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[AI Library] Chapter 24: The Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Crisis — The Diplomatic Costs of a Hardline Conservative
Beyond the Glass Ceiling
Part 5: Power — Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae
Chapter 24: The Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Crisis — The Diplomatic Costs of a Hardline Conservative
Kim Kyung-jin
The morning of November 7, 2025, at the National Diet Building in Tokyo.
The lighting in the House of Representatives Budget Committee Room is always bright. No one has to squint here. The faces of the opposition members, the Prime Minister at the witness stand, the reporters in the gallery—everything is seen with crystalline clarity. It is not just about what is seen; every single word spoken is vividly recorded.
A member of the opposition Democratic Party stood up. Placing a set of prepared documents on the table, the lawmaker turned toward Prime Minister Takaichi and asked, "Prime Minister, how will Japan respond if China takes military action against Taiwan? Is there a possibility that this would constitute a 'situation to threaten Japan’s survival' (存立危機事態), thereby allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense?"
Takaichi answered. She bypassed the usual procedure of scanning her prepared briefing materials. It was an impromptu response.
"If China were to attack Taiwan by using warships to exercise force, I believe that would be a case that, by any measure, could be considered a situation to threaten Japan’s survival."
The room fell silent. Cameras moved rapidly. Takaichi continued speaking. Both she herself and the reporters in the gallery—and even the embassy staff of various countries in Tokyo watching the live broadcast—instantly grasped the weight of those words.
What exactly is a 'situation to threaten Japan’s survival'? It is a concept created in 2015 when the Abe administration revised the security legislation. It stipulates that even if Japan is not directly attacked, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) can retaliate if a country with which Japan has close ties is attacked and it is judged that Japan's own survival is threatened. It is the Japanese expression for the right of collective self-defense.
Applying this to a Taiwan contingency meant that if China attacked Taiwan, the Japanese SDF could take military action. This was the core of Takaichi's statement. It was an off-the-cuff remark not found in her briefing notes. Later, Takaichi was reported to have confessed to her inner circle, "I might have let my words get ahead of me."
International media, including Bloomberg, reported the news immediately. "Japan's Prime Minister Hints at Military Response in Event of Chinese Attack on Taiwan." It took less than a few hours for this headline to reach Beijing.
China's reaction was instantaneous and intense.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson used forceful language during a press conference. "This is a serious violation of the One China principle." "It is an interference in internal affairs." "The Japanese leader must not forget historical lessons." Dozens of related statements were posted on the Foreign Ministry's website.
State-run media outlets stepped in: the People's Daily, the Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao). Articles targeting Takaichi poured out day after day. "A revival of militarism." "A dangerous provocation." "An act that destroys Sino-Japanese relations." The media is the voice of the Chinese Communist Party, and when that voice unleashes words of this intensity, it is a signal that instructions have come from the very top.
It did not stop there. Economic sanctions followed. China's Ministry of Culture and Tourism issued instructions to major travel agencies to reduce the number of tourists traveling to Japan to 60% of previous levels. Chinese tourists were a major source of revenue for the Japanese tourism industry. This measure alone dealt a blow of hundreds of billions of won to the industry.
Furthermore, restrictions on the import of Japanese seafood were tightened. The measures taken after the discharge of treated water from Fukushima were maintained even more strictly. There were also reports of intensified customs inspections for products from specific Japanese companies.
There were also threats against individual diplomats. Reports reached Tokyo that Japanese diplomats stationed in Beijing had been contacted by the Chinese side in a coercive atmosphere. It was informal pressure outside of official protest channels.
Why, then, did China react so strongly?
One analysis is as follows: Takaichi's remarks themselves were not entirely new. Among Japanese security experts, the phrase "A Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency" had been used for a long time. Former Prime Minister Abe had made similar remarks in the past. However, at that time, the Prime Minister had not spoken so clearly in an official setting. Takaichi, as Prime Minister, said it officially in the National Diet.
The fact that a Japanese Prime Minister suggested the possibility of military action during a Taiwan contingency by using the expression "by any measure, a situation to threaten Japan's survival" in parliament was a signal to China that "Japan has crossed the line." Ironically, some analysts suggested that Takaichi had "showed her hand" to the enemy. In military strategy, disclosing in advance under what conditions and how one will act is a double-edged sword.
There is another analysis involving China's internal situation. Economic stagnation, the bursting of the real estate bubble, high youth unemployment, local government debt crises, and military purges. A leader facing internal difficulties has reasons to create an external enemy. The analysis was that the Xi Jinping administration sought to use Takaichi's remarks to unify domestic public opinion. A Bloomberg column evaluated, "China overreacted, effectively helping Prime Minister Takaichi execute her policies."
The Yasukuni Shrine issue became entangled in this.
Prior to taking office, Takaichi had consistently visited Yasukuni Shrine. Yasukuni is a shrine that honors Japan's war dead. The problem is that Class-A war criminals are also enshrined there. South Korea and China strongly protest a Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni because they view it as the Prime Minister worshiping the war criminals who killed victims of war.
Immediately after taking office, Takaichi made a calculation. Visiting Yasukuni right away would have had too great a diplomatic impact. APEC, a summit with Trump, and summits with South Korea and China were scheduled. Therefore, she postponed the visit. She also skipped the visit during the Autumn Festival. Instead, she only paid the ritual offering fee (Tamakushi-ryo, 玉串料). It was a compromise: "I did not visit, but I maintain my faith."
For China, even that was enough fodder for anger. Although she did not actually visit, Takaichi's past record of visits and the fact that she paid the offering even after becoming Prime Minister were continuously cited in Chinese media. Combined with the Taiwan remarks and the Yasukuni history, a Chinese narrative was constructed: "Takaichi is a militarist who denies history."
What happened to Sino-Japanese relations after November 2025?
Direct diplomatic channels were maintained. Telephone conversations between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya continued. It was not a complete rupture. However, the atmosphere grew icy.
Economic relations were complex. China is Japan's largest trading partner. If both countries were to truly engage in economic decoupling, both would suffer a significant blow. Thus, a dual state emerged where economic ties were maintained to some extent while political conflict persisted.
Moving into 2026, the situation began to change slightly. The Chinese side sent signals that they were lowering the intensity. On one hand, there was the reality of China's economic difficulties, and on the other, the calculation that completely destroying relations with Japan amid US-China tensions was not in China's interest.
Japan's Toyo Keizai (Oriental Economist) analyzed it this way: "China's overreaction actually helped Prime Minister Takaichi execute her policies. Thanks to China's hardline response, vigilance against China increased within Japan, and public support for increasing defense spending and strengthening security actually rose."
There is a paradox. Takaichi's impromptu remarks sparked a diplomatic crisis. That crisis led to China's hardline response. That hardline response boosted Takaichi's support within Japan.
A diplomatic mistake was converted into a domestic political gain. Whether this was intended remains unknown. Takaichi never said, "I expected things to turn out this way after my remarks." She was likely surprised herself by the repercussions of her off-the-cuff comment.
However, as a result, Takaichi solidified her image as a "strong Prime Minister" in the midst of this crisis. She does not yield no matter how much China pressures her. She sticks to her principles on historical perception and security issues. This was the picture seen by Takaichi's supporters.
Critics saw it differently. It was an unnecessary provocation. It increased economic damage. It added diplomatic complexity. It also placed a burden on South Korea and the United States.
The diplomatic costs of a hardline conservative. This is the title of this chapter. Exactly how much that cost is is still being calculated. We must wait and see how the future of Sino-Japanese relations unfolds during and after Takaichi's term. What is clear is that Takaichi's remarks once again demonstrated how difficult it is to walk through the minefield of the Taiwan Strait.
References
- Remarks on the Taiwan Contingency by Sanae Takaichi [高市早苗による台湾有事発言] Wikipedia: https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%AB%98%E5%B8%82%E6%97%A9%E8%8B%97%E3%81%AB%E3%82%88%E3%82%8B%E5%8F%B0%E6%B9%BE%E6%9C%89%E4%BA%8B%E7%99%BA%E8%A8%80 - [Detailed Report] Discussion on the Taiwan Contingency and Situations Threatening Survival [【詳報】台湾有事と存立危機事態を巡るやりとり] (Jiji Press): https://www.jiji.com/jc/v8?id=20251107yosan - Did Prime Minister Takaichi's Taiwan Remarks push back China's Taiwan invasion plan? (Fact Check) [高市首相の台湾有事]: https://www.factcheckcenter.jp/fact-check/politics/takaichi-taiwan-remarks-and-china-plan/ - [Column] China Overplayed Its Hand, Aiding Prime Minister Takaichi's Policy Execution [【コラム】やり過ぎた中国, 高市首相]: https://www.bloomberg.com/jp/news/articles/2025-11-19/T5XWKIT96OSK00 - Deteriorating Sino-Japanese Relations and the Perspective Japan Needs Now (Jiji Press): https://www.jiji.com/jc/v8?id=202601jpnchn
The lesson left by the Sino-Japanese diplomatic crisis is clear. When a hardline conservative leader speaks on the diplomatic stage, the repercussions spread much further than calculated. Takaichi's impromptu remarks unintentionally triggered a diplomatic crisis with China, but at the same time, they solidified her image as a "Prime Minister who does not waver on principles" within Japan.
The relationship with China is a space where two realities—economic interdependence and security competition—clash. Japan's exports to China account for about 20% of its total exports. China is Japan's largest trading partner. Yet, at the same time, China is in a territorial dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese) and is increasing military tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Managing these two realities simultaneously is the homework of every Japanese Prime Minister.
In this tightrope act, Takaichi sent a signal that she prioritizes security over the economy. The short-term costs brought by this—the decrease in Chinese tourists, diplomatic tension—certainly existed. However, whether these remarks contributed to strengthening Japan's deterrence in the long run or amplified unnecessary conflict is for history to judge.