7.1 Historical Foundations: Tagore’s 'Lamp of the East', the Legend of Queen Heo, and the 1973 Diplomatic Ties

February 22, 2019, Grand Intercontinental Seoul Parnas. Prime Minister Narendra Modi stood at the podium for the Seoul Peace Prize. After announcing that he would donate the entire $200,000 prize to the Clean Ganga Fund, he stated, "This award does not belong to me as an individual but to the 1.3 billion people of India." Before taking his seat, he added one more remark: "India is proud to have contributed to peace on the Korean Peninsula."

Where are the roots of that pride? To find the answer, one must travel back 2,000 years.

The *Samguk Yusa* (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms) tells a strange tale in its "Record of Garakguk." In 48 AD, Princess Suriratna of the Kingdom of Ayuta followed a divine revelation that appeared in her parents' dreams and crossed the sea by boat. She arrived in Garakguk, where she married King Kim Suro and became Heo Hwang-ok—Queen Heo. Today, the Gimhae Kim and Gimhae Heo clans of Korea honor this legendary couple as their founding ancestors.

There is ongoing debate regarding how much of this story can be considered historical fact. It is difficult to confirm whether "Ayuta" refers to Ayodhya in northern India or another region in Southeast Asia. There are no contemporary Indian records, and the possibility of later nationalistic reinterpretation cannot be ignored. However, the lack of historical evidence does not diminish the power of this narrative. In diplomacy, a good story sometimes lasts longer than a treaty. Once a narrative takes hold in the human heart, cold numbers—such as summits, investment agreements, and defense contracts—can be built steadily upon it.

Prime Minister Modi grasped the diplomatic value of this legend more accurately than anyone else. During his 2015 visit to Korea, his 2019 Seoul Peace Prize acceptance, and meetings with the Korean diaspora, he repeatedly stated that "Korea and India are countries joined by marriage." This was no mere pleasantry. The legend aligns perfectly with Hindu nationalism, his political foundation. Ayodhya is the birthplace of the Hindu deity Lord Ram and a core holy site for the Hindu revivalist movement led by Modi and the ruling BJP. A narrative of kinship stretching from the lands of ancient myth to Korea: for Modi, this was the perfect material to gain both religious symbolism and diplomatic utility simultaneously.

Actions followed. In November 2018, at Prime Minister Modi's invitation, First Lady Kim Jung-sook made a solo visit to India. It was the first solo overseas trip by a Korean First Lady in 16 years. Modi invited her as the chief guest for the Diwali festival in Ayodhya, and the two attended the groundbreaking ceremony for the Queen Heo Memorial Park together. This was "emotional diplomacy" shared under the lights of a festival rather than stiff diplomatic protocol. The scene transformed the image of Korea in the eyes of the Indian people from a "distant country" to a "country of relatives." How this cultural link connects with K-pop and K-dramas to form a new Hallyu (Korean Wave) diplomacy will be discussed in Chapter 9, Section 9.4.

Closer in time than the legend of Queen Heo, but no less resonant emotionally, is a connection left by the Indian poet-saint Rabindranath Tagore: a four-line poem.

It happened in 1929 when Tagore was visiting Japan. A Korean reporter asked him to visit Korea, but his schedule did not permit it. Tagore contributed a short poem as a gesture of apology and solidarity.

"In the golden age of Asia / Korea was one of its lamp-bearers / And that lamp is waiting to be lighted once again / For the illumination in the East"

A four-line poem. Yet, the impact this poem had on colonial Joseon far exceeded its length. Asia's first Nobel laureate in literature had declared to a nation suffering under the same imperialism: "You are not a forgotten, weak nation, but a shining lamp." It was both a comfort and a prophecy. And that prophecy came true. Korea rose from the ruins of war to become one of the world's top ten economies, and Tagore’s poem remains in Korean textbooks to this day, ensuring India is remembered as a "spiritual brother."

Prime Minister Modi did not miss the value of this poem either. During a meeting with the Korean community in Seoul in 2015, he directly quoted Tagore's poem, saying, "As Tagore prophesied, Korea has become the Lamp of the East and is radiating its light." The skill of converting a past literary heritage into a current diplomatic asset: this is the core of Modi-style "storytelling diplomacy."

Between the legends and the poems, there is a bond forged with bullets and scalpels.

When the Korean War broke out in 1950, newly independent India chose neutrality. Instead of combat troops, it sent a medical unit: the 60th Parachute Field Ambulance, consisting of 346 medical personnel. Led by Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Rangaraj, they were deployed to the front lines immediately after arriving in Busan in November 1950.

Though they held scalpels instead of rifles, the war they experienced was as harsh as that of any combatant. In the winter of 1950, as Chinese forces broke through UN defense lines, the 60th Unit was ordered to retreat but refused to abandon its medical equipment. Lacking transport vehicles, they found an old steam locomotive, loaded their gear, and escaped. In March 1951, they participated in "Operation Tomahawk," the second-largest airborne operation of the Korean War, alongside the U.S. 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. Twelve Indian officers, including Lt. Col. Rangaraj, donned parachutes and jumped into enemy territory. Medical officers had volunteered for an airborne operation. Over three years, they treated more than 20,000 casualties and received unit citations from both the U.S. and South Korean militaries. They earned the nickname "Maroon Angels."

India's role was even more decisive during the armistice negotiations. India served as the chair of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), mediating the repatriation of approximately 22,000 prisoners of war (POWs) rejected by South Korea, North Korea, and China. Under the command of General K.S. Thimayya, about 5,000 Indian troops were deployed to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). These forces were not for combat; their mission was to manage the POWs, confirm their intent for repatriation, and execute the return procedures. It was an extremely difficult task, both diplomatically and militarily, requiring them to take no sides while earning the trust of both parties. General Thimayya became a legendary figure in the Indian military for completing this mission and later rose to become the Chief of Army Staff.

This experience, where 346 medical personnel wiped away blood and 5,000 soldiers mediated POWs, showed India's "active involvement" hidden under the name of "neutrality." Because they did not fire weapons, India's name is often omitted from Korea's memories of the war, but it is questionable whether the final piece of the armistice agreement could have been fitted without India.

Because of this history, the official establishment of diplomatic ties in December 1973 was less a beginning of a new relationship and more an institutional confirmation of an old bond. However, for a while after established ties, the two countries remained merely "polite neighbors." Under the Cold War structure, India was a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, while South Korea was a staunchly anti-communist state. India's socialist-style closed economy and Korea's export-led economy ran on different tracks.

The tide turned after India's economic liberalization in 1991. As India opened its doors, Korean companies began to move: LG Electronics (1997), Hyundai Motor (1996), and Samsung Electronics (1995). They boldly entered the Indian market at a time when most multinational corporations were hesitant. And when the 1997 Asian financial crisis struck, while many foreign firms withdrew from India, Korean companies stayed. This choice became trust, and trust turned into market share.

From Queen Heo’s boat to Tagore’s poem, from the Maroon Angels to the 1973 diplomatic ties, and the entry of Korean companies in the 1990s—the relationship between Korea and India cannot be explained by a single event. There are stories stacked layer by layer over 2,000 years, and today's diplomacy, economy, and security cooperation stand upon those stories. Narendra Modi was a politician who knew the value of these narratives. He knew how to convert ancient legends into modern diplomatic assets, a poet’s prophecy into a Prime Minister’s speech, and wartime friendship into strategic trust.

7.2 Elevation to a Special Strategic Partnership: Modi’s 2015 Visit and Deepening Cooperation Across Administrations

July 2018, Noida, near New Delhi. The leaders of the two nations stood side-by-side at the completion ceremony of Samsung Electronics' world's largest smartphone factory. President Moon Jae-in and Prime Minister Narendra Modi traveled to the factory via subway instead of protocol vehicles. A photo of the two suited leaders standing among passengers, holding onto handrails, spread throughout India. It might have been a performance based on political calculation, but the message conveyed by that single photograph was clear: Korea and India are moving in the same direction.

The background that made this scene possible was a decision made in May 2015.

When Prime Minister Modi made a state visit to Korea the year after taking office, the two countries added the word "Special" to their existing "Strategic Partnership." Adding one word to diplomatic rhetoric might seem trivial. However, the number of countries to which India has granted the status of a "Special Strategic Partnership" is very small. Korea’s inclusion on this list alongside traditional powers like Japan and Russia shows how Modi positions Korea.

The "elevation" of the relationship is important because it changes how individual projects are handled. Before the elevation, issues—whether trade or investment—were handled on an ad-hoc basis. After the elevation, multiple tracks of diplomacy, economy, and security operate simultaneously under top-level agreements. A structure is created where, even if one field falters, others hold firm. This is how the "Special Strategic" framework actually functions.

There is a notable passage in the 2015 joint statement. Modi called Korea a "privileged partner" in the "Make in India" policy (refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.2 for the full vision and strategy of the Make in India policy). He also promised to establish "Korea Plus," a dedicated investment facilitation cell for Korean companies, within India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Creating a dedicated window within a government department for companies of a specific country is an unusual measure. For Korea, it would be similar to setting up a separate "India Investment One-Stop Center" within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Had this elevation ended with a single summit, it would have been mere diplomatic rhetoric. It did not.

Whenever the administration changed in Korea, the policy of prioritizing India, far from wavering, was actually strengthened. This is a unique feature of the Korea-India relationship.

The Park Geun-hye administration elevated the relationship. The Moon Jae-in administration filled it with practical substance. President Moon Jae-in announced the "New Southern Policy," which elevated ASEAN and India to core cooperation targets on par with the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia, and India became a key partner in this policy. Prime Minister Modi’s "Act East Policy" and Korea’s "New Southern Policy" mirrored each other. Korea sought to broaden its diplomatic scope toward ASEAN and India, while India sought to expand into East Asia to strengthen its economy and security. Their directions aligned.

President Moon Jae-in's state visit to India in 2018 was the moment this synergy took concrete form. Prime Minister Modi took the unusual step of personally greeting him at the New Delhi airport. In diplomatic protocol, a Prime Minister’s airport reception is the highest level of hospitality. Guided by Vice Chairman Lee Jae-yong, the two leaders toured the production lines at the Samsung Electronics Noida factory. A site where Korean technology produced goods for the global market through the hands of Indian workers on Indian soil: for Modi, this factory was a showcase proving the success of "Make in India," and for President Moon, it was a fruit of the "New Southern Policy."

In November of the same year, at Prime Minister Modi's invitation, First Lady Kim Jung-sook visited India alone. She attended the groundbreaking ceremony for the Queen Heo Memorial Park and the Diwali festival. Although it was a visit by the First Lady rather than the head of state, its impact was no less significant. Indian media gave it major coverage, stating, "Korea's First Lady was with the Indian people under the lights of the festival." Emotional diplomacy where hearts met, rather than rigid diplomacy: this served as the catalyst that rapidly boosted the sense of intimacy toward Korea among the Indian people.

The momentum continued under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. 2023 marked the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties between Korea and India. President Yoon and Prime Minister Modi held two summits: at the G7 Hiroshima summit and the G20 New Delhi summit. They discussed expanding defense cooperation, stabilizing supply chains, and cooperating on core technologies. With the activation of the Electronic Origin Data Exchange System (EODES) between the customs authorities of both countries, a practical hurdle to utilizing the Korea-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was removed. The Yoon administration sought to elevate cooperation with India within the framework of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy," and under this stance, the 6th Foreign Affairs-Security Dialogue was held in Seoul in February 2026. The regularization of vice-ministerial dialogue channels shows that the relationship between the two countries has moved beyond personal chemistry between leaders and into the realm of bureaucratic habit.

In terms of numbers, bilateral trade has not yet reached its target. As of the 2024–25 fiscal year, Korea-India trade volume stands at approximately $26.9 billion. To reach the goal of $50 billion by 2030, it must nearly double. Even after CEPA took effect in 2010, Korea's exports to India did not explode as expected. This was due to bottlenecks such as India's complex state-level regulations, low logistics infrastructure, and the low degree of liberalization in CEPA itself. Negotiations to improve CEPA are currently underway, with both sides discussing expanding the scope of tariff reductions on goods and further liberalizing the service and investment sectors.

Nevertheless, the reason both countries do not give up on this relationship is clear: there is a structural necessity. For Korea, India is an alternative market and production base that can reduce dependence on China. For India, Korea is a mentor and investor with advanced technology and manufacturing know-how. This complementarity does not disappear even if the administration on either side changes.

Thus, the 2015 elevation to a "Special Strategic Partnership" was not diplomatic rhetoric; it was an act of placing the bilateral relationship on an institutional framework rather than relying on personal ties or temporary needs. Creating a structure that persists even when leaders change, the economy wavers, or the security environment shifts is a rare and difficult feat in diplomacy.

7.3 Korea as an Economic Model: The "Make Gujarat Like Korea" Remark

October 7, 2018, Dehradun, northern India. At the opening of the Uttarakhand Investors Summit, Prime Minister Modi looked back on the past.

"It was on October 7, 2001, when I first became the Chief Minister of Gujarat. I didn't even know what government was. I had zero experience. I was a complete novice. A reporter asked me, 'Who is the role model for Gujarat's development?' Usually, people answer 'like America' or 'like Britain' to such a question. I answered differently: 'I want to make Gujarat like Korea.'"

The reporter was reportedly puzzled. Modi continued his explanation. "The population of Gujarat and the population of Korea are similar. I studied that point very precisely. If we move in that direction, we will not stop."

While this remark was first made public in the 2018 Dehradun speech, Modi's obsession with the Korean model began much earlier. From immediately after his inauguration as Chief Minister of Gujarat in 2001 to the moment he said, "I want to transplant Korea's development experience to India" during his visit to Seoul in 2015, he repeatedly mentioned Korea. This was not diplomatic lip service, but the analysis of a pragmatist.

What did Modi see in Korea? Why Korea, among so many countries?

There were four reasons.

First, similarity in scale. The population of Gujarat is approximately 60 million, while Korea's is about 50 million. Modeling after the U.S. or China would not be a realistic benchmark due to the massive difference in scale. Korea was a size comparable to Gujarat.

Second, state-led industrialization. Korea succeeded in industrialization through a structure where the government drew the blueprint, the bureaucracy allocated resources, and private enterprises executed. An example of maintaining a democratic system while enforcing a strong role for the state. Between authoritarian industrialization (the Chinese style) and pure marketism (the American style), Korea showed a middle path that Modi could take.

Third, export-led growth. Korea, with its small domestic market, targeted the global market from the beginning. Gujarat was also a hub for maritime trade within India, and Modi wanted to convert this tradition into modern export industries.

Fourth, the Chaebol system. The way the Korean government fostered a few large corporations like Hyundai, Samsung, and POSCO as "national champions" to create global competitiveness. Modi sought to assign similar roles to large Indian corporations such as Reliance, Adani, and Tata. The government-chaebol cooperation structure of the Park Chung-hee era became a reference point for setting up government-business relations in Gujarat.

Modi experimented with this structure in Gujarat. He created the "Vibrant Gujarat" Global Investors Summit, rolling out the red carpet for businesspeople worldwide (refer to Chapter 3 for the start and growth of Vibrant Gujarat). He established one-stop administrative services that stably supplied the power and water needed for factories. When Tata Motors abandoned a site for its Nano factory in West Bengal due to political conflict, Modi showed the decisiveness to attract it to Gujarat in just a few days. His saying, "I will lay out a red carpet instead of bureaucratic red tape," was an Indian version of the "Pali-pali" (hurry-hurry) administration that the Korean government had shown in the 1960s and 70s.

Physical points of contact with Korea existed in Gujarat. Korea's POSCO operated a cold-rolled steel sheet plant in Gujarat, and the Hazira plant, where Hanwha Aerospace and L&T cooperated to assemble K-9 Vajra self-propelled howitzers, is located in Gujarat. To Modi, Korean companies were not slogans but a reality that created jobs and transferred technology within his jurisdiction.

After becoming Prime Minister, Modi expanded the Gujarat experiment to all of India. The core logic of the "Make in India" policy was borrowed from the Korean model. The judgment was that India, which had a deformed growth structure centered on the service industry (IT outsourcing), must plant manufacturing industries that have a large job-creation effect. And as the model answer for that manufacturing, he pointed to the factories established by Korean companies in India.

The Samsung Electronics Noida factory became a symbol of this strategy. This factory, completed in 2018, is the world's largest smartphone production facility. The message Prime Minister Modi sent to the world while cutting the completion ribbon alongside President Moon was simple: "India can do it too." Hyundai Motor's Chennai plant became the foundation for the second-largest domestic and largest exporting company in India, and LG Electronics swept the Indian home appliance market. The stories of each company's Indian business are covered in detail in Chapter 8.

Modi actively promoted the success of Korean companies as his own policy achievements. At the same time, he applied the way the Korean Chaebol system laid the foundation for the national economy to India. He fostered large Indian corporations like Reliance, Adani, and Tata as "national champions" and provided them with policy support. In terms of structure, it is a method resembling how the government nurtured Hyundai, Samsung, and POSCO during Korea's Park Chung-hee era.

Of course, there are limits to this comparison. Korea is a single nation of 50 million people. India is a federal nation of 1.4 billion people where 28 states each have different regulations and tax systems. It is impossible to replicate the Korean model exactly. The fact that Modi compared a state-level unit like "Gujarat" to Korea reflects this reality. While the entire continent of India cannot be compared to Korea as a whole, the calculation was that one piece called Gujarat could be.

Recently, this cooperation has been expanding beyond consumer goods into high-tech fields such as semiconductors, electric vehicles (EVs), and AI. India has made "semiconductor self-reliance" a national task and is attracting investment by providing extraordinary incentives (Production Linked Incentives, PLI) to Korean companies, which are leaders in memory semiconductors. For Modi, Korea is a "senior he wants to learn from" and at the same time a "realistic partner" who will turn India's potential into reality.

"Make Gujarat like Korea." This 2001 remark is being realized across the stage of all India now, 24 years later. However, whether that process can be as fast and smooth as Korea's remains an open question.

7.4 Defense and Security Cooperation: K-9 Vajra, Military Intelligence Sharing, and NSG Support

January 2019, Hazira, Gujarat. Prime Minister Modi stood atop a K-9 Vajra self-propelled howitzer at L&T's defense plant. The photo of him giving a thumbs-up spread throughout India. A scene where a Prime Minister personally climbs onto a weapon is rare even in Indian politics. What he intended to show was clear: this weapon was not bought from abroad but made on Indian soil by the hands of Indian workers.

The K-9 Vajra is considered the first visible achievement in Korea-India defense cooperation. "Vajra" refers to the thunderbolt weapon used by the deity Indra in Hindu mythology. The name itself is a product of combining Korean technology with Indian identity.

The project dates back to 2015. The Indian Ministry of Defence held an international tender for 155mm 52-caliber self-propelled howitzers to replace its aging artillery. Korea's Hanwha Aerospace (then Hanwha Techwin) was selected, beating Russia's 2S19 Msta-S. There were two decisive factors: performance and local production.

In accordance with the Modi government's "Make in India" principle, a structure was designed where the first 10 units were manufactured in Korea and the remaining 90 units were assembled and produced by India's L&T at the Hazira plant in Gujarat. The formal contract was signed in April 2017, and all 100 units were delivered by 2020. A structure where Korea transfers technology instead of just selling finished products, and India makes them itself: this was the method Modi wanted, and it was the method Hanwha Aerospace agreed to.

The K-9 Vajra met its true testing ground in 2020. In June of that year, India and China had a bloody clash in the Galwan Valley of the Himalayan highlands. It was the first time in 45 years that casualties had occurred (refer to Chapter 6, Section 6.3 for the full course of the Galwan clash and its impact on India-China relations). The Indian military urgently deployed K-9 Vajras to the Ladakh plateau. An environment over 4,000 meters above sea level and 30 degrees Celsius below zero. Conditions where thin air reduces the output of general engines and the limits of equipment designed for deserts are easily revealed. The K-9 Vajra proved its mobility and strike capability in these adverse conditions. The Indian military leadership was satisfied.

Satisfaction led to additional orders. In December 2024, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) officially approved the second K-9 Vajra project—the introduction of 100 additional units—and the contract was signed in the same month. In April 2025, Hanwha Aerospace held a signing ceremony for a parts supply contract worth approximately $253 million at the Indian Embassy in Seoul. The local production rate in India, which was 50% in the first project, will increase to 60% in the second project. An increase in the localization rate means that the transfer of technology from the Korean side deepens, and it also means that the Indian defense industry's own capabilities rise to the next level. According to reports, discussions are also underway for the introduction of 200 more units, which may include engine upgrades optimized for high-altitude operation. If this materializes, the K-9 Vajra will become the backbone of the Indian Army's artillery power.

In the defense industry, additional orders are more difficult than the first. The first order is achieved through expectations and promises. An additional order is only made after confirming the results of actual operation, the stability of the maintenance system, the reliability of parts supply, and performance in various environments. The fact that the K-9 Vajra received an additional order means that India's trust in Korean weapons systems has moved beyond promises on paper to trust verified in the field.

It is not just about arms deals. The two countries have also proceeded with the institutionalization of security dialogue. A vice-ministerial 2+2 dialogue channel for foreign affairs and defense was newly established, and joint naval exercises and mutual port calls have expanded. A foundation for sharing maritime security information in the Indian and Pacific Oceans was laid through a military intelligence protection agreement.

All of this forms a single system. Defense cooperation is the hardware, information sharing is the software, and the 2+2 dialogue is the operating system. Only when the three are combined does the system called a security partnership function.

Mutual support on the international stage cannot be overlooked either. Korea supports India's early entry into the four major export control regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This is not just diplomatic protocol. It means that Korea, a core member of the NSG, recognizes India as a "responsible nuclear-armed state" and is a declaration that it will stand by India despite China's opposition. India highly values this support.

There is also support in the opposite direction. India has consistently supported Korea's position regarding North Korea's nuclear provocations and has participated in implementing UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. A relationship that watches each other's backs on core security issues: while economic cooperation can be shaken by economic fluctuations, such mutual support based on norms is a way of building long-term trust.

When the muzzle of the K-9 Vajra is pointed toward the Himalayan highlands, Korean technology, Indian needs, and the strategic trust between the two countries are loaded within it together.

7.5 Indo-Pacific Strategic Partners: A Similar Dilemma Between the U.S. and China

If you ask a Korean diplomat, "What is the most difficult question?" the likely answer will be: "The question of where you will stand between the United States and China." If you ask an Indian diplomat the same question, a similar answer will return. Only the terminology is slightly different. Korea calls this "strategic ambiguity," while India calls it "strategic autonomy." The words are different, but the structure of the dilemma that causes sleepless nights is the same.

Let's look at Korea's situation. The core of its security is the ROK-U.S. alliance. 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed on the Korean Peninsula, and a nuclear umbrella deters North Korea's threats. Yet, its largest trading partner is China. China is a market that absorbs about 20% of Korea's exports. The economic retaliation China imposed on Korea during the 2016 THAAD deployment showed how realistic this dilemma is.

Let's look at India's situation. India simultaneously manages the Quad, traditional friendly relations with Russia, and a 3,000-kilometer border confrontation with China. Modi's "multi-alignment" strategy—an approach of flexibly aligning on an issue-by-issue basis without belonging completely to any one camp—emerged from this complex equation (refer to Chapter 6, Section 6.1 for the specific aspects of India's multi-alignment strategy and participation in Quad/BRICS, and Chapter 6, Section 6.3 for the overall framework of the Indo-Pacific strategy).

A comparison of the structures reveals similarities. Both countries are closely linked to the United States in terms of security, intertwined with China in terms of economy, and feel a direct threat due to their geographical proximity to China. For Korea, there is the existential threat of North Korea, with China standing behind it. For India, there is its long-time enemy Pakistan, also supported by China. This is not a coincidence, but a similarity in geopolitical structure.

This similar dilemma makes the two countries natural partners. When countries that cannot fully choose one side between the U.S. and China join hands, they gain bargaining power that is impossible as individual nations. This is the core logic of Korea-India cooperation in the Indo-Pacific strategy.

In October 2024, India and China agreed on the disengagement of troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). It was a partial resolution of the military confrontation that had lasted for more than four years since the 2020 Galwan clash. With this agreement, India's strategic environment seemed to ease somewhat. However, as the "Pahalgam incident" broke out in April 2025, India fell back into tension with Pakistan (refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.5 and Chapter 9 for the development of the Pahalgam crisis and India-Pakistan relations). A pattern where, when one front quiets down, a fire breaks out on another. India's security environment is complex in a different way than Korea's, but with a similar intensity.

There is a space where this common dilemma leads to concrete cooperation: the restructuring of supply chains. As the U.S.-China conflict spreads beyond a trade war into a tech hegemony war, "China Plus One" has become a survival task for both countries. Korean companies must diversify their production facilities concentrated in China. India seeks to be the beneficiary of this diversification. The participation of both Korea and India as founding members of the U.S.-led IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework) is the institutionalization of this logic.

Reducing dependence on China in the supply chains of core materials such as semiconductors, batteries, and rare earths is a common interest for both countries. Korea can provide semiconductor design and production technology, while India can provide a huge market and labor force. This is not just business; it is a matter of economic security.

There is a larger picture. India identifies itself as a leader of the "Global South," representing developing and underdeveloped nations. Korea aims to be a "Global Pivotal State" that bridges advanced and developing nations. A structure where the two countries can together play the role of a bridge filling the gap between the Western G7 and the rest of the world. Korea's active cooperation when India held the G20 presidency in 2023 was a preview of this possibility.

In April 2025, two things happened in Seoul. The signing of a K-9 Vajra parts supply contract between Hanwha Aerospace and L&T took place at the Indian Embassy. In the same month, a Korea-India-U.S. 1.5-track dialogue was held in Seoul to discuss the vision and synergy of trilateral cooperation. It is no coincidence that a defense contract and a strategic dialogue took place in the same month. It is a signal that hardware and software, economy and security, are moving as a single package. The emergence of the Korea-India-U.S. trilateral dialogue shows that bilateral relations have begun to expand into trilateral ones.

Korea and India are becoming "essential" rather than "choices" for each other. Because they are countries that cannot make a perfect choice between the U.S. and China, there is a high possibility of developing "cooperation that does not force a perfect choice." A rules-based maritime order, supply chain resilience, joint defense production, and high-tech cooperation: these agendas move in the language of "capability building" rather than the language of "taking sides."

Capability building lasts longer than diplomatic rhetoric. And only that which lasts deserves to be called strategy.