The evening of October 30, 2025, Gyeongju, Gyeongbuk.

It was the city hosting the APEC Summit. The ancient capital of Silla. Stones imbued with a thousand years of history stood in the autumn light. In that city, the President of South Korea and the Prime Minister of Japan sat face-to-face.

President Lee Jae-myung and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. It was the ninth day since Takaichi had taken office as Prime Minister. It was the first meeting for both of them. The summit began at 6:02 PM and concluded 41 minutes later. It was not a short time.

President Lee Jae-myung spoke first. "In the midst of the rapidly changing international situation and trade environment, South Korea and Japan are neighboring countries with many things in common. I believe it is time for our two nations to strengthen future-oriented cooperation more than ever before."

Takaichi replied, "Japan and South Korea are important neighbors to each other. Under the current strategic environment, I believe the importance of Japan-Korea relations and cooperation between Japan, Korea, and the U.S. is increasing even further."

These were words prepared in accordance with diplomatic protocol. However, there was weight in every single word. "Important neighbors." It might seem simple, but coming from Takaichi, it held significant meaning.

How does the name Sanae Takaichi sound in South Korea?

In 2015, the Abe administration pushed through the revision of security legislation. Takaichi was at the core of the supporting faction. Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Opposition to selective separate surnames for married couples. Statements on historical perception that clashed with South Korea. Before she became Prime Minister, South Korean media coverage of Takaichi was largely filled with concern.

"Hardline right-wing." "Historical revisionist." "One of the Liberal Democratic Party politicians least friendly toward Korea." Such expressions appeared in South Korean articles.

Yet, in October 2025, that same Takaichi became Prime Minister. How did the South Korean government and media react?

Surprisingly, they prepared for cooperation.

President Lee Jae-myung sent a congratulatory message immediately after Takaichi's election. This was the reality of diplomacy. The fact that they were neighbors who needed to cooperate right now was more important than who the other person was.

Takaichi also sent signals. In an interview before taking office, she said something unexpected: "I like Korean seaweed. I watch Korean dramas. I use Korean cosmetics." There are many ways for a politician to express affinity for a neighbor's culture. Takaichi chose the most mundane way: food, entertainment, and beauty. These were things grandmothers might discuss at the dinner table.

In her subsequent policy speech, Takaichi moved to the diplomacy section and stated, "South Korea is an important neighbor. I want to develop Korea-Japan relations in a future-oriented and stable manner." When this expression reached Seoul through diplomatic channels, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reportedly relieved.

On January 13, 2026, two and a half months after the Gyeongju Summit, President Lee Jae-myung traveled to Japan.

The location was Nara (奈良). The ancient capital of Japan and a city that had deep exchanges with the ancient Korean Peninsula. It was also Takaichi's constituency. Takaichi had invited her guest to her hometown.

The summit lasted about 100 minutes, divided into a small-scale private meeting and an expanded meeting. The next morning, the two leaders visited Horyu-ji (法隆寺) together. A temple with over 1,500 years of history. A structure built after technology and culture from the Korean Peninsula crossed over to Japan. It was a choice that symbolized the deep and long-standing relationship between the two countries.

The outcomes of the summit were substantial: joint stockpiling of rare earths and the establishment of a supply chain early warning system; a supply chain cooperation framework for the stable procurement of semiconductors and critical minerals; comprehensive cooperation in science and technology; and the reaffirmation of the intent to pursue the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership).

These were not romantic results. They were supply chain cooperation efforts for South Korea and Japan to survive amidst the hegemonic competition between the U.S. and China. In a situation where China was weaponizing rare earth exports and aiming for dominance in the semiconductor sector, the goal was to create a structure for both countries to respond together.

The Associated Press evaluated the Nara Summit as follows: "Takaichi is attempting to secure a stable relationship with South Korea as she struggles with escalating disputes with China." It was a cold assessment. To Takaichi, South Korea was not a partner of pure friendship, but a strategic partner that provided balance under pressure from China.

But what about the Yasukuni issue?

During her term as Prime Minister, Takaichi refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in person. She paid the ritual offering fee (tamakushiryo, 玉串料) but did not visit. The South Korean government appreciated this. While not viewing it as a complete resolution, they accepted it as a minimum diplomatic consideration.

Some South Korean media outlets criticized it: "Even if she doesn't visit Yasukuni, her view of history does not change." This was true. Takaichi's personal thoughts on Yasukuni had not changed. She had merely postponed the shrine visit based on diplomatic calculations.

However, in real-world diplomacy, there are times when actions are more important than beliefs. It is a fact that she did not visit the shrine. That fact created space in Korea-Japan relations.

To handle Korea-Japan relations, one must look at two tracks simultaneously.

One is the history track. The issue of forced labor. The comfort women issue. Sovereignty over Dokdo. Yasukuni visits. These are problems that cannot be declared solved. As long as Takaichi is Prime Minister, these issues will not be fundamentally resolved. It is near impossible for South Korea and Japan to align perfectly on historical perception.

The other is the practical cooperation track. Semiconductors, rare earths, defense, cybersecurity, climate change, and North Korea. In these areas, the reasons for South Korea and Japan to cooperate are growing. Amidst the U.S.-China competition, the need for middle-power nations to cooperate among themselves is rising.

The most notable change during this period was that the trend of restoring Korea-Japan relations, which began during the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, continued under the Lee Jae-myung administration. A progressive president inherited and expanded the framework established by a conservative president and a conservative prime minister. It was a case where national interest took precedence over political ideology.

The same was true for Takaichi. A politician who personally had views on history distant from those of South Korea took care of relations with Korea in the name of practical diplomacy.

Can these two tracks run in parallel without colliding? Continuing practical cooperation while not ignoring the wounds of history is the eternal task of Korea-Japan relations.

A columnist for Global Economic wrote after the Gyeongju Summit: "A Korea-Japan summit where cooperation was declared, but order was not shared." It was a sharp evaluation. Although the two countries agreed to cooperate, their fundamental perceptions of right and wrong remained different. How to narrow that gap was the question that remained even after Gyeongju and Nara.

There is something I want to say honestly to Korean readers.

Sanae Takaichi is not a Japanese leader who possesses the historical perception that South Korea desires. She is a successor to the Abe line. She stands in the current of those who refuse to offer clear apologies for colonial rule and wars of aggression. Nor has her heart regarding the Yasukuni Shrine changed.

Yet at the same time, Takaichi is a realist who knows that completely destroying relations with South Korea is not in Japan's interest. In a situation where tensions with China are rising, South Korea is an even more important neighbor. As the United States went through the Trump era, the need for East Asian middle powers to cooperate independently has grown.

This is the reality of Korea-Japan relations. They are not drawing closer because they like each other. They are drawing closer because they need to. And how a relationship born of necessity will change over time depends on the people of both nations.

Takaichi, who said she likes Korean seaweed, dramas, and cosmetics—we cannot know if those words were sincere or mere diplomatic rhetoric. What matters is the fact that those words were spoken, and that they led to the meetings in Gyeongju and Nara.

A photograph remains of President Lee Jae-myung and Prime Minister Takaichi standing side by side in front of the stone walls of Horyu-ji. Before stones laid by artisans from the Korean Peninsula 1,500 years ago, the leaders of the two countries in the 21st century stood. History continues in that way—carrying wounds, calculating interests, and yet walking together.

The closest neighbors, the most difficult relationship. That relationship is still ongoing.

References

- First Summit between President Lee Jae-myung and Prime Minister Takaichi, Gyeongju APEC (MoneyS): https://www.moneys.co.kr/article/2025103018581054916 - Korea-Japan Summit and Key Outcomes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs): https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_29514/view.do?seq=15 - January 2026 Korea-Japan Summit (Namuwiki): https://namu.wiki/w/2026%EB%85%84%201%EC%9B%94%20%ED%95%9C%EC%9D%BC%EC%A0%95%EC%83%81%ED%9A%8C%EB%8B%B4 - Takaichi's remark: "I like Korean cosmetics, seaweed, and dramas" (Daum): https://v.daum.net/v/20251022002312744 - Japan-Korea Summit Meeting, January 13, 2026 (Embassy of Japan in Korea): https://www.kr.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_ko/news_20260114.html

When thinking about the future of Korea-Japan relations, Takaichi's approach is based on the framework of "separating historical issues from cooperation on current pending matters." For this framework to actually work, two conditions are necessary. First, a minimum level of sincerity must be shown on the history track. Refraining from direct Yasukuni visits was that signal. Second, visible results must be produced on the practical cooperation track. The agreement on rare earths and supply chains at the Nara Summit was that achievement.

How should a South Korean reader view this relationship? Sanae Takaichi is not the kind of Japanese Prime Minister that South Korea's progressive camp can welcome. Her position on historical perception is far from Korea's expectations. However, realpolitik is not about talking with the partner we want, but about talking with the partner who actually holds power.

Economic security, semiconductor supply chains, North Korean issues, and trilateral cooperation with the United States—in these areas, the interests of South Korea and Japan align. Building cooperation in those areas of alignment is realistic Korea-Japan diplomacy. Prime Minister Takaichi saying she "likes Korean seaweed" may be nothing more than a diplomatic gesture. However, the process of those gestures accumulating to become substance is also how the history of Korea-Japan relations progresses.