) were also damaged.

ELOU-AVT is the first gateway of a refinery. When crude oil enters a refinery, the first equipment it encounters is the crude oil distillation unit. If this stops, all the downstream processes stop. The pipeline is not blocked. The starting point of the pipeline is destroyed.

Two industry sources contacted by Reuters spoke on condition of anonymity about the situation. Fires broke out in two primary processing units and some secondary equipment. They said it was difficult to predict when repairs would be completed. Surgutneftegaz did not immediately respond to Reuters' request for comment.

This was the fifth drone attack on the Kirishi refinery. After the first strike in March 2024, it was hit repeatedly in March, September, and October 2025. During the early morning attack on October 4, 2025, NASA's Fire Information Management System (FIRMS) detected a thermal anomaly in the ELOU-AVT-6 area. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) disclosed that it conducted the operation jointly with 'Chornaya Iskra' (Black Spark), a Russian internal resistance organization.

The October 2025 strike forced KINEF to suspend operations of its most powerful processing unit. Repairs took several months. And the moment repairs were completed, on March 8, 2026, drones flew again. Governor Drozdenko reported damage to the external structures of storage tanks. Just seventeen days later, on March 25, more than twenty drones appeared in the skies above Kirishi once more.

The fifth attack was qualitatively different from the previous ones. This time, it was not only Kirishi that was struck.

On March 22, a drone fell on Primorsk, a petroleum export terminal. Fire broke out on a fuel storage tank. Primorsk is the terminus of the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) and Russia's largest Baltic crude oil loading port.

On March 24-25, the NOVATEK gas condensate separation and transshipment complex at Ust-Luga port was struck. The facility processes nearly 7 million tons annually of gas condensate, converting it into petroleum products for export. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) disclosed that its Alpha Special Operations Center conducted the attack using long-range drones that flew more than 900 kilometers. The attack sealed off the Ust-Luga port area, and multiple oil storage tanks caught fire.

March 25-26: The KINEF Kirishi refinery was struck.

March 26-27: Ust-Luga and Primorsk were both struck again simultaneously. NASA satellite data confirmed new fire traces at both ports.

March 29: A third strike on Ust-Luga. The SBU announced that Alpha unit's long-range drones inflicted "severe damage" on the oil terminal.

Three times in five days. In one week, Russia's entire Baltic energy export corridor was systematically pounded.

Combined, Primorsk and Ust-Luga handle about 2 million barrels per day. During 2025, Ust-Luga exported 32.9 million tons of petroleum products and Primorsk exported 16.8 million tons. When combined with damage to these two ports, the KINEF refinery, and the Druzhba pipeline, which has been shut down for months, approximately 40 percent of Russia's crude oil export capacity was offline, according to Reuters.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, traveling through the Middle East, told journalists on March 28: "We disabled approximately 60 percent of Ust-Luga's facility capacity." While acknowledging that some "partner" nations had raised objections to the strikes, he said that if Russia stopped attacking Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Ukraine would halt striking Russian facilities.

The night at the Kirishi refinery was therefore not an isolated incident. Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Kirishi. It was striking all three vertices of a triangle simultaneously. It was part of an intentional campaign to destroy Russia's Baltic oil export capacity to an irreparable level.

Let me outline the technical significance of what happened at Kirishi that night.

The drones' flight distance was more than 800 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Since Kirishi is located southeast of Saint Petersburg, it is well over 800 kilometers in a straight line from Ukraine's northern border. To Ust-Luga is roughly 900 to 1,000 kilometers. These were not small FPV (First-Person View) drones hunting Russian infantry in trench warfare. They were long-range unmanned suicide platforms equipped with precision navigation systems.

To fly more than 800 kilometers and penetrate Russia's air defense radar network. The Russian military had deployed short-range air defense systems such as the TOR-M1 around Leningrad Oblast, but failed to stop all the drone formations arriving simultaneously from multiple directions. When Governor Drozdenko said "we shot down more than twenty," it also suggests that the actual number that arrived may have been considerably larger.

The cost per unit is on the order of tens of thousands of dollars. Many analysts estimate 50,000 dollars each. This fifty-thousand-dollar device stopped a refinery that processes 350,000 barrels daily. Calculated at eighty dollars per barrel, the loss amounted to halting 28 million dollars worth of refined fuel production per day. Asymmetry in cost-to-benefit ratio. This is the arithmetic of modern asymmetric warfare.

Repairs take months. After the October 2025 strike, repairs to the most powerful processing unit alone took several months. And once repairs are complete, drones fly again. The fifth time since March 2024. As the cycle of repair and destruction repeats, the refinery's operating rate cycles between recovery and decline. This cycle itself is the strategy. Even without total destruction, repeated uncertainty and strikes gradually erode production capacity over the long term.

21.2 Saint Petersburg Air Pollution Alert

The flames burning simultaneously at Primorsk and Ust-Luga did not go out for days.

Jukka-Pekka Lumilahti, the Finnish Border Guard's official responsible for the Finnish Bay coast, told Reuters: "The fire at Primorsk has not yet been completely extinguished. It continues burning at nearly the same scale as when it started. Enormous scale of fire, enormous volume of smoke." Heikki Autto, chair of the Finnish Parliament's Defense Committee, told Reuters he directly witnessed a massive black smoke column rising from the direction of Primorsk.

The scale of smoke captured in satellite photos was unprecedented. The black smoke columns rising simultaneously from Ust-Luga and Primorsk were visible to the naked eye across the Finnish Bay from Finland's opposite shore. Finnish authorities detected air pollution within their territory. Tens of thousands of tons of crude oil and petroleum products burning released toxic fumes that, carried by wind, blanketed hundreds of kilometers around the area.

As wind direction shifted, this smoke was driven toward Saint Petersburg. Russia's second-largest city with a population of about 5.4 million. It is also President Putin's hometown. CNN reported that the Russian Emergency Ministry warned Saint Petersburg residents of "air pollution" following the Ust-Luga attack. Pulkovo Airport suspended flights multiple times due to drone threats. The night of March 26-27, more than sixty flights were delayed or canceled. It was past five in the morning when Rosaviatsiya, the Federal Air Transport Agency, lifted landing restrictions.

What Saint Petersburg residents experienced was an indirect sense of war. Bombs did not fall on the city. Yet they had to breathe acrid air, aircraft could not take off, and civil defense sirens wailed in the night sky. For four years, the Kremlin had packaged the war in Ukraine as a 'special military operation' beyond the border. The front was far away, and an implicit social contract held that daily life in Moscow and Saint Petersburg would remain unchanged.

That contract began to break. Black smoke that must be explained as something other than black smoke. Canceled flights that must be explained as something other than drones. Air pollution alerts that must be explained as something other than war. The Leningrad Oblast environmental authority attributed the degradation of air quality to "unfavorable weather conditions" and "vehicle and factory emissions." Before flames visible to satellites hundreds of kilometers away, blaming weather conditions amounted to asking citizens to deny the reality before their eyes.

Governor Drozdenko acknowledged on March 22 that Leningrad Oblast was under "unprecedented enemy drone attacks." Administrative authorities and emergency services switched to round-the-clock alert status. During the week from March 22 to 29, when continuous attacks began, the number of drones shot down over Leningrad Oblast reached 235 according to the Russian Defense Ministry's count. Xinhua News Agency reported that this week's attacks represented "the largest-scale drone raid on Leningrad Oblast since the full-scale war began in 2022."

What reflected in Saint Petersburg's night sky was not flame. It was the limit of the air defense system. The Russian Defense Ministry announced every morning that it had shot down dozens or hundreds of drones, but the fires still burning after those shootdowns contradicted the credibility of the announcements themselves. Citizens had to choose which to believe between official statements and the smoke before their eyes.

21.3 Russia Reintroduces Gasoline Export Ban

As ports and refineries were struck repeatedly, direct repercussions rippled through Russia's domestic fuel market.

Let me first establish the context. Since summer 2025, Ukrainian refinery strikes have had a noticeable impact on Russia's domestic gasoline supply. Several independent service station chains imposed rationing, and some stations closed entirely. Wholesale gasoline prices surged. In September 2025, the wholesale price of Russian AI-92 (regular unleaded gasoline) reached an all-time high of 73,848 rubles per ton (approximately 888 dollars).

The Russian government introduced a gasoline export ban in August-September 2025 to protect domestic supply. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated in September that year that he would extend the export ban through year-end. "Shortages persist in some regions, which are being made up through reserves," he acknowledged. "Overall, the supply and demand balance for September and October is a difficult situation," he said.

In January 2026, the government lifted the gasoline export restrictions on oil producers. It maintained the export ban for non-producers (traders) through the end of July but allowed companies that directly refine oil to export. International crude prices were rising, and the government needed foreign currency income from exports.

And March arrived. As the Iran war sealed the Strait of Hormuz, international crude oil prices exceeded one hundred dollars per barrel. Russian Urals crude was trading at levels similar to Brent or even at a premium. Deputy Prime Minister Novak himself stated that "strong overseas demand for Russian energy resources continues to be maintained."

President Zelenskyy precisely pointed this out in a CNN interview. "The Iran situation is bringing Putin more money." Analysts estimated that Russia could earn tens of billions of dollars in additional revenue despite existing sanctions due to a spike in oil prices from the Hormuz blockade. CNN reported that Russia's energy income could have doubled over the past month. Zelenskyy claimed, "Over these 14 or 15 days, they earned roughly 10 billion dollars."

It was an enormous windfall opportunity. Oil prices were soaring, demand for Russian crude was strong, and Western sanctions were even loosening. As the United States focused on the Iran war, signs emerged of weakening sanctions pressure on Russia.

Yet at this very moment, Ukrainian drones were physically destroying Russia's export capacity itself.

On March 26, 2026, Deputy Prime Minister Novak spoke. According to Reuters, he warned that if necessary, he would reintroduce a ban on gasoline exports. He said he would hold an emergency meeting with oil companies the next day, on March 27.

The March 27 meeting took place. According to a Russian government statement, the meeting paid special attention to the task of ensuring that "domestic fuel prices set by President Putin do not exceed forecasts." The Energy Ministry reported that refinery operating rates currently remain at March 2025 levels, maintaining stable supplies of petroleum products. Industry companies confirmed adequate reserves of gasoline and diesel and high refinery capacity utilization rates.

Yet behind these reassuring words, a conclusion was waiting. Deputy Prime Minister Novak instructed the Energy Ministry to draft a government decree banning gasoline exports beginning April 1, 2026. According to TASS, the ban would last until July 31. Bloomberg reported that the measure was intended to meet domestic demand amid a global surge in fuel prices caused by the Iran war.

The structural contradiction emerges here.

Russia needs hard currency to sustain the war. The main means of earning foreign currency is oil exports. The situation of skyrocketing international oil prices due to the Iran war presented Russia with an opportunity for enormous revenues. But as Ukrainian drone attacks destroyed refineries and export ports, Russia was losing the physical capacity to take advantage of that opportunity. With 40 percent of export capacity paralyzed, the remaining volumes had to be diverted first to the domestic market. The gasoline export ban was the result.

Let me read Deputy Prime Minister Novak's words again. "The Middle East crisis is causing considerable turbulence in global oil and petroleum product markets, resulting in substantial price fluctuations." And immediately the next sentence. "Strong demand for Russian energy resources on overseas markets remains a positive factor."

Strong overseas demand. Soaring prices. Yet the ban on exports. Line these three sentences up next to each other and Russia's dilemma becomes visible.

Zelenskyy called this "Ukraine's own sanctions." In a late March Reuters interview, he said this: "Global pressure on Russia is diminishing. Therefore, unlike most countries in the world, Ukraine has its own means of sanctions. Our long-range strike capability is that means."

Western economic sanctions worked by placing a price ceiling on Russian exports. Ukrainian physical sanctions made exports themselves impossible. A price cap can be circumvented. You deploy a shadow fleet. But when ports burn and refineries shut down, there is nothing left to circumvent.

Russia's reintroduction of the gasoline export ban was an event that showed this difference in numbers. Over 2025, Russia exported roughly 5 million tons of gasoline. Approximately 117,000 barrels per day. This volume will be diverted to the domestic market beginning April 1. Money that could have gone into Russia's war coffers is instead used to shorten lines at domestic gas stations.

A nation that positions itself as an energy superpower is unable both to export its own energy and to fully meet domestic demand. This was the most stark expression of the internal contradiction inherent in a war economy.

21.4 A Drone Falls on Latvia

In the early morning hours of March 25, 2026, at the height of a massive drone offensive directed at the Kirishi refinery and the Ust-Luga port, an unforeseen event was unfolding across the Baltic.

Estonia's Internal Security Service (KAPO) announced that a drone that had originated from Russian airspace collided with the smokestack of the Auvere power plant near Narva in northeastern Estonia. There were no casualties. Narva is a city adjacent to the Russian border, with a substantial Russian-speaking population, making it a sensitive area. Margo Palloson, the head of Estonia's Internal Security Service, issued this warning: "This is the result of Russia's large-scale war of invasion. Similar incidents can happen again."

On the same day, a drone entered Latvian airspace. According to Latvia's Defense Ministry, this drone crashed near the village of Dobročina in the Krāslava district near the Russian border, exploding upon impact. It was approximately 12 to 15 kilometers from the Belarusian border. The Latvian military explained that because this drone was flying at an altitude of less than 1 kilometer, it was not detected by primary radar. The drone was equipped with an explosive warhead and detonated upon collision. There were no casualties. Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs stated that this drone was confirmed to be of Ukrainian origin.

Two days earlier, on March 23, a similar incident occurred in Lithuania. Drone wreckage was discovered on the ice of Lake Lavisas near the Lithuania-Belarus border.

By March 29, it had spread to Finland. Two drones crashed near Kouvola in the southeast. Kouvola is a city approximately 70 kilometers from the Russian border. The Finnish Air Force scrambled F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets to track low-flying objects. One was confirmed to be a Ukrainian AN-196 'Lyuty' drone. The Finnish Air Force did not fire. It was concerned about collateral damage.

Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo's response was concise. "A violation of territorial sovereignty is a very serious matter." At the same time, he identified Russia's "extremely powerful" electronic warfare jamming capability as the cause of the drone's course deviation. Finnish President Alexander Stubb confirmed: "There is no military threat to Finland. An investigation is underway."

Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhii Tykhyi explained that the drone was not intended for Finland, and it was likely that Russian electronic warfare jamming had disrupted navigation. "We have already apologized to the Finnish side for this incident. We are sharing all relevant information to clarify the facts."

The Baltic states and Finland had a common pattern in their government responses. While acknowledging the severity of the incident, they attributed the root cause to Russia's war. Latvian Prime Minister Evika Siliņa put it this way: "On the face of it, the drone that fell on Latvia, like in the Lithuanian case, appears to be of Ukrainian origin. Similar incidents can be confirmed in Estonia as well." And she added: "Given the frequency of Russian attacks on Ukraine, we should anticipate that Ukraine's countermeasures will be on a considerable scale. We are at the border, and we are feeling it."

Major Ēģils Leščinskis, deputy chief of the Latvian military's joint staff, assessed that the drones had deviated from their course or been knocked off trajectory by Russian electronic warfare. Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds suspended his planned visit to Ukraine and rushed back to Riga.

According to reporting by Meduza, the response of the Baltic Sea nations to these incidents was relatively understanding. Authorities in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland all concluded that whether the drones originated from Russia or Ukraine, such airspace intrusions were a consequence of Moscow's full-scale war.

Meanwhile, Russia's response was entirely different.

Russian propaganda media and so-called 'Z-bloggers' sought to use this incident as evidence of NATO's military involvement in the war. The Russian Telegram channel SHOT claimed that all 43 drones that attacked Ust-Luga had passed through the airspace of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It said the flight paths had been coordinated with NATO military staff. Some military bloggers even claimed they had been launched directly from Estonian and Latvian territory.

These claims were unverified. Investigation results from the Baltic states and Ukraine's explanation pointed to course deviation caused by electronic warfare jamming. Yet from Russia's perspective, a narrative that NATO had participated in the attack was far more useful for domestic opinion management than the fact that its own air defense had been breached, refineries were burning, and ports were ablaze.

Finland's follow-up response was noteworthy. After this incident, Finland made clear it would not ask Ukraine to stop or scale back attacks on Russian oil facilities. While expressing concern about territorial sovereignty violations, it maintained its assessment that the root cause lay in Russia's war.

A drone falling in a Latvian field. Fragments lodged in an Estonian power plant smokestack. An AN-196 crashed in the forest near Kouvola, Finland. These were not deliberate attacks. Yet the absence of intent did not reduce the danger.

In modern long-range drone warfare, the concept of a front line becomes blurred. A drone launched from Ukraine pierces Russia's air defense and electronic warfare jamming, or is knocked off course by that jamming, and falls on the territory of a NATO member state. With an explosive warhead attached. This time it was fields, lakes, and a power plant smokestack. Next time it could be a school or a hospital.

The exchange of strikes between Russia and Ukraine over energy infrastructure had layered a new variable onto the geopolitical balance of the Baltic region. Article 5 of the NATO treaty stipulates that an armed attack against one member shall be considered an attack against the entire alliance. A drone crash is not an armed attack. Yet it is not easy to definitively say that a drone carrying an explosive warhead falling on NATO member territory is not an armed attack. In this gray zone, the Baltic states must make judgments each time. Is this an accident or an attack? Russia's responsibility or Ukraine's mistake? Does NATO need to respond, or is a diplomatic protest sufficient?

In one week, Ukrainian drones fell on the territory of four NATO members. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland. All four times there were no casualties. All four times the deviation was attributed to electronic warfare jamming. All four times the governments of the affected countries demonstrated understanding and restraint.

But the fifth time could be different. And no one knows when the fifth time will come or where it will fall.

War's fragments do not choose sides of the line. Wind and radio waves and navigation errors decide. The way asymmetric war over energy infrastructure spreads across borders is not through artillery but through wreckage. Unintended escalation. This is the most troubling attribute inherent in 21st-century drone warfare.

AI expert and attorney Kim Kyung-jin

Specialist in AI legal policy, former member of the National Assembly, author of numerous works

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