Table of Contents
Han Dong-hoon, Busan Buk-gu Gap: A Record of the 100 Days Before and After the Election (Mar. 26-Jul. 3, 2026)
Kim Kyung-jin
Table of Contents and 13 sections
From March 26 to July 3, 2026, this record follows the spring after expulsion, the Busan Buk-gu Gap by-election, victory as an independent, and the first bill submitted in the National Assembly.
Table of Contents
Artificial Intelligence and Medicine
Kim Kyung-jin, Attorney at Law
AI in clinical care, hospitals, education, and research
AI in medical imaging, risk prediction, treatment planning, hospital operations, education, and research, with patient safety, privacy, and accountability.
[AI Library] Chapter 23: Diplomacy with the United States — The Alliance in the Trump Era
Beyond the Glass Ceiling
Part 5: Power — Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi
Chapter 23: Diplomacy with the United States — The Alliance in the Trump Era
Kim Kyung-jin
Evening, March 19, 2026, Washington D.C.
Tablecloths were laid out in the White House banquet hall. Silver candlesticks gleamed. It was a dinner hosted by President Donald Trump himself. The guest was Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. It was an evening when the heat of the summit held earlier that day had not yet cooled.
Trump proposed a toast. According to a Japanese Foreign Ministry official who conveyed the atmosphere of the banquet, he used the expression "the best partner (相棒)." Takaichi also responded. "To realize a strong Japan and a strong America, a prosperous Japan and a prosperous America, we are the strongest partners (最強の相棒)."
The flashes of the press went off. This scene was broadcast across Japan that night.
However, behind those smiles were complex calculations. There were tariff issues, the problem of defense cost-sharing, and the landmine of a request to dispatch troops to the Strait of Hormuz. Takaichi was calculating even as she smiled. Trump was the same.
Takaichi first experienced the United States in 1987.
At that time, with the support of the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management (松下政経塾), she went to Washington, D.C. She entered the office of Patricia Schroeder, a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Schroeder was a prominent lawmaker known for fighting for women's rights in American politics. Takaichi helped with legislative research work in that office.
Later, a controversy arose over this career. This was because Takaichi had listed herself as a "Congressional Legislative Investigator (立法調查官)" on the cover of her first book. In reality, she was working in an intern-like capacity in the lawmaker's office with the status of a researcher funded by the Matsushita Institute, not a U.S. federal civil servant. Since U.S. government officials can, in principle, only be U.S. citizens, it was pointed out that this description was an exaggeration.
However, apart from this controversy, the experience in Washington itself left a deep impression on Takaichi. Later, she wrote a book on the subject of the U.S. Congress. The title was "America's Representatives (アメリカの代議士たち) — The Real Face of the U.S. Congress." It was an observation of how parliamentary democracy works. The scene where laws are made. Lobbying by interest groups. The relationship between lawmakers and aides. It was written based on what she saw firsthand with the eyes of someone in her 20s.
This experience formed Takaichi's view of Japan-U.S. relations. It was not knowing the U.S. as an abstract ally, but the experience of walking the halls of Congress herself and hearing the speech and logic of lawmakers with her own ears. The view of America for someone with that experience is different from someone without it.
Two days after her inauguration as Prime Minister on October 21, 2025, Takaichi made the first phone call. The recipient was Trump. It was her first call with a foreign leader after taking office. It was a clear message that she would prioritize the Japan-U.S. alliance.
About five months later, on March 19, 2026, an official summit was held in Washington.
The key outcome of the meeting was expressed in numbers. $550 billion. Approximately 87 trillion won. This was the scale of investment Japan planned to make in the United States. It was a number that combined the relationship Shinzo Abe had built through golf diplomacy during the first Trump administration with the logic of the "fair deal" demanded by Trump.
Specifically, the details were as follows. Construction of small modular reactors (SMRs). A nuclear power plant to be built in Tennessee and Alabama by a joint venture between GE Vernova and Hitachi. Worth up to $40 billion. Added to this was the construction of natural gas power generation facilities in Pennsylvania. Worth up to $17 billion. Joint development of rare earths. Exploration of rare mineral resources in the southern current waters. All of this was agreed upon in a single summit.
Trump called it a "very fair deal." Takaichi called it "the strongest partnership." Both showed satisfied expressions. At least in front of the cameras.
However, there were also issues that were not easily resolved at the meeting.
It was the tariff issue. The automobile tariffs, steel tariffs, and semiconductor tariffs imposed by the second Trump administration. These hit the Japanese economy directly. Takaichi had been firm on this issue since the party leadership election. While criticizing the Ishiba Cabinet's response to tariff negotiations during her time in the opposition, she had said, "The leadership is not visible." Even after becoming Prime Minister, it was not easy.
The tariff issue was not completely resolved at the summit. Trump showed flexibility in certain areas but was firm regarding automobiles. The Japanese automobile industry tried to avoid tariff pressure by building factories directly in the U.S. or increasing investment. It was a workaround rather than a fundamental solution.
The Strait of Hormuz issue was more sensitive. Trump requested contributions from allies amid tensions with Iran. Japan was also a target of this request. After the summit, Takaichi told reporters, "There are things we can and cannot do within the laws of Japan. I explained this to President Trump in detail." This was an attempt to wrap the word "no" as diplomatically as possible. Trump said he understood on the spot, but it was unclear whether he was satisfied.
This is the difficulty of Trump's diplomacy. Trump is hard to predict. One day he is an ally, and the next he imposes tariffs. One day he criticizes, and the next he praises someone as the best. To maintain a stable alliance relationship amidst such fickleness, one must bolster the other's pride while protecting their own national interests. Japan has been performing this balancing act since the Abe era.
Shinzo Abe and Trump. The relationship between the two was famous for its personal friendship. Golf. Gifts. Titles. Abe knew how to handle Trump. It was a method of stimulating Trump's vanity while securing practical benefits. The Japanese media called it "Abe's Trump Diplomacy."
Takaichi's claim to be Abe's political successor meant inheriting this diplomatic style as well. Before Takaichi visited the U.S., experts from American think tanks advised, "Dive into his arms like Abe did. Praise him. Show respect and consideration to his inner circle." They were telling her to follow Abe's formula.
Takaichi followed that advice to some extent. She made a statement saying, "Only Trump can bring peace to the world." This remark became a controversy within Japan. It was criticized for being too subservient. Takaichi's side said to "look at the context," but the statement itself spread as is to the international media.
Bloomberg analyzed just before Takaichi's visit to Washington: "Takaichi embarks on a visit to Trump amid a sudden change in the situation regarding the response to Hormuz." The visit, which was initially being prepared smoothly, had become complicated due to the Iran issue. Diplomacy is always accompanied by variables.
Views on evaluating Takaichi's diplomacy toward the U.S. are divided.
Positive view: The $550 billion investment package has opened a new chapter in Japan-U.S. economic cooperation. It has upgraded the relationship from a simple security alliance to a partner in shared economic prosperity. The fact that Trump called it a "fair deal" is a signal that the U.S. recognizes Japan as a serious negotiating partner.
Critical view: The $550 billion investment is essentially a surrender to tariff pressure. It is taking money that Japanese companies should invest in their own country to the U.S. In the long run, it could accelerate the hollowing out of Japanese manufacturing. The expression "strongest partner" is also excessively subservient.
Both views are partially correct. In diplomacy, there is a reality where principles alone are not enough. The Japan-U.S. alliance is the foundation of Japan's security. To protect that foundation, the demands of the U.S. must be met to some extent. The question is the line of how far to go.
Where did Takaichi draw that line? In Hormuz, she maintained the line of "within the scope permitted by law." In tariffs, she responded with investment. Whether this was the best line will be judged by history.
When thinking about the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance, there is one variable. How long will Trump be president? The term of a U.S. president is four years. The second Trump term is from 2025 to 2029. What happens after that is unknown.
Takaichi's term is also a variable. She must go through the party leadership election and the general election for the House of Representatives. Economic performance, domestic politics, and diplomatic achievements. Everything affects her term.
However, one thing is certain. The Japan-U.S. alliance should not depend solely on the personal relationship of any one political leader. While the golf diplomacy of Abe and Trump was remarkable, it cannot replace a structural alliance relationship. The framework of systems, treaties, and military cooperation. This is the foundation of an alliance that remains unshaken even when personal friendships change.
On the night of March 19, 2026, the candles in the White House banquet hall were extinguished. Takaichi left Washington. What she brought back was the $550 billion agreement and the words "strongest partner." Whether that will truly open a new chapter in the alliance or end as just another scene in a photograph. The answer has not yet emerged.
For Takaichi, the Japan-U.S. relationship was not an ideology but a reality. The U.S. Congress she experienced firsthand in Washington in 1986 was not an abstract "ally." It was a space where real people worked, debated, and compromised. The view of the U.S. created by that experience was not mere pro-Americanism. Knowing the U.S., and knowing how to negotiate with the U.S. That was Takaichi's way of navigating Japan-U.S. relations in the Trump era.
References
- Japan-U.S. Summit Held: Investment Project Announced (JETRO): https://www.jetro.go.jp/biznews/2026/03/ab62054548af3a25.html - Prime Minister Takaichi, "Strongest Partner (最強の相棒)," Dinner hosted by President Trump (Nikkei): https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA200S20Q6A320C2000000/ - Japan-U.S. Summit and Dinner (Ministry of Foreign Affairs): https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/na/na1/us/pageit_000001_00014.html - PM Takaichi to Visit U.S., Struggling with Response to Trump (Bloomberg): https://www.bloomberg.com/jp/news/articles/2026-03-18/TBTQUGKJH6V400 - Prime Minister Takaichi's Political Origin: Served Under a Prominent Female Lawmaker in America (ANN): https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/088632c128a9d8ec0d30a1752705e1df50e397e9