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[AI Library] Chapter 29: Okinawa — An Unchanging Burden
Beyond the Glass Ceiling
Part 6: Reflection — What is Japan?
Chapter 29: Okinawa — An Unchanging Burden
Kim Kyung-jin
At dawn on April 1, 1945, the waves off the western coast of Okinawa turned red. A fleet of 1,500 U.S. ships filled the horizon. At 8:30 a.m. that morning, approximately 60,000 U.S. Marines and Army soldiers began their landing. The operation was codenamed "Iceberg." It was the last large-scale amphibious assault of the Pacific War.
The entire island became a battlefield. During 82 days of combat, the Japanese military established positions in underground caves and resisted until the very end. More than 12,000 U.S. soldiers were killed. Japanese military casualties exceeded 100,000. And then there were the residents of Okinawa. Out of a population of 450,000 at the time, approximately 120,000—one-fourth of the total—lost their lives in this battle. Combined, more than 200,000 soldiers and civilians died on this island.
Okinawan residents were sometimes killed by the Japanese military after being accused of being spies. Under the name of "group suicide," there were tragedies where families killed one another due to the coercion or pressure of the Japanese military. Instances occurred where mothers strangled their children and older brothers fed poison to their younger siblings. The war left Okinawa with the scar of being a sacrificial lamb for the defense of the Japanese mainland. Okinawan residents later said, "We were not protected by the army; we were abandoned by the army."
On June 22, organized resistance ended as Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima (牛島満), commander of the Okinawa defense forces, committed suicide. However, the suffering of the Okinawan people did not end. The island fell under U.S. occupation. While the Japanese mainland signed the instrument of surrender in September 1945 and eventually emerged from occupation, Okinawa was different. Okinawa simply remained under American rule.
Okinawa was returned to Japan on May 15, 1972. It was a reversion that came 27 years after the U.S. occupation began. However, the reversion was incomplete. The U.S. military bases remained exactly where they were.
The numbers tell the story. Okinawa is an island that accounts for only 0.6 percent of Japan's total land area. Yet, 70.3 percent of the facilities used exclusively by the U.S. military in Japan are concentrated on this small island. As of 2020, the area of exclusive U.S. military facilities in Okinawa was 18,483 hectares, accounting for 8.1 percent of the total area of Okinawa Prefecture. If narrowed down to the main island of Okinawa alone, that ratio rises to approximately 15 percent. Fifteen percent of the island is taken up by the bases of a foreign military.
Looking at Okinawa on a map makes it clear. The northern half of the island is a U.S. military training area. In the center of the island lies the massive Kadena (嘉手納) Air Base, the largest U.S. Air Force base in Asia. It is surrounded by private homes. At night, the noise of training flights disturbs sleep. Children wake up to the sound of explosions. Lawsuits over noise damage have been ongoing for decades.
Futenma (普天間) Marine Corps Air Station is located in the middle of Ginowan (宜野湾) City. Schools and hospitals surround the base. Fighter jets fly directly over residential areas. This is why it is often called one of the most dangerous military bases in the world. That danger became a reality in 2004 when a helicopter crashed onto the nearby campus of Okinawa International University. Miraculously, no students were killed, but the incident etched into the entire island's memory just how close the base is to people's daily lives.
The issue of relocating the Futenma base has been a conflict lasting over 30 years.
In 1995, an incident occurred where three U.S. Marines raped a 12-year-old girl in Okinawa. Enraged, 85,000 Okinawan residents took to the streets. it was the largest anti-base protest since the war. The Japanese government entered negotiations with the United States, and in 1996, both nations agreed to relocate the Futenma base to another location within Okinawa within five to seven years.
That "other location" was Henoko (辺野古). The plan was to reclaim the coast of Henoko in Nago (名護) City, northern Okinawa, to build a new base. Okinawan residents opposed this. They argued that it was merely moving Futenma, not eliminating it. They pointed out that the burden on Okinawa would remain the same, with only the location changing. They also raised concerns about the destruction of Henoko's beautiful coral reefs and ecosystem. The reasons for opposition continued to mount.
Reclamation work began in 2018. The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture attempted to stop the construction. Legal battles followed. In 2024, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state. Construction continued. The waters off Henoko were filled with red soil. The total project cost is estimated at approximately 930 billion yen. With the sudden discovery of soft ground, the completion date was pushed back to the 2030s or later.
A referendum was held in Okinawa in 2019. Seventy-two percent voted against the Henoko reclamation. However, the Japanese government ignored this result, citing the reason that the referendum was not legally binding. This is the essence of the Okinawa problem: expressing one's will through democratic procedures only to be ignored.
Sanae Takaichi has a connection to Okinawa. In 2006, under the first Abe cabinet, she entered the cabinet as Minister of State for Special Missions. Her role was in charge of Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs.
At that time, she was a young politician—a first-time cabinet member at the age of 45. She saw the reality of Okinawa with her own eyes: the private houses surrounding the bases, the noise of fighter jets, and the anger of the residents. It is unknown how that reality was received by her. However, if that experience did not influence her subsequent Okinawa policy, that too is an answer.
Even after becoming Prime Minister, this stance did not change. In her 2025 policy speech, she stated: "We will continue to work on reducing the base burden, including for Okinawa Prefecture. We will proceed with the relocation work to Henoko with the aim of the total return of Futenma Air Station as soon as possible." Continuing the Henoko relocation—this is Takaichi's Okinawa policy. The gap between what the Okinawan residents want and what the government does remains as wide as ever.
Okinawa's location is central to Taiwan contingency scenarios.
The distance between Okinawa and Taiwan is about 600 kilometers. From mainland China to Okinawa is about 800 kilometers. If a scenario arises where China invades Taiwan by force, the U.S. bases in Okinawa would serve as forward bases for U.S. intervention. Fighter jets taking off from Kadena Air Base can reach Taiwan's airspace within 10 minutes. This is why the United States and Japan are unwilling to ever give up the bases in Okinawa.
However, from the perspective of Okinawan residents, this carries a different meaning. If a conflict breaks out between China and the United States, Okinawa would be the first target of attack. Just as it was in 1945, Okinawa could once again become the front line of a war. This is what Okinawan residents fear most: having to shoulder the risk of war because of their geographical location, regardless of their own will.
The Takaichi administration's policies of increasing defense spending, pushing for constitutional amendment, and strengthening responses to a Taiwan contingency are logical from a security perspective. However, from Okinawa's perspective, that logic exposes the island to greater danger. Japan's strengthening military power feels to Okinawan residents not like a force that protects them, but like a force that drags them into danger.
To simplify Okinawa's complex emotions is to misunderstand them.
There is an independence movement. Okinawa was only incorporated into Japan in 1879. Before that, it was the independent Ryukyu Kingdom (琉球王國). The Ryukyu Kingdom was a nation with its own unique civilization that flourished through trade between China and Japan. Okinawan people possess an identity as Ryukyuan people before they are Japanese. Those who desire independence speak based on this identity. However, support for independence is not high. The power of identity has not yet surpassed the realities of the economy and security.
There is also the reality of the "base economy." This includes the consumption of base personnel, construction and maintenance work for the bases, and jobs that depend on the bases. A portion of Okinawa's economy relies on the bases. There is a practical fear regarding what would fill that economic void if the bases were to disappear.
However, the weight of the bases in Okinawa's economy has become smaller than before. The tourism industry has grown, and with increasing interest in Ryukyuan culture, new industrial possibilities are opening up. The number of Korean tourists visiting Okinawa is also rising rapidly. Those beautiful coral seas, the unique food, and the music of Ryukyu—these are Okinawa's true assets. Yet, as long as those assets exist alongside the bases, it is difficult for them to fully blossom.
The relationship between the Japanese government and Okinawa is one of structural inequality. In terms of population, Okinawa accounts for about 1 percent of Japan's total. It is also a minority in terms of the number of parliamentary seats. In a Diet where the Liberal Democratic Party holds an overwhelming majority, the voices of opposition lawmakers from Okinawa are numerically weak.
No matter how many anti-base candidates Okinawan voters elect, they remain a minority in the Diet as a whole. Even if they express opposition to the bases in a referendum, it is not legally binding. Even if they fight in court, the Supreme Court sides with the state. When all these paths are blocked, what remains is protest. Every morning in front of the Henoko reclamation site, elderly people sit on the road to block construction vehicles. Police lift them up, and the vehicles enter. The next morning, the elderly sit down again. This has been repeated for 10 years. Those elderly people remember the war of 1945. That memory brings them to the construction site every day.
Okinawa is a mirror showing that Japan's democracy is not complete.
If democracy is understood only through the principle of majority rule, then Okinawa simply has to lose. Even if 73 percent of the bases are here, if the majority of all voters in Japan want it that way, that is the end of it. However, liberal democracy is not just the rule of the majority. It also involves the protection of minority rights, respect for local autonomy, and compensation for disproportionate burdens. These are the other faces of democracy. As long as the Okinawa problem remains unresolved, it cannot be said that Japan's democracy is complete.
The place that was sacrificed most in the war and was forced to unilaterally shoulder the burden of the bases after the defeat. That burden remains in place, unchanged even after 70 years. Sanae Takaichi visited Okinawa as Prime Minister. In her speeches, she promised to reduce Okinawa's burden. Yet, the Henoko construction continues. The distance between words and reality. Okinawan residents live while measuring that distance.
The blue sea of Okinawa remains beautiful. The waters off Henoko, where reclamation is underway, are also still beautiful, if slightly less so. Before that beauty disappears, people stand in front of the construction site today, hoping that something will change. Whether the day will come when that distance narrows. Whether the day will come when Japanese politics honestly faces this question. That is one of the tasks that rests on the Takaichi era.
References
- 70% of U.S. Military Bases in Japan Concentrated in Okinawa (nippon.com): https://www.nippon.com/ja/japan-data/h01329/ - U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa (Wikipedia Japanese): https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%B2%96%E7%B8%84%E3%81%AE%E7%B1%B3%E8%BB%8D%E5%9F%BA%E5%9C%B0 - Battle of Okinawa (Wikipedia Korean): https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%98%A4%ED%82%A4%EB%82%98%EC%99%80_%EC%A0%84%ED%88%AC - Ministry of Defense — Reducing the Burden of Bases in Okinawa: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/saco/ - Okinawa Prefecture Official — Construction of the New Henoko Base: https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/heiwakichi/futenma/1017409/1017415.html - Data on the Ratio of Area of Exclusive U.S. Military Facilities in Okinawa Prefecture: https://www.pref.okinawa.lg.jp/_res/projects/default_project/_page_/001/017/415/r2_p04_05.pdf