The traces Han Dong-hoon left on South Korea

Korean-style Jessica Law and lowering the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles

Not putting Cho Doo-soon next to my children - Han Dong-hoon and the Korean-style Jessica Law

1 The origin of the name Jessica

In February 2005, a nine-year-old girl named Jessica Lunsford, who lived in Florida, went missing. The search ended with the discovery of the girl's body. The perpetrator was John Couey, a sex offender who lived next door. He had previously served time for sexual crimes. After being released from prison, he lived without any restrictions right next to an elementary school, and he kidnapped and murdered the neighbor's child.

The enraged state of Florida enacted 'Jessica's Law' the same year. The law's core provision is clear: child sexual offenders are prohibited from residing within 1,000 to 2,000 feet (approximately 300 to 600 meters) of schools, playgrounds, and childcare facilities after their release. The law subsequently spread to more than thirty U.S. states.

2 The repeated nightmare in Korea

Korea experienced similar horrors repeatedly.

In December 2020, child sex offender Cho Doo-soon was released after serving his twelve-year sentence. He returned to his previous residence in Ansan, Gyeonggi Province. The victim's family lived in the same neighborhood. Residents took to the streets in protest, but there was no legal way to prevent him from living there. In the end, the victim's family moved away. It was a result where the victim, not the perpetrator, was driven out.

In 2022, Park Byung-hwa, a serial sex offender known as 'Hwaseong Bal-bal-i,' was released and chose to establish his residence in Hwaseong, Gyeonggi Province. The mayor of Hwaseong and residents held protests demanding his eviction. The same year, another child sex offender, Kim Geun-sik, was released. A nationwide controversy erupted over where he would live.

The structural problem was the same each time: there was no legal basis for the state to intervene in where a high-risk sex offender would live after completing his sentence. The existing system's limits were electronic monitoring, assigning probation officers, and publicly disclosing personal information. It was impossible to prevent him from living next to a school or across from a childcare facility.

3 Han Dong-hoon: 'Now is the time'

Han Dong-hoon directly referenced the American Jessica Law in his 2023 New Year's address. He stated: 'We must actively consider ways to adopt this law to fit our country's circumstances and reality, and implement groundbreaking measures.'

On the 26th of the same month, the Justice Ministry included the 'Korean-style Jessica Law' as one of five key initiatives in its presidential briefing. Han Dong-hoon diagnosed that while measures existed to protect society from high-risk sex offenders, they were insufficient, and he declared his intention to create legislation suited to Korea's domestic environment by reviewing overseas cases.

In fact, the National Assembly had previously introduced several bills restricting where sex offenders could live. Bills were proposed prohibiting offenders from residing in the same city, county, or district as their victims, or expanding the exclusion zone from 100 meters to 1 to 2 kilometers. However, each time these bills failed, argued to be violations of the constitutional right to freedom of residence.

Han Dong-hoon did not avoid this issue; he attempted to break through it directly. Rather than simply declaring 'you cannot live here,' he chose an active management model: 'you must live in a state-designated facility.'

4 Specific details of the bill

On October 24, 2023, the Justice Ministry announced draft legislation on 'the restriction of residence for high-risk sexual violence offenders' and revisions to the 'law on chemical castration treatment for sexual offenders.'

The bill's scope does not cover all sex offenders. It applies only to high-risk offenders: those convicted of sexual crimes against children under thirteen and sentenced to ten or more years in prison, or those with three or more sexual convictions. According to the Justice Ministry, 325 high-risk sex offenders needed review for residence restriction orders as of the end of 2022. It was expected that 50 to 60 of them would be released each year.

The procedure works as follows: The head of the probation office determines whether residence restriction is necessary based on the subject's age, health, and living environment. If deemed necessary, the official applies to the prosecutor for a restriction order. The prosecutor then conducts a separate review and petitions the court. The final decision rests with the court. The design ensures that the executive branch does not make decisions arbitrarily but undergoes judicial review.

When a court issues a residence restriction order, it designates the offender's residence among state, local government, or public institution facilities within the metropolitan area where the offender resides, specifically those designated as 'designated residential facilities' by the Justice Minister.

Along with residence restriction, chemical castration treatment was strengthened. The revision requires that prosecutors conduct mandatory medical evaluations for high-risk sex offenders and petition for chemical castration treatment orders for those diagnosed with paraphilic disorders. The rationale was statistics showing that sex offenders who received chemical treatment had a recidivism rate of 1.3 percent, substantially lower than those who did not receive treatment (10 percent).

This bill was designed so that if it passed the National Assembly, it would be retroactively applied to those already released, including Cho Doo-soon, Kim Geun-sik, and Park Byung-hwa.

5 The fork in the road between support and opposition

As expected, the bill sparked heated debate.

The logic of those in favor is intuitive: children must be protected. An analysis of the residences of 138 sex offenders in the Daegu region showed that 77 of them (56 percent) lived within 500 meters of elementary schools. The argument is that it is irresponsible for the state to allow someone who has committed atrocious crimes against children and has a high risk of reoffending to live right next to a school.

The concerns of those opposed cannot be ignored either. The argument arose that this constituted double punishment of someone already punished through imprisonment and carried the risk of being unconstitutional as it violated the right to freedom of residence guaranteed by the Constitution. Issues were also raised concerning residential opposition to areas where designated facilities would be located and the problem that personal detention amounts to re-imprisonment in practice.

Han Dong-hoon did not shy away from this controversy. He emphasized: 'I understand how anxious the public has been each time a predatory high-risk sex offender is released. Through the Korean-style Jessica Law, the state will punish these offenders more severely and manage them more thoroughly.' At the same time, after the public hearing period, he added provisions allowing target sex offenders to request changes to their residence and ensuring that mental health counseling and treatment would be provided by the state and local governments.

While being mindful of concerns about unconstitutionality and human rights violations, he did not yield on the value of children's safety.

6 Accomplishing 'the obvious thing'

On January 2, 2024, the Korean-style Jessica Law passed through a cabinet meeting. This came shortly after Han Dong-hoon stepped down as Justice Minister. The legislation was conceived and drafted during his tenure, and the final cabinet hurdle was passed on to his successor.

In December 2020, when Cho Doo-soon was released, the entire nation was outraged. Yet outrage alone did not change the law. For more than two years afterward, no government and no minister was able to implement Jessica's Law. Four characters , 'constitutional concerns' , blocked every attempt.

Han Dong-hoon broke through those four characters. Knowing that constitutional concerns existed, he struck a balance in the bill's design by building in judicial review as a safety mechanism, attaching chemical treatment as a supplementary measure, and adding a residence change request process as a remedy. Rather than choosing only one side between children's safety and a criminal's basic rights, he considered both but ultimately placed the scale's weight on the children's side.

325 people. As a number, it is not large. But if one of these 325 people lives on the path where my child walks to and from school, then the number 325 is meaningless to that child's parent. That one person next to my child is everything.

Han Dong-hoon declared that the state would manage that one person, each individual. He pushed through something no other minister had done, bearing the cost of constitutional concerns. His principle of being strong against the strong and protecting the weak runs through this bill as well.

'I'm a juvenile delinquent so I can't be punished' - a standard seventy years old

1 A country where a thirteen-year-old can pick up a knife and not go to prison

Juvenile delinquent. When you first hear this word, you tilt your head in confusion. To explain it simply: it refers to a minor who committed an act in violation of the law but cannot face criminal punishment because of his or her age.

South Korean criminal law does not assign criminal responsibility to anyone under fourteen years of age. Whether a youth aged ten to thirteen commits murder, robbery, or sexual assault, he or she cannot be sent to prison. Instead of criminal punishment, protective measures under the Juvenile Law , community service, attendance at educational programs, probation, commitment to a juvenile detention facility , are possible.

This standard was established when the Criminal Law was enacted in 1953. It has been maintained for approximately seventy years. Are thirteen-year-olds seventy years ago the same as thirteen-year-olds now? Seventy years ago, there were many children who could not even attend elementary school. Today's thirteen-year-olds use smartphones, access all the world's information through the internet, and in many cases show physical development approaching that of adults. Yet the standard for criminal responsibility remained frozen as it was half a century ago.

The problem was that people began to exploit the gaps in this system.

2 'I'm a juvenile delinquent, so what are you going to do about it?'

As justice minister, Han Dong-hoon diagnosed this problem in the following way. "There have been cases where the juvenile delinquent system was actively misused for criminal conduct. There have even been cases where minors below the criminal responsibility age were brought in to commit crimes."

Adult criminal organizations used children under fourteen as tools for their crimes. Since children could not face criminal punishment even if caught, dangerous roles were assigned to them. Among children themselves, the phrase circulated that "I'm below the criminal responsibility age, so police can't do anything to me." The system that the law had created to protect children was now having the opposite effect, turning children into instruments of crime.

The numbers tell this story. Crimes committed by juveniles below criminal responsibility age jumped from 7,897 cases in 2017 to 12,502 cases in 2021. This represented a nearly sixty percent increase in just four years. Among all juvenile crimes, the proportion of violent crimes rose from 2.30 percent in 2005 to 4.86 percent in 2020, more than doubling. Among violent crimes, the proportion of sexual offenses surged from 48.55 percent to 86.22 percent during the same period.

The problem was not simply that crime was increasing. The nature of the crimes was changing. Groups would assault victims while recording videos to post on social media, then threaten the victims with additional violence. Society grew fearful, and victims and their families were enraged. Yet because the perpetrators were under fourteen, they could not be brought to criminal court.

3 The Ministry of Justice's Four-Month Review

Shortly after taking office, in June 2022, Han Dong-hoon formed a task force to update the age threshold for criminal responsibility. It brought together experts from within the Justice Ministry, researchers specializing in juvenile justice, and practical field workers. The task force had three questions to address. First, what age should the threshold be lowered to? Second, would lowering it alone be sufficient? Third, what complementary measures would need to accompany the change?

The task force debated whether to lower the threshold to twelve, thirteen, or apply different standards by offense type. President Yoon Suk-yeol had promised in his campaign to lower it to twelve, reducing the age by two years. Instead of simply adopting the presidential pledge, however, the Justice Ministry conducted its own independent assessment of the appropriate threshold.

Four months later, on October 26, the Justice Ministry announced its conclusion. It would lower the age for criminal responsibility from the current fourteen to thirteen, a one-year reduction.

Why thirteen rather than twelve? The Justice Ministry offered three reasons. First, the country needed protection from increasingly brutal juvenile crimes. Second, children aged thirteen comprised approximately seventy percent of those who received juvenile protective dispositions below the criminal responsibility age. Third, Korea's educational system divides elementary and middle school at age thirteen.

The seventy percent figure deserves close attention. Seven out of every ten children below criminal responsibility age who received protective dispositions were thirteen years old. Those aged ten, eleven, and twelve combined accounted for only thirty percent. This meant that the weight of juvenile crime was concentrated at age thirteen. The judgment was that including just that one age group in criminal liability would substantially prevent misuse of the juvenile protection system.

4 Punishment Combined with Rehabilitation and Protection

What Han Dong-hoon devoted the most effort to in this policy was not actually the age reduction itself. It was the remaining elements of the Comprehensive Juvenile Crime Prevention Plan that he announced alongside the age change.

Han Dong-hoon stated, "I reflected concerns that lowering the age of criminal responsibility alone would not be sufficient as a measure against juvenile crime." Sending children to prison should be a last resort. He designed a plan that addressed what could be done beforehand and what needed to be done afterward.

The ministry improved conditions in juvenile facilities. It reduced the size of dormitory rooms in youth detention facilities from ten to fifteen beds to four beds, and raised meal allowances to the level provided by child welfare institutions. Juvenile facilities are not punishment institutions but educational ones. To ensure that children do not repeat crimes after returning to society, the environment during their detention must maintain at least basic human dignity.

Education was also strengthened. Working with the Education Ministry, juvenile facilities were included in the First Comprehensive Plan for Guaranteed Basic Learning, and required courses for high school equivalency exams were introduced in juvenile prisons. A new juvenile correction facility focused on academic education would operate in the Seoul metropolitan region. It provided children who had lost educational opportunities a path back to learning.

Tailored psychological treatment programs for juvenile sex offenders were developed, and victim-centered education was introduced. This education helps perpetrators understand the pain their actions caused their victims.

Victim protection was significantly strengthened. The notification system for victims in juvenile protection proceedings was improved, and provisions granting victims the right to attend court hearings were established. Legal grounds were also created to prohibit perpetrators from contacting victims through telecommunications such as social media and phone calls. Previously, even after receiving juvenile protective dispositions, perpetrators could contact or threaten victims through social media. Now this could be prevented by law.

Human rights protections were not overlooked either. The practice of imposing excessive protective dispositions such as long-term probation and commitment to youth detention on pre-delinquent youth was abolished, and new rights were established allowing juveniles to challenge the court's emergency decisions.

It was a multilayered approach that lowered the threshold for punishment while improving the quality of punishment, strengthening the effectiveness of rehabilitation, protecting victims, and safeguarding the human rights of perpetrators.

5 The Logic of Opposition and Han Dong-hoon's Response

Opposition to this policy was considerable. The National Human Rights Commission declared it 'inadvisable.' The chief grounds for opposition were that the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child had recommended maintaining a minimum age of criminal responsibility at fourteen or higher, and concerns about creating a generation of minor offenders with criminal records.

The Justice Ministry responded with a clear rebuttal. Its position was: 'International human rights standards have no legal force domestically, and the age of criminal responsibility varies by country depending on cultural characteristics and social environment.' It cited the fact that many countries, including France, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States, have criminal responsibility ages below thirteen.

It also prepared countermeasures against concerns about creating minor offenders with records. The Justice Ministry explained, 'Even if the age for criminal responsibility is lowered, most juveniles would still be referred to juvenile court as before, and only very exceptional cases such as premeditated murderers or the most violent offenders are expected to face criminal prosecution.' Additionally, to minimize disadvantages in schooling and employment, it examined ways to restrict record disclosure for crimes committed at age thirteen.

6 Between Punishment and Protection

The core of Han Dong-hoon's Comprehensive Juvenile Crime Prevention Plan lies in the recognition that strengthening punishment and strengthening protection are not contradictory.

Children must be protected. That principle does not change. But when protection becomes a framework with no accountability, gaps in that structure allow more children to be exploited for crime and more children to be harmed. A paradox emerges where the very system designed to protect children actually puts them in danger.

Han Dong-hoon saw through this paradox. Lowering the age by one year might appear to be merely symbolic. But given that seventy percent of juveniles below criminal responsibility age are concentrated at thirteen, this one-year difference is a measure that fundamentally changes the system's effectiveness.

At the same time, improving juvenile facility conditions, strengthening education, introducing psychological treatment, and codifying victim protection send the message: 'We are not trying to imprison children, but to return them to society.'

Han Dong-hoon stated, 'I concentrated policy capacity on addressing juvenile crime, which had long remained an intractable challenge, and developed a comprehensive plan that addresses not only the age of criminal responsibility but also strengthens correction and rehabilitation, improves victim protection and human rights safeguards, and expands infrastructure.'

He stepped forward to change a standard that no one had touched for seventy years, grounding that change in four months of empirical review. In making the change, he did not design it as punishment alone but paired it with rehabilitation and protection. To punish the child while not abandoning the child. That was the philosophy Han Dong-hoon embedded in this policy.

7 The Seed Was Sown, But the Fruit Is Not Yet

However, the comprehensive plan has not yet been completed as law.

In December 2022, the Justice Ministry submitted amendments to the Juvenile Law and Criminal Code to the National Assembly. The Supreme Court's Administrative Office submitted an opposing statement, saying 'It is difficult to definitively conclude that thirteen-year-olds possess the capacity for criminal responsibility.' The National Human Rights Commission also reaffirmed its position that the change was 'inadvisable,' citing recommendations from the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child.

With opposition from the Supreme Court's Administrative Office, the Human Rights Commission, and the opposition party, the bills stalled at the legislative committee stage of the National Assembly. Even during President Yoon Suk-yeol's administration, related bills never made it to a full parliamentary vote.

The seed Han Dong-hoon planted began to move again three years later. In December 2025, President Lee Jae-myung instructed that the matter be added to the National Cabinet agenda, saying at a Justice Ministry briefing, 'Lately there have been people claiming they are below the criminal responsibility age while causing various incidents, and arguments are arising that the threshold should be lowered.' Justice Minister Jung Sung-ho agreed, saying, 'Wouldn't it also be necessary to lower the threshold for drug offenses and sexual crimes?'

But this time, too, the path was not smooth. The minister of gender equality and family took an effectively opposing stance by saying 'careful deliberation is needed,' and opinions within the government itself became divided. If disagreements between the Justice Ministry and the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family are not resolved, legislation could again drift without progress.

Meanwhile, juvenile crime below the criminal responsibility age did not stop after Han Dong-hoon announced his comprehensive plan in 2022. Arrests of juveniles below criminal responsibility age nearly doubled from 11,677 in 2021 to 21,095 in 2025 in just four years. The escalating brutality that Han Dong-hoon warned about is now proven by the numbers, yet the legal tools to stop it remain bound by standards from seventy years ago.

What does not change is the fact that in 2022 Han Dong-hoon was the first to frame this issue not as political rhetoric but as a policy package supported by data and comprehensive measures, placing it in the public arena. The comprehensive plan he designed,lowering the age, improving juvenile facility conditions, strengthening education, and codifying victim protection,will serve as a starting point regardless of which future government addresses this problem. The seed has been sown. Bearing fruit remains the task of the National Assembly and the people.