6.1 Multi-alignment Strategy: Balancing the US (Quad) and Russia (BRICS)

On the evening of July 8, 2024, at the Novo-Ogaryovo presidential residence on the outskirts of Moscow, Narendra Modi—having secured his third consecutive term less than a month prior—stepped off his private plane. He was greeted by Vladimir Putin. Instead of a handshake, the two leaders opened their arms and shared a passionate embrace before the world's cameras. Western media dubbed it the 'Bear Hug.'

The timing was problematic. That very day, Russian missiles had struck the Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital in Kyiv, killing dozens of civilians. The following day, a summit celebrating the 75th anniversary of NATO was scheduled to begin in Washington. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky posted photos of the hospital ruins on social media, writing: "It is a huge disappointment and a devastating blow to peace efforts to see the leader of the world's largest democracy hug the world's most bloody criminal in Moscow on such a day."

Modi, however, appeared unperturbed. He spent over four hours in conversation with Putin, sipping chai on a terrace and touring the residence's stables in a golf cart. Choosing Moscow as his first overseas destination after taking office, instead of a traditional South Asian neighbor, was a break from convention. From a Western perspective, this scene bordered on betrayal, but for Modi, it was a thoroughly calculated grammar of power.

Why did he choose this specific time and place?

To find the answer, one must trace the trajectory of the 'Multi-alignment' diplomatic strategy designed by Modi.

In the past, during the era of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's diplomatic principle was 'Non-alignment.' It was a form of passive neutrality that declared, "I will not take anyone's side." India maintained this principle for some time even after the Cold War ended and the world reorganized into a US-centered unipolar system. Modi's strategy, however, is fundamentally different. He has chosen an offensive pragmatism that says, "I will stand on everyone's side to take only India's interests." In Korean terms, it is a clever social skill of staying friendly with all the neighborhood's powerful figures while taking only what is needed from each. The only difference is that the 'neighborhood' is the entire planet and the 'powerful figures' are superpowers armed with nuclear weapons.

The mechanism of this strategy is revealed in numbers. First, let's look at Russia. In 2021, before the war in Ukraine broke out, Russian oil accounted for only 2% of India's total crude oil imports. However, when the price of Russian crude plummeted by $15–20 per barrel below international market rates due to Western sanctions, the Modi government did not hesitate. By the 2024–25 fiscal year, Russia became India's largest supplier, accounting for approximately 40% of its crude oil imports. India surpassed China to solidify its position as the world's largest importer of Russian oil. This represents a nearly 50-fold surge compared to pre-war levels. Indian refiners processed this cheap crude into diesel and jet fuel and resold it to Europe, reaping massive profits. In December 2024, Reliance Industries even signed a long-term, 10-year supply agreement with the Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft for 500,000 barrels per day.

India's External Affairs Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, responded to Western criticism by saying, "Europe buys more Russian gas in one afternoon than India imports crude oil in a month." His remarks were met with great enthusiasm within India. The message that "We are not a satellite state of the US" stimulated the nationalistic pride of 1.4 billion Indians.

Yet, during the same period, Modi was receiving the highest level of treatment from the United States. During his state visit to Washington in June 2023, President Joe Biden invited Modi to a White House state dinner. He was also granted the rare honor of addressing a joint session of the US Congress. On this occasion, Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to address a joint session twice. The gifts were also impressive: agreements were announced for the transfer of technology for co-producing the advanced US fighter jet engine (GE F414), the acquisition of high-altitude drones (MQ-9B), and investments in India by the semiconductor company Micron.

Why did the United States tolerate Modi's move toward closer ties with Russia? The reason is clear: the giant variable that is China. In the US Indo-Pacific strategy, India, with its 1.4 billion people, is the only counterweight to check China. Modi exploited this point precisely. While actively participating in the Quad (US, Japan, Australia, India)—a four-nation security dialogue led by the US—he firmly rejected its transformation into a military alliance like NATO. From India's perspective, if the Quad were seen as an 'outpost for an anti-China blockade,' relations with China would deteriorate irreversibly. Instead, Modi utilized the Quad as a practical, functional grouping for maritime security, critical mineral supply chains, technology standards, and infrastructure cooperation. It was a way to maximize benefits while minimizing military burdens.

At the same time, Modi was an active core member of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), both led by Russia and China. When BRICS expanded in 2024 by admitting Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE, India used this platform as leverage to demand reform of the dollar-centered financial structure and increased representation for the Global South. However, he was wary of BRICS leaning toward an anti-Western block led by China. His attitude was: "I will sit at the same table as China, but I will not let it become China's table."

However, starting from the second half of 2023, unexpected discordant notes began to ring in this sophisticated balancing act.

In September 2023, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made a bombshell statement in Parliament. He revealed the existence of "credible allegations" that the Indian government was involved in the death of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Sikh separatist activist murdered in British Columbia in June of that year. India immediately denied the claim. Both countries expelled each other's diplomats, and India-Canada relations plummeted to their worst in decades.

The repercussions did not end there. In November 2024, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Nikhil Gupta, identified as an Indian government operative, for conspiring to assassinate Sikh separatist activist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun on American soil. The allegation that India, a US ally and democratic partner, attempted to assassinate a US citizen was a matter that shook the foundations of the relationship between the two countries. Although the Indian government announced that it had formed an internal investigation committee, the Western gaze turned cold. A deep blemish appeared on the image of a 'responsible democracy' that Modi had built on the international stage (see Chapter 3, 3.4).

To make matters worse, the second Trump administration, which took office in January 2025, presented a new testing ground for India. President Trump called India a "big abuser" of trade and took issue with its imports of Russian oil. Pressure through tariffs on Indian products began, and the US strongly demanded the opening of agricultural markets and the resolution of trade imbalances. The honeymoon period of India-US relations built during the Biden era entered a phase of recalibration.

The Modi government was not intimidated. It showed the audacity to push back against the US by playing the card of improving relations with China if necessary. India's diplomatic flexibility was closer to the dynamics of a seesaw, shifting weight to the other axis when one was shaken.

Modi's moves have many points that overlap with Korea's diplomatic dilemma. Korea also walks a tightrope between the security pillar of the ROK-US alliance and the reality of ROK-China economic relations. However, there is a decisive difference. While Korea worries about 'strategic ambiguity' while watching the moods of superpowers, Modi asserts 'strategic clarity' with the weapons of a 1.4 billion population and a giant market. "India is on the side of peace, and India's national interest is the top priority." There is no ambiguity in this sentence.

It is often said that power is strongest when it is not revealed. But Modi flipped that rule. He showcased power brilliantly on the world stage. The hug with Putin, the handshake with Biden, and the summit with Xi Jinping were all scenes in a play for the survival and rise of 1.4 billion Indians. For Modi, diplomacy is not a world of justifications. It is a thorough business, and multi-alignment was the final puzzle piece for India to join the ranks of the great powers.

How to avoid getting lost among the great powers. Modi is now showing the world his own solution. However, the diplomatic crisis with Canada and the US, and the tariff pressure of the second Trump administration, are the first cracks testing the durability of this solution. No one knows yet whether those cracks will turn into gold or be sealed.

6.2 G20 Presidency: Leader of the Global South

On the morning of September 9, 2023, inside the newly built Bharat Mandapam convention center at the Pragati Maidan complex in central New Delhi, Prime Minister Narendra Modi struck a golden gavel from the chair's seat. "We welcome the African Union as a permanent member of the G20." As the Chairperson of the African Union (AU), representing 55 countries, walked to the podium, Modi stood and gave him a warm embrace. Applause erupted in the hall.

It was a moment of dramatic expansion since the founding of the G20. Following the European Union (EU), it was the second regional organization to become a permanent member. The African continent, with its 1.3 billion people, officially gained a seat at the table of global economic governance. And the person who staged this historic scene was Modi.

One might ask: what is so special about holding the G20 presidency once? But for Modi, the 2023 G20 was more than just an international event. It was a political coronation that etched the narrative that "India is now the center of the world" into the hearts of 1.4 billion citizens. It was no coincidence that this occurred ahead of the 2024 general election.

By tracing how Modi designed this stage, the mechanism by which power feeds on images becomes clear.

First, Modi did not confine the G20 to the single city of New Delhi. By holding over 200 related meetings in 60 cities across India, he turned the entire country into a G20 exhibition hall. Under the name of 'Jan Bhagidari,' or 'People's Participation,' even students in rural villages were made to participate in G20 quiz competitions. According to an Indian government announcement, more than 70 million people were mobilized for these participation activities. Modi's declaration that "the G20 is not a feast for bureaucrats but belongs to all citizens" was essentially a political message saying, "This success is my success, and soon it will be your success."

Just as the 1988 Seoul Olympics instilled a sense of pride in Koreans that "we did it too," Modi sought a similar effect with the G20. The only difference was that the Olympics is a sports event, while the G20 is a diplomatic stage.

The notable leadership Modi showed at the G20 was his self-appointment as the spokesperson for the 'Global South.' Well before the G20 plenary session, in January 2023, Modi convened the 'Voice of Global South Summit' virtually, inviting leaders from more than 125 developing countries. "Your priorities are India's priorities." This single sentence resonated strongly with countries in Africa, South America, and Asia that were tired of a world order centered on great powers. In November 2024, by successfully hosting another G20 summit in a virtual format, he showed that his leadership as the chair was not a one-time event.

The Global South. This term may be somewhat unfamiliar to Korean readers. Simply put, it refers collectively to the rest of the world that does not belong to the G7 club of advanced nations, mainly developing countries in Asia, Africa, and South America. In terms of population, they are the overwhelming majority of the world, but they have long been alienated from the tables where the international order is designed. Modi stepped forward to represent the voices of this massive majority.

A representative achievement was the African Union's admission to the G20. In June 2023, Modi sent letters directly to the leaders of G20 member states, proposing the AU's permanent membership. The idea was to bring Africa's 55 countries into global economic discussions as a single voice. From India's perspective, this proposal was a move where several interests overlapped. By securing the support of African countries, India could gather the votes necessary for its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and establish a bridgehead to expand its influence in Africa against China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The management of the G20 summit itself was a scene where Modi's diplomatic skill shone. At the time, the G20 was in a situation where the adoption of a joint declaration was uncertain due to extreme confrontation between the West and Russia/China over the war in Ukraine. Agreements had already failed several times at preliminary meetings that year. Xi Jinping did not attend, and Putin did not come either. There was an atmosphere predicting failure even before the meeting began.

However, Modi engaged in fierce behind-the-scenes negotiations over the phrasing. Instead of the expression 'invasion of Russia' demanded by the West, he inserted the ambiguous phrase 'war in Ukraine' and proposed a compromise emphasizing the human suffering caused by war and the principle of territorial integrity. As a result, the 'New Delhi Leaders' Declaration' was issued, with all 83 clauses adopted unanimously. Covering a wide range of agendas such as growth, climate, energy, digital transformation, development finance, and support for small and medium-sized enterprises, this declaration was a diplomatic victory proving the capabilities of "India the Mediator."

Modi did not stop there. He wanted to make the G20 a platform for tangible results rather than just a talk shop. He launched the Global Biofuel Alliance to preempt the agenda of energy transition and successfully brokered the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). IMEC is a railway, port, energy, and data connectivity initiative connecting India through the UAE and Saudi Arabia to Europe, attracting attention as a Western alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative. The US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, EU, France, Germany, and Italy participated in the signing, and President Biden evaluated it as a "historic agreement." However, as the Gaza conflict that intensified after October 2023 shook the dynamics of the Middle East, substantial progress on IMEC has been slower than expected. It is as if reality caught up before the ink on the MOU had even dried.

Another noteworthy point was India's proposal to spread its Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) to the Global South. It planned to provide its national biometric identity system 'Aadhaar' and the 'UPI' unified payment system to other developing countries for free (see Chapter 4, 4.2–4.3). The message "Our technology will help your growth" was a strategic move to elevate India from a country that receives aid to one that provides solutions. It is a point that overlaps with Korea's experience of transitioning from an aid recipient to a donor country. However, India went one step further, revealing its ambition to spread its own technology model as a global standard.

Yet, behind this brilliant festival, the shadow of power was also dark. Slums along the routes used by the leaders were thoroughly hidden behind large screens. Thousands of street vendors were driven off the streets. To show a 'Shining India,' the lives of poor people had to be temporarily erased. Throughout the meeting venue, nameplates read 'Bharat,' the ancient Sanskrit name for the country, instead of 'India,' which was an expression of Modi's nationalistic will to erase British colonial legacy and assert the identity of a Hindu civilizational state (see Chapter 3, 3.2). Human Rights Watch urged G20 member states to "confront the backsliding of civil and political rights in India," but that voice was buried in the noise of the festival.

The compromise over the wording regarding Ukraine in the joint declaration was also controversial. Some in the West criticized it for "abandoning principles." But for Modi, what mattered was not a moral judgment. His goal was to demonstrate to the world the capability of the chair to lead an agreement. On this stage, Modi stood not as a moral judge but as a thorough seeker of pragmatism.

The success of the G20 was immediately converted into domestic political assets. Posters featuring Modi's face and the G20 logo covered the streets of India, and the ruling BJP campaigned that "India has returned as Vishwa Guru (Global Teacher)." One of Modi's strong political assets that led to his third consecutive term in the 2024 general election was this G20.

The title "Leader of the Global South" is not a position that can be earned through slogans alone. True leadership comes from the ability to translate the desperate problems of developing countries—such as development needs, debt burdens, climate finance, food prices, and the digital divide—into documents and systems of international conferences, and in the process, persuade or pressure developed countries. Modi demonstrated precisely that ability while serving as the G20 chair.

Of course, there are limits. Since India itself is a giant emerging and market-based economy, it cannot avoid the dual identity of being both a "spokesperson" and a "stakeholder." Conflict of interest exists even within the Global South. Coordinating between debtor and creditor nations, oil-producing and non-oil-producing nations, and nations that want to keep their distance from China versus those that want to be close cannot be solved with a single declaration.

Nonetheless, after the brilliant lights of Bharat Mandapam were turned off, one thing became clear: India is no longer a country that waits for orders from the West. Through the stage of the G20, Modi elevated India from a 'meeting operator' to an 'agenda designer.' He sought to prove that becoming the voice of those who had no voice is a sophisticated way for power to operate in the 21st century. There is still a long way to go before that proof is complete. But the first step has clearly been taken.

6.3 Indo-Pacific Strategy: Act East, Countering China

November 2014, Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. Standing at the Southeast Asian Summit, Narendra Modi threw out a single sentence: "India's 'Look East' policy will now become an 'Act East' policy." He had only changed 'look' to 'act,' but the atmosphere in the hall changed. For over 20 years, India had only been 'looking' at Southeast Asia. It was a declaration that it would now stop just watching and jump in. Why did Modi be so quick to change the label of foreign policy just six months after taking office?

To know the answer, one must first look at what was happening in the waters off India. China was moving. The giant net called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) proposed by Xi Jinping was slowly tightening around India. The port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, the port of Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, and the naval base in Djibouti. If you look at a map, these points form a screen surrounding India. Strategists called this the 'String of Pearls.' It was a beautiful name, but for India, it was closer to a noose tightening around its neck. Modi knew that if he just kept watching, he would suffocate.

The essence of Act East was not about getting closer to Southeast Asia. It was a geopolitical leap for India to find its place in the vast maritime space connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans beyond the fence of South Asia. Modi immediately took action. In 2018, he showed an unconventional move by inviting all the leaders of the 10 ASEAN countries to the Republic Day event. It was unprecedented in Indian history. The fact itself that Southeast Asian leaders walked side by side on New Delhi's Rajpath boulevard was a visual declaration that "India will no longer stay only in South Asia."

However, the decisive turning point in Modi's eastward move was not a conference room but a battlefield. In June 2020, Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Galwan Valley of the Himalayas (see Chapter 4, 4.5). For the first time since 1975, there were fatalities on both sides. In accordance with the convention of the border region where the use of firearms is prohibited, soldiers on both sides fought with iron pipes, spiked clubs, and stones. Twenty Indian soldiers were killed. This primitive battle, taking place in a cold, dark canyon over 4,000 meters above sea level, shattered an illusion for India: the belief that "if we cooperate economically with China, peace on the border will follow."

After Galwan, the Modi government's strategy toward China pivoted sharply from 'management' to 'containment.' Hundreds of Chinese apps, including TikTok, disappeared from the Indian market overnight. For Koreans, it would be a shock similar to blocking KakaoTalk and Naver at the same time. Government prior approval became mandatory for Chinese companies' investments in India, and the joining of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was also withdrawn at the last minute. It was judged that Chinese manufactured goods flooding in without tariff barriers would crush 'Make in India.' Modi established the principle externally that "there is no normal relationship without peace on the border" and internally cried for 'Atmanirbhar Bharat' (Self-reliant India) (see Chapter 4, 4.1). It was the moment when decoupling from China was set as a long-term national task.

At this point, the diplomatic card Modi pulled out was the Quad. It is a four-nation security dialogue framework with the US, Japan, and Australia. In the past, India had been passive toward the Quad in accordance with its tradition of non-alignment. However, before the blood of Galwan had even dried, Modi changed his position. He actively participated in the Quad summits and led practical cooperation in areas such as vaccine partnerships, new technology supply chains, and maritime domain awareness (MDA). In the Malabar maritime exercises, the navies of the four countries performed anti-submarine warfare and air defense operations together, building interoperability at a practical level.

Nonetheless, Modi drew an exquisite line. He showed clear reluctance for the Quad to develop into a military alliance like NATO. Much of India's defense weaponry was still Russian-made, and even after the war in Ukraine, India imported large quantities of Russian crude oil at a discounted price. When the West asked, "Whose side are you on?" Modi's answer was consistent: "We are on the side of peace." This is the substance of the 'Strategic Autonomy' that India speaks of. It checks China in the Quad, shakes hands with the non-Western camp in BRICS, buys cheap oil in Russia, and receives jet engine technology from the US. It means sitting at all tables but not being completely tied to any one side.

Meanwhile, in October 2024, unexpected signs of a thaw appeared. India and China reached a military disengagement agreement at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The tension on the Himalayan border, which had been in a stalemate for over four years, was lowered by one level. In the same month, at the BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, Modi and Xi Jinping had their first official bilateral meeting in five years. The two leaders confirmed the importance of border stability and agreed to restore communication channels in the diplomatic and security fields. It was the moment when the thread of sealing was sewn into a relationship stained with the blood of Galwan.

However, a new security crisis erupted on India's western border. In April 2025, a terrorist attack by armed groups occurred in Pahalgam, Kashmir. The Indian government defined it as the work of a Pakistan-based terrorist organization, and relations between the two countries rapidly chilled. The fact that the crisis with Pakistan escalated the moment tensions with China eased revealed the structural instability of Modi's multi-front diplomacy. It is a geopolitical dilemma where sealing one front opens another.

From Korea's perspective, Modi's Indo-Pacific strategy has direct interests at stake. Modi saw Korea as a key partner with the technology and know-how to replace Chinese manufacturing. Samsung Electronics building the world's largest smartphone factory in Noida and Hyundai Motor rising to second place in the Indian domestic market are part of a national design to place Korea as one axis of the supply chain to replace China—Modi's 'China Plus One' strategy (discussed in detail in Chapter 7, 7.3). The deployment of Korea's K-9 self-propelled howitzers on the Himalayan border under the name 'Vajra' (Thunderbolt) is also in the same context. For the Indian Army facing the Chinese military, Korea's technological prowess was a strategic asset.

But where there is light, there is also shadow. Modi promised Korean companies to "remove red tape and roll out the red carpet," but the reality is not that easy. While participating in the IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework), a US-led economic framework, India did not participate in trade negotiations. This means it intends to maintain high tariff barriers to protect its own market. The contradiction of India—luring companies with the promise of opening the market while not lowering the threshold—is the reality faced by Korean companies.

As a result, Modi's Indo-Pacific strategy has made India a 'swing state' in the US-China hegemony competition. It is about becoming an existence needed by both sides without tilting completely to either side. Managing tensions with China through a disengagement agreement while further strengthening strategic ties with the US through the Quad and the Artemis Accords. That is the survival method of 21st-century India designed by Modi. As that strategy accelerates, the invisible string connecting the Korean Peninsula and the Indian subcontinent will tighten even further.

6.4 Space Power: Chandrayaan-3 Moon Landing

At 6:04 PM (IST) on August 23, 2023, at the ISRO control center in Bengaluru, hundreds of scientists were staring at screens. India's lunar probe 'Chandrayaan-3' had begun its final descent toward the lunar surface. It was what the industry calls the '15 minutes of terror.' Reverse thrusting the engines to slow down, sensors reading the terrain, and software correcting the landing site in real time. Since it takes 1.3 seconds for a signal to reach from Earth, at this moment, the machine must judge for itself. Just a few days prior, Russia's Luna-25 had lost control at this stage and crashed into the lunar surface. Could India pass the gateway that even the space power Russia had failed at?

The altitude reading of the lander 'Vikram' decreased. 100 meters, 50 meters, 10 meters. And then 0. When the phrase "India is on the Moon" appeared on the screen, the control center was overturned with cheers. Female scientists wearing sarees with bindis on their foreheads hugged each other. Prime Minister Modi, who was attending the BRICS summit in South Africa, waved the Indian flag in front of a video screen. "This is a victory for India and a victory for all of humanity."

India became the fourth country to succeed in a moon landing, following the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. More importantly, India was the first to set foot near the Moon's South Pole, where no one in human history had ever landed before.

There is a reason why this success was even more dramatic: the failure four years prior. In 2019, Chandrayaan-2 lost communication just before landing and crashed into the lunar surface. When ISRO Chairman K. Sivan broke down in tears of despair, a scene of Prime Minister Modi hugging and comforting him, saying "There are ups and downs in life," was broadcast live. All of India wept with that hug. The success of Chandrayaan-3 was the answer to those tears. ISRO analyzed the failure data of Chandrayaan-2 line by line. They reinforced the lander's legs, increased fuel, and completely redesigned the landing algorithm. They applied 'Failure-based Design,' simulating all failure scenarios. Failure became the blueprint for success.

What the world noticed was not just the landing itself. It was the cost. The budget invested in Chandrayaan-3 was about $75 million, which is approximately 100 billion Korean won. It means they went to the moon with less money than the production cost of the Hollywood movie 'Interstellar' ($165 million). How was this possible?

In India, there is a word called 'Jugaad.' It means the wisdom of improvisation to solve problems by making the most of what you have in a state of lacking. Translated into Korean, it would be something like 'if you don't have it, you make do without it.' This spirit was also melted into Chandrayaan-3. Instead of flying straight to the moon with a high-power rocket like NASA, India chose the 'Slingshot' method of circling the Earth's orbit and using gravity to increase speed. Thanks to this, fuel was dramatically saved, but it took more than 40 days to reach the moon. A slow but cheap, and cheap but accurate path. The survival sense of a boy who learned how to save every penny while selling chai seems to have permeated the nation's space engineering (see Chapter 1, 1.1).

In fact, India's space story begins much further back than Chandrayaan. In the 1960s, India was a country struggling with poverty and hunger. Criticism poured in, asking "What kind of space when we can't even eat?" However, the thoughts of Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, the 'father of Indian space development,' were different. To deliver weather information to hundreds of millions of people scattered across a vast territory, forecast disasters, and send educational broadcasts to schools in remote areas, artificial satellites were absolutely necessary. Space technology was not a luxury but a tool for survival. Early ISRO scientists carried rocket parts on the back of bicycles to the launch pad and transported satellite nose cones on bullock carts. They even borrowed a church building to use as a control center. The 'hungry spirit' of those days is still engraved in ISRO's DNA 60 years later.

Prime Minister Modi built a new layer on top of this legacy. He opened the doors of the space industry, which had been monopolized by the state, to the private sector. In 2020, he established 'IN-SPACe,' a private space promotion agency, to allow startups to utilize ISRO's facilities and data. Skyroot launched India's first private rocket, and Agnikul began manufacturing rocket engines with 3D printing. Modi declared that he had "unshackled the space sector." What he dreamed of was the birth of an Indian version of SpaceX.

Targeting the lunar South Pole was itself a strategic calculation. There are many permanently shadowed regions at the lunar South Pole, so there is a high possibility that water exists in the form of ice. Water can not only become drinking water but, if electrolyzed, oxygen and hydrogen can be obtained. Hydrogen is rocket fuel. If a lunar base is built in the future and we move from there to Mars, the lunar South Pole could be a place that becomes a 'space gas station.' This is why both the US's Artemis program and China's Chang'e program are targeting the lunar South Pole. By reaching there first, India secured its own stake in the resource competition for the lunar South Pole, which does not belong to anyone yet.

In June 2023, India signed the US-led Artemis Accords. It became the 27th signatory. This agreement is a multilateral framework that stipulates the principles of space exploration, such as the moon and Mars, and was essentially a strategic choice to join the US space order. In a situation where China and Russia are pursuing a separate International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) project, India planting its flag on the Artemis side clearly established one axis of 'multi-alignment' in space as well. It is the same logic as shown in the Quad. A two-pronged strategy to share technology with the US while not giving up its own capabilities.

Modi named the landing site 'Shiv Shakti.' It is a combination of Shiva, the Hindu god of creation and destruction, and Shakti, which means cosmic energy. The crash site of Chandrayaan-2, which fell in 2019, was named 'Tiranga' (the Indian tricolor flag). He put the name of the national flag on the site of failure and the name of a god on the site of success. Modi's narrative strategy of putting civilization over science and identity over technology was working even in space (see Chapter 3, 3.2).

The achievements that poured out after Chandrayaan-3 should also be noted. The solar observation satellite 'Aditya-L1,' launched in September 2023, successfully settled at the Lagrange L1 point in January 2024. This point, about 1.5 million kilometers from Earth, is the gravitational balance point between the sun and Earth, a position where a satellite can constantly observe the sun with minimal fuel. India stepped into the frontier of solar observation following the lunar South Pole.

The next goal is the manned project 'Gaganyaan' (Celestial Vehicle), which will launch Indian astronauts in an indigenous spacecraft. In February 2024, an unmanned test flight (TV-D1) was successfully completed. It confirmed that the crew escape system and the spacecraft module were operating normally. The target timing for the manned flight has been reset to 2026. If successful, India will become the fourth country to independently put an astronaut into orbit, following the US, Russia, and China. A long-term roadmap was also announced to build an independent space station by 2035 and send an Indian to the moon by 2040.

To Korean readers, this story gives a strange resonance. Korea is also a country that proved its independent space launch capability by launching the Nuri rocket. What possibilities would open up if India's low-cost, high-efficiency launch technology and Korea's sophisticated electronic and communication technology were combined? In fact, both countries are discussing lunar exploration data sharing and space cooperation. The fact that both countries are signatories to the Artemis Accords means that the institutional foundation for cooperation in future lunar exploration is already in place.

The country that used to carry satellites on bullock carts has left the first human footprint in the dark and cold place of the moon, launched an observatory toward the sun, and completed test flights of a manned spacecraft. That journey is not the achievement of Modi personally. The dreams of scientists who ran with rocket parts on bicycles 60 years ago have settled on the dust of the lunar South Pole 380,000 kilometers away through the fingertips of tens of thousands of engineers. And now that trajectory is stretching beyond the moon. How far can this country go? The answer has not been written yet.