[AI Library] Chapter 27: The Genealogy of Conservatism — Abenomics Without Abe
Beyond the Glass Ceiling
Part 8: Shadows of Power
Chapter 27: The Genealogy of Conservatism — Abenomics Without Abe
Kim Kyung-jin
September 8, 1951, San Francisco. Shigeru Yoshida (吉田茂), Japan’s chief plenipotentiary, sat in the peace treaty signing hall wearing a morning coat. His face showed neither tension nor deep emotion; it was the expression of a seasoned diplomat.
With the signing that day, Japan regained its sovereignty. However, Yoshida was thinking of something even more important: how Japan would return to the world stage. That strategy was already complete in his mind.
Yoshida’s answer was simple: leave security to the United States and concentrate on the economy. Since vast defense expenditures could be saved thanks to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, those resources could be poured into industrial reconstruction. It was a paradoxical idea: a nation that lost the war could win the economic competition by avoiding the burden of war.
This was the Yoshida Doctrine. And this doctrine became the first pillar of postwar Japanese conservatism.
Thirty years passed. In 1982, Yasuhiro Nakasone (中曽根康弘) became Prime Minister.
He was a beneficiary of the Yoshida Doctrine, yet he also wanted to move beyond it. He believed that if Japan had become an economic superpower, it was now time to become a political superpower. He established a close relationship with U.S. President Reagan, calling each other by the nicknames "Ron and Yasu." He sought to break the convention of capping the defense budget within 1 percent of GDP and privatized the national railways (Japanese National Railways).
And on August 15, 1985, the anniversary of the end of the war, he paid an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. It was the first time for a prime minister in the postwar era. This visit drew fierce protests from China and South Korea. Nakasone eventually refrained from visiting Yasukuni thereafter, stepping back in the face of diplomatic reality.
Nakasone established the second pillar of Japanese conservatism: confidence based on economic success and a desire to redefine national identity. However, he also experienced the fact that this came at a diplomatic cost.
Shinzo Abe (安倍晋三) inherited these two pillars and established a third. Returning to the premiership in 2012, Abe spoke of the "departure from the postwar regime." It was a declaration of intent to change the framework of Japan created under U.S. leadership since 1945.
His economic policy was Abenomics, which consisted of three arrows. First, aggressive monetary easing: the Bank of Japan bought government bonds at an unprecedented level to pump money into the market. Second, flexible fiscal policy: the government did not hesitate to inject budget funds when the economy was sluggish. Third, a growth strategy: seeking to drive private investment through deregulation and opening up.
The performance of Abenomics remains a subject of debate. The yen weakened and stock prices rose. Corporate profits increased, and the unemployment rate fell. However, inflation fell short of target values, and real wages stagnated. Fiscal health deteriorated. Views coexist between those who believe Abenomics saved the Japanese economy and those who see it as having only exacerbated problems without solving fundamental issues.
In foreign policy and security, Abe pushed through revisions to security laws to allow for the right of collective self-defense. He increased defense spending and strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance. He visited Yasukuni once in December 2013 and refrained from doing so thereafter. While relations with China and South Korea deteriorated, Abe accepted that cost.
Then, on July 8, 2022, Abe passed away after being shot during a campaign speech.
Abe was gone. But his path did not disappear.
The existence of Sanae Takaichi proves this. She is a figure who has publicly declared her intention to carry on Abe’s political will. She was a staunch ally during Abe’s lifetime, and after his death, she became the most distinct successor managing his legacy.
However, "Abenomics without Abe" is not a simple copy. A copy is impossible.
Abe led the Abe faction (Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyukai), the largest faction within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). He possessed the political asset of being the longest-serving prime minister and held a strong grip over the party. He pursued Abenomics upon that foundation.
Takaichi lacks such a foundation. She has no faction. Her regional base is not particularly strong. Although she has long served as a representative for Nara’s 5th district, she has no experience leading a specific faction. She received Abe’s support in the 2021 leadership election but lost to Kishida. She competed until the end in the 2024 leadership election but lost again. Finally, in her third attempt in 2025, she became the party president.
This long struggle has tempered Takaichi. However, it also reveals a vulnerability: she became president without securing sufficient allies within the party.
The economic policy proposed by Takaichi is called "Sanaenomics." While it is a continuation of Abenomics, it has several different points of emphasis.
If the three arrows of Abenomics were monetary easing, fiscal policy, and growth strategy, Sanaenomics adds economic security to the mix. This involves safely securing supply chains for core resources such as semiconductors, batteries, and critical minerals. This field, which Takaichi led during her time as Minister of Economic Security, is the distinguishing feature of Sanaenomics.
In fiscal policy, Takaichi takes a stance of active fiscal expansion. This leads to conflict with the Ministry of Finance line, which prioritizes fiscal health. The Ministry of Finance is wary of additional spending in a situation where Japan’s national debt reaches 260 percent of GDP. Takaichi counters that without investment now, there is no growth, and without growth, there is no tax revenue. Her logic is that the government must invest in growth, even if it means incurring debt.
This confrontation is an old conflict within the LDP. Since the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s, forces prioritizing fiscal consolidation and those prioritizing economic stimulus have taken turns holding the initiative. During the Junichiro Koizumi era, structural reform and small government were emphasized. In the Abe era, the pendulum swung toward active fiscal policy. Takaichi has stood on the side of active fiscal policy, inheriting Abe’s line.
There is another fracture within the LDP.
It is the conflict between the foreign policy hawks and the realists. The hawks visit Yasukuni, do not compromise on historical perception, and strongly push for constitutional revision. The realists seek realistic compromises for the sake of stable diplomatic relations.
Interestingly, Abe possessed both characters simultaneously. He visited Yasukuni once in 2013 and refrained thereafter. While he took a hardline stance on historical perception, he managed relations with China so that they would not deteriorate too far. He walked a tightrope between ideals and reality.
Takaichi walks this tightrope less. Even after becoming prime minister, she visited the Yasukuni Shrine. She also maintains a consistently hardline stance on the issue of comfort women. This provides a sense of reliability to her supporters, while for her critics, it is a diplomatic risk factor.
From South Korea’s perspective, this is particularly sensitive. A Japanese prime minister’s visit to Yasukuni strongly provokes South Korean public opinion. How Takaichi handles this issue as prime minister is one of the major variables in Korea-Japan relations.
The genealogy of Japanese conservatism can be summarized as follows.
Shigeru Yoshida: Economy first, reliance on security. He created the framework for postwar Japan. Yasuhiro Nakasone: Emphasis on nationalism and national identity. However, he compromised in the face of diplomatic reality. Shinzo Abe: Revisionist conservative. He sought to change the postwar regime. Abenomics and security law revisions are his legacy. Sanae Takaichi: Abe’s successor. However, she tends to be more faithful to principles than Abe.
Reading the flow of this genealogy, Japanese conservatism has gradually moved toward emphasizing national identity. It is a pattern where confidence gained from economic success leads to stronger assertions in security and historical perception.
Takaichi represents the current point in this flow.
Can Abenomics without Abe succeed? To answer this question, one must first examine the success of Abenomics itself.
Those who support Abenomics say: It escaped deflation. It lowered the unemployment rate. The Japanese economy did not collapse. This alone is sufficient.
Those who criticize it say: Only debt increased. Households are not prosperous because real wages have not risen. Fundamental structural reforms were not carried out. It failed to solve the real problems of a low birth rate and an aging population.
The Takaichi administration must provide the final answer to this debate. Abe governed for eight years and left behind tasks. The time available to solve those tasks will be determined by how long Takaichi stays in power.
The genealogy of Japanese conservatism has continued: from Yoshida to Nakasone, from Nakasone to Abe, and from Abe to Takaichi. Where that genealogy goes next will be told by the achievements of the current Takaichi administration.
History judges by results. Whether the genealogy of conservatism was right or not will also eventually be judged by results.
Another task facing Takaichi is relations with South Korea and China. It was a pragmatic judgment for Abe not to visit Yasukuni again after experiencing diplomatic conflict with Korea and China following his visit. To what extent will Takaichi choose that pragmatism? What kind of balance will she find between upholding conservative principles and stabilizing East Asian diplomacy?
This question is also directly relevant to South Korean readers, as the future of Korea-Japan relations depends in part on the choices of a figure named Takaichi. Finding a way to live alongside neighboring countries while continuing the genealogy of conservatism—that is one of the tasks that 21st-century Japanese conservatism must solve.
References
- Sanae Takaichi Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanae_Takaichi - Edelman — Japan's New Chapter: The Birth of the Takaichi Administration: https://www.edelmanglobaladvisory.com/insights/japans-new-chapter-birth-takaichi-administration - Carnegie Endowment — Is Takaichi Japan's Future?: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/10/the-challenges-and-opportunities-facing-takaichi-sanae - Nippon.com — Did Takaichi's Landslide Finally Bring Japan's Postwar Era to an End?: https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-topics/c14058/ - Defence Research and Studies — Abe Legacy to Takaichi Vision: https://dras.in/abe-legacy-to-takaichi-vision-a-new-hawkish-era-in-japanese-foreign-policy/